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 The price variable is among the most powerful instruments in the arsenal of the 
executives to achieve entry deterrence objectives. There are two main pricing strategies 
that firms may use to defend against a competitive market entry. The first of these 
options, limit pricing (or entry deterring price), may be utilized prior to competitive entry. 
The second option, aggressive (predatory) pricing, may be executed post-entry. The 
effectiveness of both of these options is still controversial. For example, the Chicago 
School proponents argue that these strategies are anecdotal in nature. On the other hand, 
the rationality of such conduct has been reliably simulated by Post-Chicagoans in game 
theoretic settings. The potential contributions of the marketing discipline have been 
recognized and called upon to help resolve the conflict.  
 With this dissertation, I attempt to shed light on the role that price plays in 
preemptive and post-entry market defense of firms. As such, the questions tackled 
include but are not limited to: how effective is price as an entry-deterrence tool; in 
conjunction with firm and market specific barriers to entry; and as a post-entry retaliation 
mechanism? What are the facilitating conditions for limit, aggressive (predatory), 
competitive and supra-competitive pricing? What are the (long-term) consequences of 
these strategies? Following a multi-disciplinary literature review, I present a dynamic 
process model and test my hypotheses in a key network industry – the airline industry. 
Building upon the advantages of multiple methods a la triangulation, I find that both limit 
pricing and predatory pricing can serve as effective strategies for the incumbents’ market 
defense. Predatory use of pricing in network industries may diminish consumer welfare. 
 xiv
Results also suggest that firm specific barriers have a more significant role in market 
defense than market specific barriers. Insights and frameworks based on the marketing 
philosophy are also presented with the hope of advancing the ongoing debate between the 








 The contemporary competitive process resembles military campaigns. Firms need 
to advance and protect their strategic positions often at great cost. Conflict with too many 
competitors quickly diminishes the scarce resources and depresses the viability of firms. 
Resource advantages need to be fortified, exploited, and enhanced before competition can 
emulate (cf. Barney 1992). Therefore, the attention to market defense mechanisms has 
been increasing (Kuester et al. 1999), and managers consider market entry deterrence to 
be a major strategic issue (Smiley 1988). Scholars from economics, industrial 
organization, and marketing have acknowledged the important managerial and public 
policy implications of market defense and provided guidance for this problem (e.g., Bain 
1956; Gatignon et al. 1989; Gruca et al. 1992; Han et al. 2001; Kuester et al. 1999; 
Milgrom and Roberts 1982a; Ramaswamy et al. 1994; Sullivan 1977).  
A firm may retaliate to competitive market entry with several options such as 
increased promotional spending (to consumers or trade members), new product launch 
and price reductions, simultaneously or otherwise. There is evidence that as the number 
of the marketing mix instruments used (breadth of reaction) increases, market defense 
becomes less successful (Gatignon et al. 1997). The most common reaction pattern is 
reaction by a single variable (Robinson et al. 1988). The price variable is among the most 
powerful weapons in the arsenal of the executives to achieve entry deterrence objectives. 
It is inherently flexible, can be modified quickly, and is directly associated with 
profitability. In one survey, pricing was deemed to be “extremely important” by seventy-
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eight per cent of the respondents and ranked third among fifteen key marketing issues (cf. 
Srinivasan et al. 2000). Chen and McMillan (1992) reported that the likelihood of 
competitive response is higher, the response delay is shorter, and the likelihood of a 
matching response is higher for price cuts than they are for other competitive actions. 
Incumbent firms often reduce price when they encounter new market entry (Calantone 
and di Benedetto 1990).   
 There are two main pricing strategies that firms may use to defend against a 
competitive market entry (LeBlanc 1992). The first of these options, limit pricing (or 
entry deterring price (Porter 1980)), may be utilized prior to competitive entry. The 
second option, predatory (aggressive) pricing, may be executed post-entry. The 
effectiveness of both of these options is still controversial. The Chicago School 
proponents argue that they are “more anecdotal than actual” (Gilbert 1989, p.125) or an 
outright myth (DiLorenzo 1992; Koller 1971; Lott 1999). This has been the basis that 
Federal courts have used for not attributing much credit to unfair pricing claims for the 
past three decades. On the other hand, the Post-Chicagoans approach the same facts with 
different assumptions (e.g., information asymmetry) and deem the same set of options 
rational, alive and well (Jung et al. 1994).1 Lively debates between Chicago and Post-
Chicago scholars continue (e.g., Edlin 2002; Edwards 2002; Elhauge 2003; ten Kate and 
Niels 2002).  
                                                 
1 Price competition is the core element of free markets. Even though it has become much 
more complicated during the past two decades, it still remains the variable that is the least under 
the control of the firm under (perfectly) competitive market conditions. However, when the 
marketplace is not competitive the reverse becomes true and one or few firms may enjoy the 
benefits of controlling the going price in a market through the use of their market power. 
Ironically, drastic price cuts and price wars that are ingredients for healthy competition are also 
associated with unfair competitive conduct (Gundlach and Guiltinan 1998). The abuse of market 
power in terms of price manipulation is considered illegal and is subject to antitrust sanctions.  
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The disciplines of economics, law, public policy, and more recently strategic 
management have been heavily involved in this stalemate debate between Chicago and 
Post-Chicago proponents as to how intense (if any) should the antitrust sanctions be. The 
potential contributions of the marketing discipline have been recognized and been called 
upon to help resolve the conflict (e.g., Bloom and Gundlach 2001b; Grewal and Compeau 
1999; Guiltinan and Gundlach 1996b; Gundlach 1995; Helgeson and Gorger 2003; Ursic 
and Helgeson 1994). Foer (2002, p.227) suggested that marketing and strategic 
management could serve as “the third leg that gives the antitrust stool stability.” 
With this dissertation, I attempt to shed light on the role that price plays in pre-
entry and post-entry market defense of firms. As such, the questions I tackle include but 
are not limited to: 1. how effective is sole price as an entry-deterring tool; in conjunction 
with other barriers to entry; and as a post-entry retaliation mechanism? 2. What are the 
facilitating conditions for limit and predatory (aggressive) pricing? 3. What are the long 
term consequences of these strategies? After a thorough multi-disciplinary literature 
review, I develop a process model and test my hypotheses using multiple methods. Logit 
analysis enables me to examine different pricing strategies, market entry and exit as 
dependent variables. Event-history analysis enables me to consider the conditions that 
lead to or delay market exits. Finally, multi-level mixed coefficients modeling 
(hierarchical linear modeling) allows me to go beyond the framework, take the nested 
nature of the data into account, and illuminate the role that different types of barriers play 
for entry deterrence. Building upon the advantages of these methods a la triangulation, I 
attempt to contribute to the debate between Chicago and Post-Chicago Schools of 
thought, and provide empirical ammunition towards this objective.  
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The remainder of this dissertation is as follows: In Chapter 2, I undertake a 
literature review of the relevant theoretical base and develop a conceptual understanding. 
In Chapter 3, I review and synthesize the literature on predatory pricing from a multi-
disciplinary perspective. The in-depth discussion of predatory pricing here leads to the 
development of a network price competition framework i.e., Chapter 4 where I introduce 
network industries and develop and present my hypotheses. In Chapter 5, I discuss the 
context for my network data --the airline industry, in detail. Chapter 6 presents a review 
of the methods and measures I intend to use.  In Chapter 7, I analyze the data, present, 
and discuss the results. In Chapter 8, I conclude with limitations and future research 




THEORETICAL BASES AND CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING 
 
  
 The relevance of competitive signaling, resource advantage theory, game theory, 
and marketing/strategy literature for building a market defense framework is reviewed in 
this chapter.  
 
2.1 Competitive Signaling 
 Signaling theory serves as an important foundation to understand limit and 
predatory pricing because both represent (potentially) costly signals to potential and 
actual entrants. Limit pricing may signal that the cost structure of the incumbent is low 
and/or is willing to protect the market through sacrifice, whereas predatory pricing may 
indicate both a low cost structure for the incumbent and/or that the incumbent has deep 
pockets and is willing to fend off an entrant at all costs (LeBlanc 1992). Similarly, all 
price modifications can convey competitive signals, depending on the amount, timing, 
and the context. Distinguishing among temporary, evolving and structural changes in 
prices is important because they are likely to produce different results (Srinivasan et al. 
2000). Facing a price cut, an incumbent firm may choose to accommodate, to defend 
market share or to counter-attack with deeper discounts. The assumption on the degree of 
(imperfect) information is key in distinguishing Post-Chicago from the Chicago School 
of thought (Lande 1993).   
 A market signal is an action that conveys indications of intentions, motives, goals 
or abilities (Porter 1980). Signals can be directed at customers, channel members, 
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competitors or other stakeholders (Prabhu and Stewart 2000). Firms usually infer 
meaning from the signals and decide on their competitive responses. The same signal can 
gain different meanings depending on the interpretation of the message. Characteristics of 
the signal (i.e., clarity, consistency, and aggressiveness) are considered by the receivers 
(Heil and Robertson 1991). For example, a price increase can be interpreted as a response 
to market demand or a weakness on the sender’s side (Heil and Walters 1993; Prabhu and 
Stewart 2000). Moore (1992) found that managers’ beliefs about the nature of the signal 
affected the nature of their responses. If the particular signal was perceived to be 
cooperative, the managers were more likely to cooperate and not to retaliate.  
Signaling can render predation rational when there is imperfect information 
(Hilke and Nelson 1987; Kreps and Wilson 1982; Milgrom and Roberts 1982a; Milgrom 
and Roberts 1982b). In many markets, the incumbent is more informed about the 
characteristics and conditions (e.g., demand, technology, production) of the market than 
the new entrant. The utilization of the asymmetry of information can be predatory if the 
incumbent influences the belief and expectations of a rival in a way to alter its decision 
regarding entry, exit, price and output levels. This may especially be the case, if the prey 
is more efficient than the predator but still decides not to enter a market as a result of 
signaling, signal jamming, or reputation (Gundlach 1995). It was also suggested that 
when competitive intelligence is not reliable, managers have incentives to overreact when 
they face competitive actions (Leeflang and Wittink 1996). 
 
Signal Jamming: Signal jamming refers to the unobservability of a sender’s actions 
regarding key variables such as cost. A dominant firm might send signals to current and 
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prospective rivals that its costs are low and the chances for profitable entry are dim 
(Milgrom and Roberts 1990). For example, a competitor may alternate its marketing 
variables (e.g., sales promotions) to steal the short term demand for a potential entrant’s 
product when they are conducting market tests (Gundlach 1995). The potential entrant 
may not realize the ploy and decide not to launch the product. False/pre-mature product 
announcements (i.e., vaporware) can mislead competitors, potential entrants, and buyers 
in their decisions (Bayus et al. 2001; Eliashberg and Robertson 1988; Robertson et al. 
1995). Thus, signal jamming may result in an exit, a decision to not enter, or have other 
anti-competitive effects (Fudenberg and Tirole 1986; Grout 2000). 
 
Reputation: As will be detailed in a later section, repeated interaction between firms 
facilitates the formation of perceptions and beliefs of competitors. A hostile reputation 
can be an asset for the firm in the long run (Weigelt and Camerer 1988). A reputation for 
predation can deter entrants as well as potential investors of competitors. Burns (1986) 
showed that alleged predation depressed the acquisition cost of the victims and others 
through reputation. 
Case in point: The Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a suit against the Airline Tariff 
Publishing Company (ATP) in 1992. DOJ argued that the carriers were able to negotiate 
and agree on prices by signaling them through the ATP computer reservation system for a 
future date. Another charge was that carriers were able to negotiate the elimination of 
discounted tickets via signaling within the system. The case was settled in 1994 after the 
airlines agreed to restrictions in using the system (1994b). 
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2.2 Resource Advantage (R-A) Theory 
Nonetheless, as an evolutionary, process view of competition, R-A theory 
provides a viable starting point from which to debate antitrust issues. It 
also provides public policy researchers with many potentially fruitful 
avenues for empirical investigation (Hunt and Arnett 2001 p. 23-24) 
 
R-A theory is a dynamic, process theory of competition developed by Shelby D. 
Hunt and Robert M. Morgan. It has been developed through more than a dozen articles 
over time (e.g., Hunt and Morgan 1995; Hunt and Morgan 1996) and is detailed in two 
books (Hunt 2000; Hunt 2002). It draws from evolutionary economics, Austrian 
economics, heterogeneous demand theory, differential advantage theory, historical 
tradition, industrial-organization economies, resource-based tradition, competence based 
tradition, institutional economics, transaction cost economies, and economic sociology 
(Hunt 2000). Table 2.1 provides a summary of characteristics that R-A synthesis shares 
with other theory. 
 
Table 2.1: The Pedigree of Resource Advantage Theory 
Research Tradition Representative Works Affinities with R-A Theory 
Evolutionary Economics (Marshall 1890) 
(Schumpeter 1934; 1950) 
(Alchian 1950) 
(Nelson and Winter 1982) 
(Langlois 1986) (Dosi et al. 1988) 
(Witt 1992) (Foss 1993) 
(Hodgson 1993) 
Competition is an evolutionary, 
disequilibrating process. Firms 
have heterogeneous competences. 
Path Dependencies can occur.  
Austrian Economics (Mises 1920; 1949) 
(Hayek 1935; 1948) 
(Rothbard 1962) 
(Kirzner 1979; 1982) 
(Lachmann 1986) 
Competition is a knowledge-
discovery process. Markets are in 
disequilibrium. Entrepreneurship 
is important. Value is subjective. 
Intangibles can be resources. 
Heterogeneous Demand Theory (Chamberlin 1933) 
(Smith 1956) 
(Alderson 1957; 1965) 
(McCarthy 1960) (Myers 1996) 
Intra-industry demand is 
substantially heterogeneous. 
Heterogeneous supply is natural. 
“Product” should be defined 
broadly. 
Differential Advantage Theory (Clark 1954; 1961) 
(Alderson 1957; 1965) 
Competition (a) is dynamic, (b) is 
both initiatory and defensive, and 
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 (c) involves a struggle for 
advantages. General equilibrium 
is an inappropriate welfare ideal. 
Historical Tradition (North 1981; 1990) 
(Chandler 1990) 
(Landes 1998) 
History “counts.” Firms are 
entities that are historically 
situated in space and time. 





(Bain 1954; 1956) 
(Porter 1980; 1985) 
 
Firm’s objective is superior 
financial performance. Market 
place positions determine relative 
performance. Competitors, 
suppliers, and customers 
influence performance. 
Resource-based Tradition (Penrose 1959) 
(Lippman and Rumelt 1982) 
(Rumelt 1984) 
(Wernerfelt 1984a) 
(Dierickx and Cool 1989) 
(Barney 1986; 1992) 
(Conner 1991) (Grant 1991) 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) 
Resources may be tangible or 
intangible. Firms are historically 
situated combiners of 
heterogeneous, imperfectly 
mobile resources. Firms are 
constrained by a network of 
resource inter-dependencies with 
other entities. 
Competence-based Tradition (Selznick 1957) (Andrews 1971) 
(Hofer and Schendel 1978) 
(Hamel and Prahalad 1989; 
1994a; 1994b) 
(Prahalad and Hamel 1990; 1993) 
(Teece and Pisano 1994) 
(Day and Nedungadi 1994) 
(Aaker 1995) (Sanchez et al. 
1996) (Heene and Sanchez 1996) 
(Sanchez and Heene 1997) 
(Christensen 1997; Christensen 
and Bower 1996) 
Competition is disequilibrating. 
Competences are resources. 
Renewal competences prompt 
proactive innovation. Firms learn 
from competing. Firms are 
embedded.  
Institutional Economics (Veblen 1899; 1904) 
(Commons 1924; 1934) 
(Hamilton 1932) (Kapp 1976) 
(Neale 1987) (Mayhew 1987)  
(DeGregori 1987) 
(Ranson 1987) (Hodgson 1994) 
Competition is disequilibriating. 
“Capital” is more than just 
physical resources. Resources 
have “capabilities.”  
Transaction Cost Economies (Coase 1937) 
(Williamson 1975; 1985; 1996) 
Opportunism occurs. Many 
resources are firm specific. Firm-
specific resources are important. 
Economic Sociology (Parsons and Smelser 1956) 
(Granovetter 1985; 1994) 
(Etzioni 1988) (Coleman 1990) 
(Zukin and DiMaggio 1990) 
(Powell and Smith-Doerr 1994) 
(Smelster and Richard 1994) 
(Scott 1995) (Uzzi 1996) 
(Fligstein 1996) 
Institutions can be independent 
variables. Social relations may be 







 Drawing from the above theory, Hunt and Morgan (1997) present the 
foundational premises of R-A Theory as follows: 
 
1. Demand is heterogeneous across industries, heterogeneous within industries 
and dynamic. 
 2. Consumer information is imperfect and costly. 
 3. Human motivation is constrained self-interest seeking. 
 4. The firm’s objective is superior financial performance. 
 5. The firm’s information is imperfect and costly. 
 6. The firm’s resources are financial, physical, legal, human, organizational,  
informational, and relational. 
 7. Resource characteristics are heterogeneous and imperfectly mobile. 
 8. The role of management is to recognize, understand, create, select, implement, 
 and modify strategies. 
 9. Competitive dynamics are disequilibrium provoking; innovation is endogenous. 
 
Of particular interest for my purposes, Hunt and Arnett (2001) argue that R-A is 
the remedy for the current antitrust stagnation. For example, they argue that a market 
based advantage that stems from a contractual agreement that exclusively ties a 
distributor is anticompetitive if the distributor is coerced into the agreement through the 
bundling of a complementary product. In this case, the market advantage does not 
necessarily come from a relational resource but through market power. They argue that 
the focus on neo-classical theory and equilibrium economics has limited the exposure to 
outside ideas in antitrust. The focus of Chicago School of antitrust has been solely 
economic efficiency (as opposed to social welfare), which cannot be sustained through 
the analysis of the static supply and demand curves which actually do not exist, and thus 
cannot be calculated (Hunt and Arnett 2001).  
R-A is a dynamic theory that also focuses on market segments, comparative and 
competitive advantage/disadvantages and enables useful insight for framework 
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development (Hunt and Arnett 2001). It encompasses a wide body of theories (e.g., 
resource-based view (Barney 1986; Barney 1992)) and extant research (e.g., the role of 
disruptive technologies (Christensen 1997; Christensen 2001)). Finally, it stresses and 
avoids many of the unrealistic assumptions of the neo-classical price theory, which is also 
a goal of the current research.  
 
2.3 Game Theory 
 Isaac and Smith (1985) were among the first to study predation possibilities 
through game-theoretic experiments involving decision making under competitive 
contexts. They run different versions of a single market design experiment in search of 
predatory pricing (including one with sunk costs), yet they did not detect any. However, 
Jung et al. (1994) commonly observed predatory pricing in their experiment with 
repetitions of a simple signaling game. This game was set up so that the potential entrant 
would choose whether to enter or not, and the monopolist would choose whether to fight 
or accommodate. Prospective entrants were permitted to observe monopolist’s decisions. 
The entrants were better-off if they remained out of the market, unless the monopolist 
chose to accommodate. Moreover, Harrison (1988) modified and implemented Isaac and 
Smith’s (1985) work to a multiple market setting and found evidence for predatory 
pricing. Harrison’s settings were further replicated with modifications and consistent 
patterns of predatory pricing were detected in most of the markets.  It was shown that 
predatory pricing can be reliably simulated “both in stylized signaling games and in rich 
market settings”(Gomez et al. 1999) and that it is “alive and well” (Jung et al. 1994, 
p.73). 
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Kreps and Wilson (1982) analyzed the incentives of an incumbent to fight an 
entrant in order to influence the beliefs of future entrants in a case of multi-market 
predation. This work led to the classic work of (Milgrom and Roberts 1982b). According 
to the Milgrom and Roberts model, an incumbent firm manipulates its price in order to 
signal to a potential entrant, hence exerts influence on the entry decision (Milgrom and 
Roberts 1982a; 1982b). In a dynamic signaling game with two-sided uncertainty, it was 
shown that when the incumbent expected the entrant to be weak, predatory pricing was 
chosen, and when the incumbent expected the rival to be strong, limit pricing was chosen 
(LeBlanc 1992). “Predatory pricing is a rational strategy on game-theoretic models of 
oligopoly, based on informational asymmetries, that take into account signaling, signal 
jamming, and reputation effects” (Burns 1989, p.327). Thus, the entry deterring effects of 
a reputation for predation have also been established with game theoretical experiments.  
Guiltinan and Gundlach (1996a) suggested that the courts would benefit from the 
competitive interaction and strategic decision-making insights. The advancement of game 
theory has enabled the study of these complex issues. In that context, acting strategically 
meant to consider the expected move of the opponent to come up with the best possible 
move. This can be staged as a multistage game in which players intend to make 
preemptive moves. Purpose and intent are also considered, and the information needed 
for decision making of existing and potential players are described in strategic game 














Figure 2.1: A Simple Game-Theoretic Construct in the Airline Context  
Note: The expected values represent the average fare and the load factors of the incumbent and 




2.4 Marketing Strategy 
 
 Marketing strategy research (e.g., research focusing on marketing-strategy 
content, formulation process, and implementation related issues) and strategy research in 
marketing (research focusing on the role of marketing in the formulation of corporate and 
business level strategy and knowledge management) are two broad research streams that 
are getting intertwined (Bharadwaj and Varadarajan 2004). The determinants of business 
performance that the academics have considered to be predominant have evolved over 
time. The current paradigm appears to be the resource-based view of the firm also 
adopted the by general R-A Theory. Bharadwaj and Varadarajan (2004, pp.222-23) 
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 After reviewing these major theories, I focus on two relevant conceptualizations 
from marketing strategy. The first of these works is by Gruca and Sudharshan (1995) 
which focused mainly on pre-entry conditions. Their generic entry deterrence strategy 
framework consisted of feedback loops that started and evolved around the competitive 
environment (cost conditions, demand conditions, history, and legal climate). The loop 
consisted of alternative entry deterrence strategies (at functional, business unit, and 
corporate levels) leading to the anticipated entry decision, leading to anticipated 
consequences for incumbent, leading to choice of entry deterrence strategy, leading to 
entry decision, leading to realized consequences for the incumbent. Much of the attention 
was devoted to the competitive environment which formed the core of their model. The 
current research is focused on a single element (i.e., price) of the functional level entry 
deterrence strategies that Gruca and Sudharshan (1995) describe. Therefore, the overall 
marketing mix strategy (integrated product differentiation), building switching costs, 
brand proliferation, and pre-announcements of new products are beyond the scope of this 
research.  
 The second effort focused on post-entry competitive response options as opposed 
to pre-entry deterrence. Kuester et al. (1999) examined and summarized the empirical 
contributions to competitive market entry reactions to date and reported five dimensions 
for it.  
 Instrumental: refers to the elements of the marketing mix used for reaction. If retaliation 
occurs using the same instrument (e.g., counter product introduction or counter price cut) 
reciprocal retaliation is said to occur.   
 
Intensity: the weight of reaction (i.e., the funds allocated for counter promotional 
activities.) 
 
Breadth: the number (variety) of marketing instruments used,  
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Time: the speed (or time lag) of reaction. 
 
Domain: refers to the choice of market for counterattack. 
 
 
It should be noted that Kuester et al. (1999) focused on price and product 
retaliation and ignored domain retaliation in the empirical examination.  
The understanding of competitive responses was furthered by the “Defender” 
model (Hauser and Shugan 1983). Using a zero-sum approach, empirical results have 
supported that the optimal response to entry is to reduce price, advertising, and 
distribution spending for non-dominant brands; to reduce price but increase marketing 
budget for dominant brands (Gruca et al. 1992). This suggests that price reduction is the 
de facto optimal response against competitive entries. Relative power theory suggested 
that strong incumbents (i.e., those with market power) are expected to retaliate more 
intensively and more often than weak incumbents (Kumar et al. 1998). The focus in 
recent competitive interaction literature has been on competitive reactions at the retail 
level and especially on sales (price) promotions, advertising expenditures, and store 
brand sales due to the availability of scanner data. Most advertising and price promotions 
do not attract retaliation by incumbents (Nijs et al. 2001). However, when there is 
retaliation, it tends to focus on a single variable and often uses the same instrument of 
aggression (Steenkamp et al. 2005). Despite the observation that relative levels of price 
among competitors explain significant variance in retail strategy (Shankar and Bolton 
2004), the clash of the relative prices in inter-type competition (rather than short-term 
price reductions) remains a gap in literature.  
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2.4.1 Reputation effects from a marketing perspective 
 
A CEO is ultimately responsible for the growth of a company as evidenced 
by its financial performance, its capacity for self-renewal, and its 
character. The only way you can measure character is by reputation. 
Roberto Goizueta (Goizueta 1995). 
 
 
If the firm can convince its rivals that it is committed to a strategic move it 
is making or plans to make, it increases the chances that rivals will resign 
themselves to the new position and not to expend the resources to retaliate 
or try to cause the firm to back down. Thus, commitment can deter 
retaliation (Porter 1980, p.101). 
 
 
A vastly unexplored area of research is how to measure the reputation of a firm 
and its effects on different constituents in the marketplace. A favorable reputation has 
been linked to survival in crisis (Yoon et al. 1993), positive customer attitudes toward the 
company’s products and salespeople (Brown 1995), enhanced buying intentions (Yoon et 
al. 1993), and choice (cf. Traynor 1983; cf. Weiss et al. 1999). 
Corporate Reputation has been defined as the “overall estimation in which a 
company is held by its constituents. A corporate reputation represents the “net” affective 
or emotional reaction –good or bad, weak or strong– of customers, investors, employees, 
and the general public to the company’s name” (Fombrun 1996).  
In the marketing domain, Reputation Management has been increasingly attached 
to the public relations function.  A good reputation may be considered the most important 
asset of a company in the long run and can help it survive and even thrive during the 
tough times. Reputation is relied on for many aspects of organizational decision-making 
at different levels (e.g., choosing a supplier/distributor, promoting an employee). 
Similarly, many organizational decisions impact the reputation of the firm, thus attention 
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to this largely ignored topic is necessary. The corporate need for a Chief Reputation 
Officer (CRO) position has been proposed to manage the Reputational Capital of firms 
(Young 1996). “Reputation is becoming central in the language of strategy and 
competition, rather than in the old language of public relations” (cf. Garone 1998). Very 
few empirical studies that study reputation effects exist (Landon and Smith 1997; Landon 
and Smith 1998). 
Often used interchangeably in the marketing domain, both corporate reputation 
and corporate image reflect perceptions of an entity. However, they are conceptually 
distinct in two main ways. Image summarizes a brand or firm’s identity (Park et al. 1986) 
whereas “reputation reflects an overall judgment regarding the extent to which a firm is 
held in high esteem or regard. Thus, whereas image reflects what a firm stands for, 
reputation reflects how well it has done in the eyes of the marketplace. Image and 
reputation are distinct concepts as each can vary independent of the other. A firm can 
change its image through positioning, though its reputation remains intact” (Weiss et al. 
1999). Moreover, the attractiveness of images is segment specific (e.g., Rolex for luxury), 
but a favorable reputation is desirable by all customer segments (Weiss et al. 1999). For 
example, Virgin Group’s businesses range from book publishing, radio and television 
broadcasting, hotel management to entertainment retail, trading investment, and airlines. 
“Virgin is considered the consummate specialist in all things for youth fashion and 
fashionability” (Garone 1998) despite the bad publicity about the poor quality and 
services of their railroad services (Bower 2000).   
Sheth (in personal communication 2004) suggested two typologies to illustrate the 
dynamics of reputation. First, he argued that a reputation can be represented in two 
 18
dimensions: strong/weak and good/bad. Therefore, similar to conjoint analysis (Malhotra 
1999), the strength of the attribute (weight of attribute utility) can be multiplied with 








=∑∑  (Jain et al. 1979)). 
The same typology can be applied to the concept of image as well. Sheth (2004) also 
suggested a 2X2 matrix in which firm image and form reputation form the two 

















Figure 2.2: A Typology of Reputation and Image 
 
It should be noted that reputation has a somewhat different meaning when studied 
from an economics perspective. In this context, reputation has to do with the consistency 
to keep promises and sticking to a particular strategy (e.g., a government with a 
reputation for committing to a path for money supply) (Rogoff 1989). Expected actions 
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are anticipated through reputation (Evans and Thomas 1997). The rationality of 
reputation building and its effects on decision making, bargaining and technology 
adoption has been shown in game theoretical agency settings (DeJong et al. 1985; 
Dobson 1993; Evans and Thomas 1997; Hendricks 1992; Park 1999). The significantly 
positive reputation effects for not expropriating minority shareholders on stock prices and 
IPOs have been shown in Finance (Gomes 2000). 
Finally, reputation is important to examine from an antitrust perspective where it 
gains a different interpretation. Limited work on reputation so far has focused on the 
customer’s perspective. The classic definitions of reputation have not considered 
competitors as direct constituents of reputation. However, it may be possible for a 
monopolist to charge supra-competitive prices due to high barriers to entry, reputation for 
predation and other signaling effects. In this context, a reputation for predation is 
established by constant signaling of future intention to predate in the face of new entry. 
This is best demonstrated by actions in a market. Potentially more efficient competitors in 
(other) markets observe the reactions of the incumbent to entry, and often the quick 
demise of the previous entrant. As a result, they may decide not to commit the high level 
of resources needed to compete against the incumbent. Ceteris paribus, they would rather 
enter a market where the incumbent does not have a reputation for predation. Thus, a 
valid purpose of predation may be to develop a reputation as a tough competitor 
(Comanor and Frech 1993; Kreps and Wilson 1982). Reputation for predation is neither 
the only, nor the most effective factor affecting potential entry. However, a reputation for 
predation implies strong and constant signaling to all potential competitors for all the 
markets a company operates in, thus may be quite influential overall. Similarly, Weiss et 
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al. (1999) concluded that corporate reputation has a strategic influence beyond traditional 
approaches. The DOJ stated that the existence of a reputation for predation could be 
examined by means of industry surveys and that such a study had not been undertaken 
(1999e, p.134). 
Repeated interaction between firms facilitates the formation of perceptions and 
beliefs of competitors. A hostile reputation can be an asset for the firm in the long run 
(Weigelt and Camerer 1988). A reputation for predation can deter entrants as well as 
potential investors of competitors. Burns (1986) showed that alleged predation depressed 
the acquisition cost of the victims and others through reputation. Areeda and Turner 
(1975) admitted that “a demonstrated willingness to indulge in predatory pricing might 
itself deter some smaller potential entrants…” The reputation can develop from previous 
experience with the incumbent in the market in question for potential entry or in other 
markets. Similarly, the reputation may be derived from observing other firms’ 
competitive interactions with the incumbent in the market in question for potential entry 
or in other markets. The anticipated retaliation for specific markets may differ because 
the incumbent may have revealed its intent to protect a specific market(s) (e.g., fortress 
hubs (Allvine 1996b)) at all costs and not react so sharply to other market entries. I 
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Figure 2.3: Framework for Assessing the Incumbent’s Reputation for Predation and its 
 Impact on Market Entry 
 
 
For example, in the airline context, a carrier “defending its turf” against 
encroachment by a start-up carrier in a few markets can create a “reputation for 
predation” that deters start-up carriers from entering its many other hub markets; this can 
significantly alter the “cost-benefit” predation calculation for a hub carrier in a way 
uncharacteristic of most other industries” (Nannes 1999). Frederick Reid, a former Pan 
Am and American employee, who recruited to be the President and Chief Operating 
Officer for Lufthansa admitted to this phenomenon: “Pan Am was effectively destroyed 
by it and American was a winner. American has this reputation as a tough customer…” 
(McCormick and Field 1997). “If the prey believes that the threat or promise will be 
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carried out, there is no need for actual predation. Thus, like collusion, the most successful 
use of predatory threats or promises is difficult for outsiders to observe”(Comanor and 
Frech 1993). Reputations are impressions of actual behavior by the constituents. Yet, the 
courts continue to treat reputation effects as “industry folklore” because of a lack of 
empirical evidence. The bottom-line implication of the reputation effects literature is that 
it is important to consider the reputation effects as a barrier to entry when studying pre- 
and post-entry market defense. 
 
 2.4.2 Inter- vs. intra- type competition: 
 Intra-type competition takes place between businesses of similar 
cost/organization/service structure (e.g., Goldman Sachs/Merrill Lynch). By contrast, 
inter-type competition is defined as competition between businesses with different 
structure (e.g., Merrill Lynch/Charles Schwab) (Allvine 1996b). Examples in business-to-
business settings are commonplace as well: In IT outsourcing, IBM, EDS, and Accenture 
are intra-type competitors whereas Infosys, TCS, and Wipro (i.e., Indian offshore 
providers) would be considered their inter-type competitors. The competition between 
large distributors (e.g., IKON for copier and printers) and the local dealers can be 
characterized as inter-type. It is typical for intra-type competition to focus on non-price 
factors (e.g., facilities, sales assistance, and extended warranties) and for inter-type 
competition to focus on discounts. Such structural differences between inter- and intra- 
type competition have long been observed (Allvine 1996; Miller, Reardon, and McCorkle 
1999). Similarly, competition between Delta and American Airlines is considered intra-
type, while competition between Vanguard and American Airlines would be considered 
inter-type competition. It is typical for intra-type airlines to focus on non-price factors 
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(e.g., promotion, frequent flier miles) and for inter-type airlines to compete on price. 
Table 2.2 contrasts the two types of competition.  
Table 2.2: Characteristics of Intra-type versus Inter type Competition  






















Leadership Style Managerial Entrepreneurial 
Outcome Reduction of Uncertainty Novelty 
Source: Dixit (2000) 
 
 A major take-away from the retailing literature is that inter-type businesses (e.g., 
general merchandiser (Sears), broad-line specialist (Home Depot), limited-line specialist 
(Ace Hardware)) can co-exist and prosper (i.e., number of larger stores are positively 
related to the size and number of smaller stores (Miller et al. 1999)). Similar formations 
in many business-to-business contexts exist: in machine tools there are industry giants 
such as Illinois Tool Works that supply a wide variety of equipment, but there are also 
operations that focus on segments of the market (e.g., CNC tool rooms), and finally 
smaller shops that only custom-build. In heavy construction equipment, Caterpillar and 
Komatsu are the market leaders, but Linkbelt’s specialization in cranes pays-off.  
 At the absence of inter-type competition price competition typically suffers. For 
example, Table 2.3 illustrates the lack of price competition between intra-type 





Table 2.3: Non-competitive Pricing among Intra-type Competitors in the Airline Industry 
 
(Oster and Strong 2001, p.31) 
 
 The notion of inter-type versus intra-type competition is also supported by the 
notion of mutual forbearance.  
 
2.4.2.1 Mutual forbearance  
 Mutual forbearance theory implies that the higher the multi-market contact 
between the same firms, the lesser the intensity of competition due to increased 
familiarity between firms and their ability for deterrence (Jayachandran et al. 1999). 
Therefore, gaining competitive intelligence becomes advantageous. Korn and Baum 
(1999) observed that empirical evidence has robustly demonstrated that multimarket 
contact leads to mutual forbearance.  
Mutual forbearance moderates the effect of rivalry through tacit collusion and 
leads to improved performance for firms. Increased deterrence (Porter 1980) and 
increased familiarity among firms (Baum and Korn 1999) were observed as potential 
reasons for this effect (Jayachandran et al. 1999). While direct collusion is illegal and has 
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antitrust consequences, tacit collusion is observed when firms understand the motives and 
strategies of each party and implicitly coordinate so that intense competition is avoided 
(Jayachandran et al. 1999). Since most discounters that provide inter-type competition are 
smaller than their major counterparts they would have less market contact than intra-type 
competitors. Therefore, mutual forbearance would not only explain the general intensity 
aspect of inter-type competition but also help explain the exception for large inter-type 
competitors (e.g., intra-type major competitors do not retaliate against large inter-type 
discounters such as Wal-Mart and Southwest Airlines because of the high multi-market 
contact with them). 
Korn and Baum (1999) found out that firms (in the airline industry) did not 
actively increase multi-market contact to achieve mutual forbearance. Perhaps the 
potential for increased market contact is limited by resource constraints or regulation. 
Moreover, previous studies have generally not differentiated market contacts between 
inter- and intra-type competing firms. Jayachandran et al. (1999) argued that the positive 
relationship between multimarket contact and the intensity of competition was moderated 
by the organizational structure of competing firms, seller concentration, spheres of 
influence (i.e., focal market distribution), and resource similarity (i.e., parity).  
Mutual forbearance may have antitrust implications through collusion, and multimarket 
reactions may have antitrust implications through predation (Jayachandran et al. 1999). 
As previously discussed, an incumbent's competitive reputation can also deter market 
entry in the context of multimarket competition. Clark and Montgomery (1998) have 
experimentally shown that an incumbent's reputation for aggressiveness, but not 
intelligence, makes a market less attractive and more risky to a potential entrant. They 
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found that reputation has a stronger effect when the degree of multimarket contact is 
high.   
 The theoretical basis for the use of pricing strategies as a defense mechanism in 
competitive interaction was inquired in this Chapter. The theories are linked to support of 
specific hypotheses in Chapter 4 (also see Figure 4.4). In the next Chapter, an inquiry of 
the actual use and evolution of aggressive pricing is undertaken from a multi-disciplinary 




AN INQUIRY OF THE USE OF PREDATORY PRICING IN MARKET 
DEFENSE: EVOLUTION, REVIEW, AND MARKETING SYNTHESIS 
 
 
3.1 Introduction to the Review 
The monopolists, by keeping the market constantly understocked, by never 
fully supplying the effectual demand, sell their commodities much above 
the natural price, and raise their emoluments, whether they consist in 
wages or profit, greatly above their natural rate. 
   Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1776) 
 
Aggressive competitive conduct by a monopolist, which is beneficial to 
consumers, and aggressive exclusionary conduct by a monopolist, which 
is deleterious to consumers, look alike.  




 Pricing has become an increasingly complex and sophisticated marketing activity 
over the last few decades. Interestingly, among all marketing mix elements, it is the one 
that is the least under the control of the business under perfectly competitive market 
conditions. However, when a market is not competitive, the reverse becomes true and one 
or few businesses may enjoy the benefits of controlling the going price through the use of 
their market power. The abuse of market power in terms of price manipulation is 
considered illegal. This chapter focuses on a widely recognized and debated form of price 
manipulation –predatory pricing, and describes how the marketing discipline can 
contribute to its assessment. 
The current stage of the evolution predatory pricing is quite important. The very 
mechanism, drastic price cuts, that is associated with predatory pricing also happens to be 
at the heart of healthy competition (1993b). The primary objective of public policy 
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making regarding competitive interaction is to distinguish anti-competitive conduct from 
those that are pro-competitive (Scherer 1976). Despite the growing economic literature 
on predatory pricing, the case law in Europe and the U.S. remains limited (Grout 2000). 
This chapter reviews the extensive literature on the history of predatory pricing 
and presents insights to a serious debate on whether or not a new set of ground rules for 
evaluating predatory pricing antitrust cases should be adopted. The notion that the 
Supreme Court’s Brooke decision has established an imperfect standard against the 
plaintiffs/new entrants is also examined. The main goals of this chapter are to provide a 
historical perspective on the topic, to summarize the new evaluation alternatives available 
to the courts, and to present a synthesis that also integrates marketing insights.  
Courts generally do not find predatory pricing to be rational and assume that 
predatory pricing practices are rare. This emphasis comes from the concern for antitrust 
litigation to not disturb the beneficial, competitive price-cutting behavior. At the absence 
of absolute market power, the courts simply view the cases as competitive (Sheffet and 
Petty 1994). The concept of predatory pricing represents a double-edged sword for the 
policy makers in that if not prevented, the price competition that enhances consumer 
welfare in the short-run can turn out to be disadvantageous for the consumers with return 
of the supra-competitive prices in the long run (Gundlach 1995). 
 The positive impact of lower prices on consumer welfare is generally accepted. 
However, predatory pricing is detrimental to consumer welfare in the long run because 
once the competitors exit the market, the predator raises prices with the intention of 
collecting supra-normal profits. Moreover, the problem with predatory pricing is not 
limited to harm to consumers through the increase of prices back to monopoly levels. 
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Predatory pricing, successful or not, can potentially reduce incentives for investment and 
innovation, and prevent new entry or expansion by more efficient firms. There are special 
implications for network industries such as telecommunications and software where the 
value of the product/service increases along with the number of users. Innovation can be 
stifled when predatory prices induce consumers to continue to use an old technology as 
opposed to a superior alternative offered by a new entrant (Guiltinan and Gundlach 
1996). 
Price competition is the core element of free markets. Lower prices and 
competition increase the welfare of the consumers and the society in general (Grewal and 
Compeau 1999). Yet, if consumers feel that the price they have to pay is unfair, then 
social harm may occur (Guiltinan and Gundlach 1996). The line between competition and 
anti-competitive conduct needs to be carefully drawn. 
It appears that there is an increasing gap between the insights from the modern 
economic theory and the enforcement of current judicial policy. Government 
enforcement concern is high as evidenced by the DOJ lawsuits.  The new economy 
requires new rules for the assessment of predation because of the growing importance of 
intellectual property (e.g., Microsoft litigation). Increasing market concentration in many 
industries and number of mergers, are also of concern (Bolton et al. 2000). There is an 
ongoing debate between two camps on how enforcement on predatory pricing should be 
exercised. 
The Chicago School of thought, with its more established neo-classical theory 
economists and free enterprise institutes is supported by corporations and practiced by the 
Supreme Court. Since 1993, the Supreme Court requires proof of below-cost pricing and 
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of recoupment of losses suffered during predation to concur a predation case, and no 
predatory pricing plaintiff has been able to prevail in the courts (Bolton et al. 2000). The 
Chicago School concurs that Predatory Pricing cannot be a logical business practice for a 
company. They claim that it is not rational if they price below (short-run) AVC, and 
perfectly legal if they are above AVC, and thus predatory pricing claims should be 
ignored (DiLorenzo 1992). 
Many companies are suffering and trying to get attention to what Post-Chicago 
School of academics call blatant use of predatory pricing and harm to the competitive 
process. The following scenario is observed in many monopolistic markets: The 
incumbent signals the intention to predate once a new player announces entry. If the 
entrant is bold enough to actually enter the market, the predator matches the entrant’s 
(lower) price in the market and usually increases output.  The predator declares an all-
front war against the much smaller (but usually more innovative and efficient) entrant 
and does not budge until it is driven out of the market or out of business. As soon as the 
entrant has been forced out, the monopolist ignores the newly stimulated demand, 
reduces the capacity and increases its prices to levels (sometimes higher than) before the 
entry. This pattern has been observed for many cases in the airline industry (1996a; 
Allvine 1996b). There are many independent experts and academics, who concur that 
predatory pricing can indeed be a viable business strategy for the major player in a 
monopolistic market. This view validates the need for attention to this important antitrust 
topic. The Post-Chicago view of predation has been on the rise in the nineties during the 
Clinton Administration as demonstrated by the U.S. versus Microsoft, and U.S. versus 
American Airlines cases. However, it would not be surprising if most pending cases were 
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settled during the administration of President George W. Bush, who stated during his 
election campaign that he would only pursue price fixing antitrust cases (Financial 
Times, 2000c). 
Grewal and Compeau (1999) suggested that marketing researchers have not 
engaged in public policy implications of pricing until recently and that a focus on this 
issue is long overdue. They argued that developments such as the Internet, global 
markets, mega-corporations, and cooperative marketing arrangements created the 
necessity of taking a closer look at the pricing and public policy interaction with 
consumer welfare in mind. After all, courts consider economic harm to consumers as the 
best way of assessing harm to society (Baer 1996). 
Guiltinan and Gundlach (1996) argued that marketing was in a unique position to 
help form public policy guidelines with comprehensive measurement and modeling 
procedures, and that predation and predatory pricing have not been addressed by 
marketers until recently. Gundlach (1995) suggested that the marketing discipline had the 
potential to further the understanding needed for the development of a more suitable 
antitrust policy.  
The literature on predatory pricing is overwhelming and dominated by the 
disciplines of law and economics. This chapter represents a literature review of the 
existing knowledge on this topic. It is an effort to thoroughly understand, summarize, and 
then synthesize and present a big picture of the subject from the perspective of cases and 





Price can assume many meanings depending on the specific context. It can mean 
rent, tuition, fee, fare, rate, interest, toll, premium, honorarium, dues, assessment, 
retainer, salary, commission, wage, even bribe and income taxes (Schwartz 1981). 
Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines price as “the amount of money given or set as 
consideration for the sale of a specified thing.” It is also defined as the quantity of one 
thing that is exchanged or demanded in barter or sale for another or the cost at which 
something is obtained. More elaborate definitions have involved the concepts of value 
and worth. Price can mean a fair return or equivalent in goods, services, or money for 
something exchanged, or the monetary worth or value of something (Mish 1995). Simply, 
it is the amount of money the customers have to pay for a product or service (Grewal et 
al. 1998).  
The marketing mix is defined as the set of controllable marketing variables that 
marketers employ to obtain the desired responses from their target markets (Kotler and 
Armstrong 1991). Price is one of the key components of the classic “four Ps: product, 
price, place, and promotion” grouping of the marketing mix (McCarthy 1960). It has been 
cited as the most important component of the mix by marketing executives (1983). Price 
has special importance for the marketers due to its inherent flexibility and close 
association to profitability. General pricing approaches include cost-based pricing (cost-
plus (mark-up), break-even, and target profit), buyer based pricing (perceived value), and 
competition based pricing (going rate, sealed bid, competitive response) (Allvine 1999; 
Kotler and Armstrong 1991). 
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 The pricing strategy is dependent on the nature of the product in question (e.g., 
innovative versus imitative), and the product mix of the firm. For example, market 
skimming and market-penetration are two strategies that can be employed for an 
innovative product or service. Products have to be positioned in the marketplace to be 
profitable and the following are some of the options that can be employed: product-line 
pricing, optional-product pricing, captive-product pricing, by-product pricing, and 
product-bundle pricing (Kotler and Armstrong 1991, p.351). 
Prices can also be adjusted through the use of discount pricing (quantity, 
functional, seasonal discounts, payment terms) and allowances (trade-in, promotional); 
discriminatory pricing (customer-segment, product-form, location, time); psychological 
pricing; promotional pricing (loss leaders, special-event pricing, cash rebates, low-
interest financing, longer warranties, free maintenance, discounts); and geographical 
pricing (FOB-Origin, uniform delivered, zone, basing point, freight absorption). 
However, both buyers’ and competitors’ reactions need to be considered before changing 
prices (Allvine 1999; Assael 1990). 
Price theory in economics defines how the firms should set prices under certain 
assumptions to maximize their profits (Pass and Lowes 1994). However, the static nature 
of the price theory and its rigid assumptions for cost, price and quantity (product) make it 
inapplicable to marketing practitioners. When these assumptions are violated, it becomes 
hard to measure the nature of the demand (demand curve) and a profit-maximizing price 
cannot be determined. Assumptions that marketers cannot afford to have include, an 
unchanging environment, single product firms, and all customers paying the same price 
(Allvine 1999). 
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 Due to the absence of a single profit maximizing guideline in practice, the 
marketers determine their strategy for the product or service before they set the price for 
it. There are internal (e.g., marketing objectives, marketing mix strategy, costs, 
organization for pricing) and external factors (e.g., nature of the market and demand, 
competition, economy, resellers, government) that impact pricing decisions. Marketing 
objectives of the firm can include survival, current profit maximization, market-share 
leadership, product-quality leadership among others. The marketing mix for a particular 
product is closely tied to the marketing mix strategy of the related items that the firm 
offers. As most of the dot-com start-ups have painfully discovered, prices must start to 
exceed their costs (as effected by their economies of scale and learning curve) at some 
point if a company is to survive in the long run. The procedures for pricing and the 
flexibility for changing the price also have impact on the pricing decision as an internal 
factor (Kotler and Armstrong 1991). It should be noted that the nature of the market and 
demand characteristics can be industry specific (e.g., seasonal). Economists have 
identified four general types of markets (pure competition, monopolistic competition, 
oligopolistic competition, and pure monopoly). The price elasticity of demand is also of 
concern. The state of the economy impacts the purchasing power of consumers and has to 
be considered. The bargaining power of middlemen and retailers can become important 
in making pricing decisions. Finally, laws regarding pricing are also important and 
marketers need to make sure that their pricing policies do not violate them. These issues 
include price fixing, resale price maintenance, price discrimination, minimum (predatory) 
pricing, price increases (ceilings), and deceptive pricing (Kotler and Armstrong 1991). 
 35
Price fixing refers to price collusion among competitors. It is considered illegal except 
when supervised by a government agency (e.g., local milk industry agreements, fruit and 
vegetable cooperatives). Resale Price Maintenance problem implies that manufacturers 
cannot require that their dealers sell at pre-specified prices. They can only propose 
suggested retail prices. They cannot refuse to sell to a dealer or punish the dealer 
otherwise because of pricing issues. Regulated price increases refer to certain industries 
(i.e., utilities) in a free market economy. Government may also use its influence to 
discourage major industry price spikes during shortages or in times of inflation. 
Deceptive pricing problem means that the price reduction should not be advertised unless 
it is a saving from the usual retail price, not advertise inaccurate factory or wholesale 
prices, and not advertise comparable prices for different goods. FTC Guidelines against 
deceptive pricing were issued in 1958 (United States 1958). Price discrimination problem 
implies that sellers must offer the same price terms for a given type of transaction. 
Robinson-Patman Act forbids price discrimination unless the seller can prove that its 
costs are different in selling to a particular customer than others (1936). This can usually 
be the case when order quantities vary in size. However, the seller needs to prove that 
these differences are proportional to the differences of quantities. It can also be justified 
if the seller can prove that it is trying to meet competitor’s prices in good faith. Even 
then, price discrimination should be temporary, localized, and defensive rather than 
offensive (Dalrymple and Parsons 1990). For effective discriminatory pricing, segments 
in the market should indicate varying levels of demand. Discrimination does not work if 
the low price segment customers can resell the product to the higher price segments. 
Similarly, competitors who sell to the higher price segments at lower prices can be very 
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disturbing. This may lead some firms to illegally employ predatory pricing practices to 
drive the competition out of the market (Kotler and Armstrong 1991). Thus, last but 
certainly not least, minimum (predatory) pricing is an important issue that marketers need 
to be aware of. 
 
3.2.1 Predatory Pricing 
 The best known form of predation is predatory pricing, yet it has currently no 
statutory definition (Guiltinan and Gundlach 1996). Areeda and Turner (1975) argued 
that predatory pricing occurs when a firm lowers its prices in order to eliminate a current 
competitor in the relevant market or to prevent new firms from entering the market: 
[P]redation…cannot exist unless there is a temporary sacrifice of net 
revenues in the expectation of greater future gains.…Thus, predatory 
pricing would make little economic sense to a potential predator unless he 
had (1) greater financial staying power than his rivals, and (2) a very 
substantial prospect that the losses he incurs in the predatory campaign 
will be exceeded by the profits to be earned after his rivals have been 
destroyed. 
 
Others such as Professor (then Judge) Posner simply defined predatory pricing as 
pricing at a level calculated to exclude from the market an equally or more efficient 
competitor (Posner 1976). Viscusi et al. (1995) later commented that, pricing at a level to 
exclude a less efficient competitor is naturally what competition is supposed to do. Some 
researchers focus on the exclusionary conduct (Grout 2000), and some focus on losses 
imposed on others (Sullivan 1977) in their definitions. Professor Baumol’s 1996 article 
refined the Areeda-Turner definition: 
 
Indeed, one can, perhaps, define a price to be predatory if and only if it 
meets all three of the following conditions. First, the choice of that price 
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must have no legitimate business purpose. Second, that price must 
threaten the existence or the entry of rivals that are at least as efficient as 
the firm (call it firm F) that has adopted the price at issue (price P). Third, 
there must be a reasonable prospect of recoupment of at least whatever 
initial costs to firm F were entailed in the company’s adoption of the price 
in question, that recoupment taking the form of monopoly profits made 
possible by reduction (as a result of price P) in the number of competitors 
facing F. (Baumol 1996, p.52) 
 
Hence, Professor Baumol would define a business act as legitimate if the expected 
(long-run) net return is positive, and if that return does not depend on the exit of any of 
equally or more efficient competitors or the prevention of entry of such firms. 
Gregory T. Gundlach, who has published numerous articles on the topic of 
predation (e.g., Guiltinan and Gundlach 1996a; Gundlach 1990; Gundlach 1995; 
Gundlach and Guiltinan 1998) perceives predatory pricing as a reduction of prices 
(usually below cost) with the intention of punishing a competitor or gaining higher profits 
in the long run by driving competition out of business (Gundlach 1990). Predatory 
pricing can improve a firm’s bottom-line through exclusionary conduct or other anti-
competitive effects in the market. Specific cases of pricing below cost, unlawful price 
discrimination and price warring are considered predatory pricing (Grewal and Compeau 
1999). The same actions regarding pricing can be interpreted differently, depending on 
what the intent of the case is. Pricing below cost with the intent of dumping excess 
inventory can be considered legal (Grewal and Compeau 1999).  
When the cost concept is built into the descriptions above, a definition which 
would generally be accepted by the courts in the U.S. is obtained (i.e., pricing below an 
appropriate measure of unit cost (e.g., total or variable) with the intent of driving out 
rivals (presumably with shallow pockets), and later raising price above unit cost to recoup 
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losses through supra-competitive pricing. The court definition was shaped through cases 
such as Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.; Cargill Inc. v. Monfort 
of Colorado Inc.; and finally in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp. However, the measure of cost that would distinguish predatory from non-predatory 
pricing has not yet been prescribed (McCareins 1996). Figure 3.1 summarizes the current 














Whether a particular conduct is predatory may depend on the jurisdiction in which 
a firm does business or whether the suit is brought under state or federal law (McCareins 
1996). State and Federal courts use different standards to detect predatory pricing. State 
courts are usually more receptive to predation cases and tend to protect the preys (i.e., 
smaller firms) more. On the other hand, the Federal courts have stated that predatory 
pricing is “inherently uncertain” (1986b, pp.588-89) and that it is generally implausible 
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(1993b, p.226). Today, intent is at best a secondary concern for the courts in the United 
States. Predatory pricing is found only when below-cost pricing exists along with (a 
dangerous possibility of) recoupment (1993b). This puts a heavy burden of proof on the 
plaintiffs. 
Perhaps in one of the most widely quoted statements in predatory pricing history, 
the Supreme Court in the Matsushita Case stated that predatory pricing is “rarely tried, 
and even more rarely successful” (1986b, p.590). The reason for this sharp conclusion is 
discussed later in this chapter under the evolution of predatory pricing section. Similarly, 
it will be discussed later that there may be exclusionary and anti-competitive effects of 
predatory pricing that are not as obvious as the elimination of a direct competitor. The 
following definition however, successfully captures the essence of the diverse nature of 
the topic, and hence has been adopted for the purposes of my dissertation:    
 
Predatory Pricing is a price reduction that is profitable only because of 
the added market power the predator gains from eliminating, disciplining 
or otherwise inhibiting the competitive conduct of a rival or potential rival 
(Bolton et al. 2000, p.3). 
 
3.2.2 Predatory Pricing versus Predation 
Even though predatory pricing is the most widely recognized form, it is only a 
part of the larger conduct of predation. Ordover and Willig (1981) defined predation as 
actions that are unprofitable but for their possible contribution to a rival’s exit. There is a 
rather wide list of activities that can be considered to be predatory depending on their 
impact on societal welfare.  
Misleading advertising about a competitor’s product, specifically designing 
interfaces for complementary products that are incompatible for a rival, initiating 
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excessive regulatory hearings and/or lawsuits have been noted as predation (Bork 1993). 
Cutting supply of an essential output or refusal to provide access to essential resources 
for competition (e.g., slots at airports) is also predatory according to the “essential 
facility” doctrine (Gundlach and Bloom 1993). Prentice (1996) discussed the predation 
liability for fraudulent product announcements that a manufacturer knows will not ever 
be launched. In addition, raising rival’s costs through acquisition and sleeping on of 
patents, product pre-announcements, useless product modifications, exclusionary market 
channel arrangements, market share agreements, bundled discounts, discounts designed 
to reduce rivals’ ability to obtain display space (Gundlach 1990), refusals to deal, 
mandatory tying arrangements, and other uses of the power in one market to increase the 
cost to competitors in other related markets (Meeks 1998) have been reported. Non-price 
predation (e.g., reputation, raising rival’s costs) may be used to depress the acquisition 
cost of rivals.  
Predation is like warfare in that it can only be rational when less expensive 
measures fail (Scherer 1980). Indeed, it has been argued that that non-price predation is 
more effective than predatory pricing because it is less costly, less risky and more often 
successful (Bork 1978). Snyder and Kauper (1991) summarized literature on raising 
rivals’ costs, a category of predation. Salop and Scheffman (1987) showed that non-price 
predation strategies that increase rival’s costs are more advantageous than predatory 
pricing. Not every non-price predation is pre-branded illegal, non-price predation does 
not have to force exit to be successful and it does not have market power as a 
prerequisite. It may be more cost-efficient for large firms to employ contractual 
provisions and other strategies to increase barriers to entry to maintain market power. In 
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the broadest sense, sixteen non-price predation strategies have been reported which 
included outright sabotage such as burning down a rival’s plant but also vertical 
integration, innovation, and product promotion (1991). The next section discusses the 
evolution of the theory and practice of predatory pricing but also reports on non-price 
predation where necessary. 
 
3.3. Evolution of the Theory and Practice of Predatory Pricing 
3.3.1 A Historical Perspective 
Predatory pricing cases have a major role among the anti-competitive practice and 
antitrust violation cases (Gundlach 1995). Since the turn of the last century, the courts’ 
approach to evaluate predatory pricing cases has swung back and forth between being in 
favor of the plaintiffs and the defendants. Economic theory and scholarly articles seem to 
have played an important role, for better or worse, in shaping the federal court policies. 
Especially, the articles by McGee (1958), Koller (1971), and Areeda and Turner (1975) 
seem to have influenced the courts to an extent that their impact is still observed today in 
their reflection from the 1993 Brooke decision. The early influence of academics ended 
the “populist era” of predation enforcement, where plaintiffs won most of the cases. The 
adoption of Areeda-Turner rule by the courts as a standard shifted the balance in favor of 
the defendants. Predatory Pricing was defined by the courts as irrational business 
(1986b), and the neo-classical price theory school continuously presented it as a myth 
(DiLorenzo 1992; Koller 1971). Moreover, the 1993 Brooke decision has made it even 
harder for the plaintiffs to survive in courts. In this decision, the Supreme Court required 
not only evidence of below cost pricing but also of recoupment. In none of predatory 
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pricing cases since the Brooke decision (at least 38 of them), did the plaintiffs prevail 
(Carney and Zellner 2000). However, modern view holders such as Guiltinan (1996), 
(Bolton et al. 2000), as well as distinguished economists such as Alfred Kahn (1998) 
have pointed out that certain assumptions of price theory do not hold in the real world. 
Currently, there seems to be a consensus among those who hold the modern Post-Chicago 
view of predation that predatory pricing can be a viable and profitable business strategy 
especially under monopolistic market conditions (Bolton et al. 2000). This indicates that 
a reassessment of the standards that the courts use today may be well justified and 
overdue. Milestones of the evolution of predatory pricing and an approximation of 
plaintiffs’ success rate in the courts are presented next (Table 3.1; Figure 3.2), followed 
by a discussion of the evolution. 
 
Table 3.1: A Summary of the Evolution of Predatory Pricing in the U.S. 
Timeline  Description 
1890 Sherman Act Prohibited contracts or conspiracies that restrain trade including price fixing, and monopolization. 
1910 Clayton Act Defined unlawful uncompetitive behavior and practices other than monopolization. 
1911  Standard Oil Co. v. United 
States 
Standard Oil found guilty in this classic case of 
monopolization. A major component of the case involved 
the allegations that Standard Oil had employed predatory 
pricing to drive its competitors either out of business or to 
force them to sell it to Standard Oil at distressed prices. 
Standard Oil was broken up into 33 geographically distinct 
companies (Gibb and Knowlton 1965). 
1914 Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act 
Extended Sherman Act in terms of restraints for trade. FTC 
authorized to interpret antitrust statutes. 
1936 Robinson-Patman Act Price discrimination that lessens competition or promotes monopoly declared illegal. Protected small business from 
price-cutting by large sellers. 
1938 Wheeler-Lea Amendment FTC authorized to protect consumers as well as competitors. 
1940’s Strong FTC enforcement Cases are infrequent until 1940’s. More cases observed with strong FTC enforcement (Bolton et al. 2000). 
1936-70’s The Populist Era Roughly 77% of predatory pricing plaintiffs win their case (Koller 1971). 
1967   
In this classical example of the populist era, three producers 
in California were accused of charging less for their pies in 
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Utah Pie Co. v. 
Continental Baking Co. 
Utah than in markets closer to their plants after Utah Pie’s 
entry to the market. Court decided in favor of Utah Pie. The 
Supreme Court reinstated the jury verdict though this 
decision was widely criticized. Justice Stewart argued that 
the consumers benefited from lower prices and increased 
competition in Utah. 
1975 Areeda-Turner AVC Rule From the seminal article proposing a per se AVC standard for detecting predatory pricing. 
1975-80 A Defendant’s Paradise Dramatic change in enforcement  –no plaintiff prevailed during the five years following Areeda-Turner (Bolton et al. 
2000). 
1982-92 Augmented AVC Era Intent and market structure also considered. Equilibrium was claimed to be reached at 17% plaintiff success rate (Bolton 
et al. 2000). 
1986   
Matsushita Electric 
Industrial Company v. 
Zenith Radio Corporation  
American television manufacturers sued twenty-one 
Japanese corporations that sold televisions in the United 
States. Plaintiffs’ argument was that the defendants 
conspired to drive them out of the U.S. market with 
predatory pricing. The court’s assessment became one of the 
most quoted in the following cases to come: “consensus… 
that predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even 
more rarely successful. . .” (1986b, p.590) Thus, the court 
did not find an economic motive for the defendants to 
predate. Earlier verdict of the Court of Appeals was reversed 
and remanded. 
1989  A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. 
Rose Acre Farms, Inc.  
 
The defendant’s prices were less than its average variable 
costs for a period during (and below ATC throughout) the 
price war. Predatory intent of defendant’s executives was 
also documented: “We are going to run you out 
of…business. Your days are numbered”(1989, p.1398).  The 
court focused on recoupment and concluded that intent by 
itself did not help determine the probability of recoupment, 
and in the absence of recoupment, even the most vicious 
intent was considered harmless to the system. 
1993  Brooke Group v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco  
 
Brooke Group (formerly known as Liggett) alleged that 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation introduced its 
own line of generic cigarettes (that the plaintiff had 
pioneered with great success) and used predatory pricing to 
stifle price competition in the economy segment of the 
national cigarette market. Brooke argued that the defendant 
used below cost pricing and offered discriminatory volume 
rebates to wholesalers. Brown not only matched the 
plaintiff’s retail price but also consistently undercut its 
wholesale price. A harsh price and rebate promotion war 
took place at the wholesale level that lasted eighteen months. 
Ultimately, Brooke gave in and increased its prices. Generic 
brand prices increased by 71% and branded cigarettes prices 
increased by 39% whereas the costs where roughly constant 
(Bolton et al. 2000). Even though below cost pricing and 
predatory intent was documented, and the defendant was 
found guilty by a jury, the Supreme Court required proof of 
below cost pricing, and of recoupment, and subsequently 
decided in favor of the defendant.  
Table 3.1 (continued) 
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 Defendants’Ultimate Paradise Era Commences 
Brooke decision led to excessive summary dismissal by 
lower courts. Augmented AVC Era equilibrium destroyed. 
Plaintiffs have not prevailed in a case since Brooke. 
Summary dismissal is the norm. (Bolton et al. 2000) 
1998 DOT Proposed Guidelines Department of Transportation (DOT) realized the strategic  problem and would allow proof of recoupment based on  
reputation effects (and would not require proof of below  
United States v. Microsoft Microsoft is accused of predatory pricing against Netscape 
for bundling its Internet Explorer with its operating system 
free of charge, and later settles the case. 
1999 
United States v. AMR 
Corp.  
Department of Justice (DOJ) filed complaint against 
American Airlines based on strategic and reputation effects 
in parallel with DOT guidelines.  
2000 Presidential Elections George W. Bush stated during his election campaign that he would only pursue price fixing antitrust cases (2000d). 
DOT switches to case by 
case approach 
After evaluating thousands of responses from different 
parties, DOT dropped proposed guidelines and decided to 
take a case by case approach (January). 
2001 
American Case Dismissed Judge Morton dismissed the case basing on “time honored  
rules” (April); DOJ decides to appeal the decision (July). 
2002 - 
 
Evolution continues… DOJ appeals the dismissal of American case but does not 
pursue the objective aggressively in the aftermath of 
September 11 events (the summary dismissal is later verified 
by a panel of three judges in July 2003). American Antitrust 
Institute observed that this marked “the death of predatory 
pricing as a critical antitrust tool in this political climate” (cf. 
Foer 2003, p.14). The low cost carriers start to make 
headway into bleeding major carriers’ territories. Another 
wave of predation against the discounters may be in order 
after the major carriers get their act together, however the 
discounters (e.g., Southwest, JetBlue, AirTran) now have 
deeper pockets. As a preliminary step, the majors launch a 
new wave of low-cost versions of themselves (e.g., Song for 





































Figure 3.2: Approximated Predatory Pricing Plaintiff Court Success over Time 
Table 3.1 (continued) 
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 3.3.2 Regulatory Acts Regarding Predatory Pricing 
 Predatory pricing is a violation that is monitored by antitrust regulation bodies. 
Antitrust regulation is constructed to prevent substandard industry performance 
(efficiency) and promote competitive performance and equitable distribution of market 
power. The typical targets of antitrust regulation are those industries with oligopolistic 
structures with high entry barriers where market power stifles innovation. The following 
are renowned Acts that were designed to regulate such behavior:  
 
Sherman Act – 1890: Section 1 of this Act basically prohibited contracts or conspiracies 
that restrain trade. The behavior considered illegal (e.g., price fixing, allocating territories 
among competitors, tying purchases of one product to another) was defined by courts. 
Section 1 makes concerted action illegal regardless of their market impact. If the 
conspiracy is proven, the plaintiff does not have to prove actual or potential 
monopolization (Hawker and Petty 1996).“Rule of Reason" doctrine, which suggested 
analyzing the context of behavior to see if the case displays unreasonable restraint of 
trade or legitimate business practice, was used for cases of ambiguous nature (Sullivan 
1991). Section 2 declared monopolization and conspiracy to monopolize, as a felony. 
Intent was defined further with subsequent legislation (Kovaleff 1994). 
 
Clayton Act – 1914: Defined unlawful anticompetitive behavior and practices other than 
monopolization (e.g., price discrimination (Section 2), exclusive dealing and tying 
contracts, mergers (Section 7), and inter-locking directorates.) Section 7 was an important 
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antitrust statute in terms of its impact on litigation and structure. Cellar-Kefauver (1950) 
made mergers and acquisitions that decrease competition or promote monopoly unlawful 
(with respect to Section 7 of Clayton). This Act was intended to prevent unfavorable 
market structures. However, labor unions and agricultural organizations (cooperatives) 
were exempt (Martin 1959; States 1984).  
 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act – 1914: Extended and overlapped with the 
Sherman Act in terms of restraints for trade. It defined certain conduct modes businesses 
must compete in (e.g., Unfair Methods of Competition (Section 5)). The FTC was 
authorized to interpret antitrust statutes. With the extension of Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, 
FTC was authorized to protect consumers as well as competitors (American Bar 
Association. FTC Act Editorial Committee. 1981). 
 
Robinson-Patman Act –1936: Amended Section 2 so that price discrimination that lessens 
competition or promotes monopoly was considered illegal. The original Clayton Act had 
exempted price discrimination in the form of quantity or volume discounts (1936). 
Two main types of price discrimination were recognized. Primary discrimination 
included injury to competing sellers, whereas secondary discrimination included injury to 
competing buyers. A key case for primary discrimination was the Utah Pie Case (1967). 
Pie producers in California, were accused of charging less for their pies in Utah than in 
markets closer to their California plants, after Utah pie’s entry to the market. Court 
decided in favor of Utah Pie, though Justice Stewart argued that the consumers benefited 
from lower prices and increased competition in Utah (Van Cise and McCord 1969). A 
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key case for secondary discrimination was Morton Salt Case (1948). Morton gave 
volume discounts to selected buyers. Large chain grocery stores were given the lowest 
wholesale prices. Court found against Morton based on Robinson-Patman Act (1948).  
It appears as if the Robinson-Patman Act was designed to protect small businesses 
against the “chain-store revolution.” Secondary type of price discrimination was enforced 
in the courts more, typically in the form of “mom and pop” grocery stores versus the 
major food chain. However, today Robinson-Patman Act is interpreted rather strictly, and 
is not considered a major factor in food retailing anymore (Dickinson 2003). The 
standard for primary-line Robinson-Patman violations has become basically the same as 
it is for ordinary predatory pricing under Section 2 of the Sherman Act (Kintner 1979). 
Most predatory pricing cases fall under either an attempt or actual monopolization charge 
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act or Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act 
(McCareins 1996). 
Antitrust legislation is enforced by the Antitrust Division of the Department of 
Justice, and by FTC with some overlap. However, most lawsuits are filed by private 
parties rather than the government agencies. The cases can be criminal or civil. Most 
forms of price discrimination are not illegal themselves, though the market power 
exercised to employ price discrimination may be illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act. The Robinson-Patman Act extended antitrust for price discrimination to credit terms, 
delivery times, quality, and volume discounts. It was designed to protect small 
competitors rather than the competitive process. Robinson-Patman Act  is easier to 
pursue in courts as it requires proof of a reasonable possibility of substantial injury, 
whereas Sherman requires a dangerous probability of actual monopolization. Still, 
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Robinson-Patman Act is not favored by the FTC and Department of Justice (DOJ) which 
do not currently enforce the Robinson-Patman Act (Dickinson 2003; MacAvoy 2000). 
There was also one Act that specifically regulated marketing behavior within a particular 
industry --Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act –1937 (United States 1937). 
 
3.3.3 Early Years and the Populist Era (1890 - 1975) 
Very few cases were observed before the 1940’s. This inactive period continued 
until the 1936 Robinson-Patman Act. Plaintiffs gained substantial power after Robinson-
Patman which protected smaller firms from price cutting by large ones. FTC initiated a 
strong enforcement effort in the early 1940s. More lawsuits started to emerge. Oral and 
written statements were used as evidence of intent. It was relatively easy to establish 
predatory intent (Koller 1978). Koller (1971) reported that the Federal courts had 
identified that predation had occurred in 95 out of the 123 cases. This equals to a 77 per 
cent litigated case success rate for plaintiffs. This high rate may be due to the fact that 
plaintiffs have won some cases “they probably should have lost. It seems no exaggeration 
to call this the populist era of predatory pricing enforcement” (Bolton et al. 2000, p.14). It 
was in this context when Justice Sullivan proposed that predatory behavior can be 
identified by two non-cost criteria – whether it looks “jarring or unnatural”, and whether 
it is aimed toward a particular target rather than an abstraction such as market share 
(Sullivan 1977, p.112). Alan Greenspan commented that, “the entire structure of antitrust 
statutes in this country is a jumble of economic irrationality and ignorance” (Greenspan 
1962).  
Despite the cases in which firms were found to employ predatory pricing, there 
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was a lack of economic theory supporting the presence and rationale of it. On the other 
hand, Koller’s dissertation titled “The Myth of Predatory Pricing” (1971), and the 
literature stemming from this work, was relied upon by the Chicago School and cited by 
the courts and influential academics such as Areeda and Turner (1975). 
 
3.3.4 Areeda-Turner Era (1975- 1982) 
A new era started to emerge in the 1970’s, in which law’s condemnation of many 
forms of predation was criticized. This notion gained significant support among the 
Federal judiciary and antitrust scholars (Bernstein 2001), and the legal environment that 
favored the plaintiffs came to a halt with the publication of the seminal 1975 Areeda-
Turner article. The Areeda-Turner rule basically stated that a firm should be found guilty 
of predatory pricing whenever it sets price less than its marginal cost (i.e., the cost of 
material and labor in making the last unit, excluding the startup/fixed costs). It followed 
that any price set equal to or above the firm’s marginal cost is non-predatory. According 
to Areeda-Turner, competition in an industry would naturally drive prices toward the 
marginal costs. Pricing below marginal cost, meant operating at a loss, and was 
considered irrational, except for the intention to drive out competitors, which was 
considered predatory. After competitors were driven out of business, a predatory 
monopolist could potentially recoup its losses by charging supra-competitive prices, 
which hurt the welfare of the consumers. Areeda and Turner also recognized that 
marginal cost data (i.e., how costs vary with each additional unit of output) were not easy 
to compute. In practice, marginal cost was more of a conceptual tool for economists. 
Thus, Areeda and Turner suggested the use of a per se standard of Average Variable Cost 
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(AVC) as a substitute for marginal cost. AVC is calculated by identifying those costs that 
vary with output, adding them up, and dividing the result by the total number of units 
produced (Pass and Lowes 1994). Even though there are differences between MC and 
AVC, a firm with prices below AVC is not even covering the variable costs, not to 
mention its fixed costs. Deductive reasoning follows that, in the absence of a justification, 
a firm with below AVC pricing must be conducting predatory pricing since the only 
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Figure 3.3: Cost Relationships 
 
With the lack of a major alternative theoretical model of predatory pricing to 
consider, the courts embraced Areeda-Turner AVC rule and replaced the uncertain 
factors adopted previously. As a result, the legal trend was totally reversed against the 
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ success rate immediately fell down to only eight per cent as opposed 
to seventy-seven per cent during the populist era (Hurwitz and Kovacic 1982). Areeda 
and Turner also spread the view that predatory pricing is a rare event in practice (Brodley 
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and Hay 1981).  
 
3.3.4.1 Counter Cost and Non-cost Proposals 
 Despite its increasing popularity in the courts, Areeda-Turner rule was criticized 
by economists because it did not capture the strategic factors and long run welfare 
effects. Sharp price reductions can also be viewed as market signaling that communicate 
threats and sanctions. Alternative cost and non-cost standards were proposed to overcome 
the practical drawbacks of Areeda-Turner rule, but none of them could replace the 
precedent in court practice (Bolton et al. 2000, p.15):  
 
Alternative Non-cost Standards: Some economists argued that predatory pricing is a 
matter of intent, not costs. The price could even be set higher than ATC for a case to be 
considered predatory (Shepherd 1986). 
Williamson Output Increase Rule. Williamson (1977) suggested that predatory pricing be 
evaluated as a long-run strategy, particularly from the perspective of the incumbent firm's 
response to entry. Temporary price cuts have negligible benefits and long-term welfare 
problems occur when the predator raises prices after competitors exit. Williamson 
concluded that his rule would have superior welfare consequences to the Areeda-Turner 
cost rule where strategic responses were not taken into consideration. Williamson output 
increase rule basically stated that it would be considered predatory conduct if a firm 
raised its output significantly within the twelve to eighteen months following a rival’s 
entry.  
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Baumol Price Reversal Rule. Baumol (1979) proposed that it is predatory conduct if the 
incumbent first decreases the price sharply, but then increases it again after the 
competitor exits, and this is not accounted for by a rise in cost or demand.  
 
Alternative Cost Standards: In order to replace Areeda-Turner, other counter cost rules 
have also been proposed. 
Joskow and Klevorick (Two-stage rule). Under the Areeda-Turner rule, a firm covering 
its AVC is considered lawful yet the fixed costs remain unaccounted for in the equation. 
Average Total Cost (ATC) includes both fixed and variable costs and it was argued that 
pricing below ATC for a considerable period could also be predatory. Thus, even though 
the firm may be pricing above AVC, it is still informative to compare the price to ATC. 
In one of the more comprehensive alternative proposals to Areeda-Turner, Joskow and 
Klevorick (1979) basically argued that a price below AVC is always predatory, and a 
price greater than AVC but less than ATC is predatory unless the defendant shows that it 
has or had a reasonable justification for the price: 
Therefore, the adoption of a strategy of pricing below average variable 
cost by a dominant firm confronted with entry is sufficient to demonstrate 
predation. A price below average variable cost, and for that matter, a 
price below average total cost, could not possibly be sustained in the long 
run since, to survive, firms must cover total costs in the long run. A firm 
with market power-the ability to control price-would only have an 
incentive to impose losses on itself when faced with an entrant if the 
promise of future monopoly gains made such a tactic profitable from a 
long-run perspective (Joskow and Klevorick 1979, p.252). 
 
 
In their two-stage test Joskow and Klevorick (1979) would first focus on the 
market structure to determine if predation is likely to be successful. This meant a careful 
examination of the entry and exit costs. They argued that screening out markets where 
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predatory pricing was unlikely would ensure not discouraging truly competitive price 
competition. The assumption was that only firms with market power would have 
incentives to exclude rivals through predation. On the second stage, they proposed to test 
if price was below cost. They would also determine if Baumol price reversal happened 
(price cut, exit of competitor, price rise), and see if corporate predatory intent was 
documented. 
Average Total Incremental Cost. Incremental costs are defined as the costs that will be 
incurred as the result of a decision (e.g., capacity increase). In other words, it is the 
difference between the firm’s total cost at the two output levels divided by the change in 
output. Average Incremental Cost (AIC) (also known as Average Avoidable Cost 
(AAC)), is the unit cost of the added output, or in other words, the cost that would have 
been avoided had the additional amount of output not been produced (Baumol and Sidak 
1994). As the time frame of the cost measure gets longer, more costs become avoidable, 
because there is a greater opportunity for redeploying assets that are fixed in the short 
run. Therefore, average long run incremental cost (LAIC) is the incremental cost when all 
costs are considered variable, and serves as a natural upper threshold.  
Baumol (1996) argued that combinations of the firm’s products had to be 
considered for a proper Areeda-Turner test. Accordingly, the price of each product by 
itself had to equal or exceed that item’s average avoidable cost. Moreover, any 
combination of the firm’s products had to be priced so that the incremental revenue had 
to exceed the avoidable cost incurred by that combination of products.  
 
Still, there are a number of instances in which the odor of predation is 
strong, as when an entrant airline with its six-plane fleet, operating on 
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almost as many routes, proposes to fly a route coveted by a large 
incumbent airline, whereon the latter announces that it will open for 
business (for the first time) along each of the most promising of the 
entrant’s routes. Analogous examples in which predatory pricing is the 
issue are also easily imagined. There is reason to provide the entrant in 
such a scenario effective recourse against overaggressive acts by the large 
incumbent. Accordingly, the rules for proper execution of an average 
variable cost test that are described in this article are designed not to 
offer undue protection to the firm suspected of predatory pricing  (Baumol 
1996, p.52). 
 
Other proposals included that of Posner (1976) (required AVC test, high market 
concentration and proof of intent), Scherer (1976) (full rule of reason inquiry with focus 
on intent and market structure), and Ordover and Willig (1981) (predatory conduct if 
benefits depend on added market power through forced exit). 
The following statement summarizes the position of most courts regarding cost 
before the decisive Brooke Case (1992b):  
If the defendant’s prices were below average total cost but above average 
variable cost, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing defendant’s 
pricing was predatory. If, however, the plaintiff proves that the 
defendant’s prices were below average variable cost, the plaintiff has 
established a prima facie case of predatory pricing and the burden shifts 
to the defendant to prove that the prices were justified without regard to 
any anticipated destructive effect they might have on competitor. 
 
As summarized in the above statement, AVC and ATC were commonly used as 
lower and upper thresholds for proving predatory pricing by the courts. However, some 
researchers observed that this standard was not appropriate for certain industries (e.g., 
telecommunications) (Grout 2000). Joskow and Klevorick (1979) were the first to 
recommend the use of long run average incremental cost as an upper threshold. Grout 
(2000) evaluated alternative thresholds and concurred with Joskow and Klevorick in that 
LAIC was the most appropriate upper threshold for high fixed cost industries with 
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multiple product catalogs.  
 
3.3.5 Augmented AVC rule era (1982 – 1992) 
The lower courts faced with difficulties when they tried to implement the AVC 
standard as proposed by Areeda-Turner. Cost was very hard to determine, and there were 
many criticisms toward the use of a per se short term cost test. The fact that no single 
plaintiff won a case during the five years following Areeda-Turner made the courts “a 
defendant’s paradise” (cf. Bolton et al. 2000, p.18). 
In the absence of a binding Supreme Court example, lower courts adopted what 
was called an augmented AVC rule, which also took intent and market structure into 
consideration. High concentration in markets and barriers to entry were recognized as 
enablers of recoupment. During the ten year augmented AVC rule period until the Brooke 
Decision (1983-1993), the plaintiff success rate increased to seventeen per cent and 
probably would have been much higher if out of court settlements were included in that 
figure. Bolton et al. (2000) suggested that “a more or less satisfactory equilibrium” was 
reached during the augmented AVC era. Dismissal of cases by summary judgment was 
common, and cases remained tough to win, yet the occasional excessive jury awards may 
have prevented many cases of predatory pricing from taking place.  
 
3.3.6 The Recoupment requirement Era (1993 -  ) 
Recoupment element started to gain importance in the courts during late eighties 
as evidenced by three cases leading to the Brooke Decision --Matshushita (1986), Cargill 
(1986a), and Rose Acre (1989). The reasoning used in the Matsushita Case required that 
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plaintiffs prove not only below cost pricing, but also that the alleged predator either 
recouped its losses or at least had a very high probability of recoupment. Recoupment 
would be through succeeding in driving competitors out of the market, restricting output, 
and raising prices (Sheffet and Petty 1994). During the same year, the verdict of the 
Cargill Case, in which the plaintiff had alleged that a proposed merger had antitrust 
implications by enabling the defendants to implement a price-cost squeeze strategy 
against the plaintiff, was reversed. The Supreme Court held that the proposed merger did 
not constitute antitrust harm and that the Court of Appeals had erred (1986a). In the Rose 
Acre Case, the court decided to analyze the possibility of recoupment before analyzing 
below cost pricing. The rationale was that the determination of likelihood of recoupment 
was easier than undertaking the cost analyses. It would not be necessary to analyze below 
cost pricing if recoupment was not considered to be possible (Calvani 1999). The 
recoupment element evolved into today’s final and strict form with the critical Brooke 
case verdict. 
The Brooke decision established a framework in which the plaintiffs were 
required not only to prove below-cost pricing, but also recoupment of losses suffered 
during predation. No plaintiff has been able prevail in the courts since the Brooke 
Decision (Bolton et al. 2000). However, if a company can ever prove that an incumbent 
used below-cost pricing and also intended to recoup its losses later through supra-pricing, 
than the courts will rule that this was illegal conduct because the incumbent has harmed 
the welfare of the society by diminishing the efficiency of the allocation of resources 
across the society (Guiltinan 1996). Yet, the Supreme Court did not define what an 
appropriate measure of cost is, or elaborate on the issue of recoupment sufficiency. 
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3.3.6.1 Brooke Case 
A brief summary of Brooke is provided here and the case is discussed in a later 
section. The market in the Brooke Case consisted of six main players with little price 
competition, resulting in high profitability. The plaintiff was the first to introduce a 
generic and less expensive product. As a result of the introduction of this new brand 
category, smokers of both the plaintiff’s and the competition’s brand switched to the less 
expensive product, increasing the “generic” sales. The defendant (third largest player 
with 12% market share) introduced counter generic cigarettes with wholesale prices even 
lower than that of the plaintiff’s. A price war took place during which the plaintiff 
claimed that the defendant sold its generic product at a loss. It was claimed that the 
defendant was trying to force the plaintiff to increase its generic product prices in an 
effort to minimize the cannibalization of the defendant’s premium brand and maintain its 
profitability. The jury found the defendant guilty, however that verdict was overruled, 
reasoning that recoupment was not probable (1993). 
First a plaintiff … must prove that the prices complained of are below an 
appropriate measure of its rival’s costs … second … is a demonstration 
that the competitor has a reasonable prospect [under Section 2a of the 
Robinson-Patman Act], or under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, a 
dangerous probability, of recouping its investment in below-cost prices 
(1993, pp.4702-703). 
 
Starting with Brooke, recoupment was perceived to be the ultimate objective of 
predatory pricing. Unless recoupment was probable, the general view held that price 
wars (and predatory pricing attempts that failed) were beneficial for the consumers. 
The court admitted that below-cost tests might not always be effective in determining 
whether predatory pricing was employed. Nevertheless, it chose to dismiss the 
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possibility in its administration, arguing that it would be beyond the practical ability 
of any jurisdiction to control:   
As a general rule, the exclusionary effect of prices above a relevant 
measure of cost either reflects the lower cost structure of the alleged 
predator, and so represents competition on the merits, or is beyond the 
practical ability of a judicial tribunal to control without courting 
intolerable risks of chilling legitimate price-cutting. (1993 p. 223) 
 
With Brooke, the Supreme Court also welcomed the idea of dismissals by 
summary judgment in the absence of proof of below-cost pricing and recoupment. The 
lower courts embraced the invitation and have dismissed a vast majority of the predatory 
pricing cases since Brooke.  
 
3.3.7 The Emerging School of Thought 
It has been noted that Brooke decision was the most important predatory pricing 
decision of the modern times. It set a milestone in jurisdiction, and was particularly 
crucial, as it seemed to destroy the satisfactory equilibrium that was achieved with the 
augmented AVC rule. It is important to note that almost all predatory pricing cases have 
been dismissed by summary judgment and that no plaintiff has prevailed in the courts 
since Brooke. The reason may be that the Supreme Court encouraged lower courts to 
dismiss predatory pricing cases by summary means (at the lack of market concentration, 
entry barriers, and capacity to absorb additional market share). Another explanation could 
be the Supreme Court’s skepticism that predation can be a rational business strategy and 
its disregard of modern theories of predatory pricing. Today, the survival chances of a 
predatory pricing case beyond the summary judgment phase are slim (Bolton et al. 2000). 
However, the fact that reputation effects were considered plausible in at least one case 
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(1995) was a positive development. The courts may start to integrate the thinking from 
modern theories into the jurisdiction in the near future. DOJ’s civil complaint against 
American Airlines was also based partially on reputation effects. 
The proof requirement for recoupment of losses as well as below-cost pricing put 
a heavy burden on plaintiffs to prove their case. The Supreme Court "sent a chilling 
message to predatory pricing plaintiffs" with the Brooke decision (Denger and Herfort 
1994). Following Brooke, it became very difficult to successfully prove a predatory 
pricing case in most markets either with below-cost or recoupment elements (Meeks 
1998). Proof of recoupment was a legal element additionally required by the Brooke 
Case.   
The critical Brooke Decision was not without its critics. Bolton et al. (2000) 
argued that the notion that predatory pricing was “rare and implausible” stems from early 
and old economic theory and that the new approaches have to be used to assess predatory 
pricing cases. They argued that the Supreme Court failed to take a strategic approach to 
develop an understanding of the case. The defendant successfully deterred aggressive 
pricing for an extended period in the future. Aggressive pricing was also effectively 
prevented in other markets (e.g., branded cigarettes).  
The limits of the existing enforcement stemming from earlier decisions including 
that of the Brooke Case were increasingly criticized. For example, Guiltinan and 
Gundlach (1996b, p.88) explained that predatory pricing litigation relied on the narrow 
assumptions of neoclassical price theory. They questioned the underlying assumptions of 
the theory, which are exclusive motivation for profit maximization, possession of perfect 
information, and calculated rationality in decision making. They also questioned whether 
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or not the welfare of the consumers should be judged solely on the basis of allocative 
efficiency. Ordover and Willig (1981) suggested that opportunity cost of capacity 
decisions should also be considered. The lack of strategic theory approach and lack of 
consideration of game theoretic models were also criticized (Bolton et al. 2000). 
Predatory conduct in many industries and the inability of neo-classical theory to detect 
and deal with it became increasingly apparent. Growing literature on the inability of the 
courts to deal with the problem (Bolton et al. 2000), and the observation of anti-
competitive affects of predation on the airline industry (Oster and Strong 2001), led DOT 
to draft and propose guidelines for governing the airline industry. 
 
 DOT Guidelines: The traditional assumption of the Chicago School does not hold well in 
industries where there is a high fixed cost structure. That was the reason why DOT felt 
the need to propose a set of guidelines to govern anti-competitive conduct in the airline 
industry in 1998. Interestingly, DOT guidelines allowed for reputation effects (expected 
gains from deterring future entry by competition) as evidence for predatory pricing, and 
did not require proof of below-cost pricing (1998d). In essence, DOT was trying to 
update the rules that defined anticompetitive conduct for the airline industry. These 
guidelines are detailed in Chapter 6. 
 
DOJ Efforts: DOJ Antitrust Division Section Chief Roger Fones announced that they 
would not be using Areeda-Turner (AVC) test, but would be focusing on a measure of 
costs that the alleged predator “could have avoided had it not embarked upon the 
pricing/capacity strategy under review” (Fones 1997). It was stressed that the division 
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would not look into the very short-term average avoidable cost, but would have a short to 
medium run perspective. He made many remarks regarding the airline industry including 
“a popular misconception that predation cannot occur in the airline industry because the 
avoidable cost of filling an empty seat is low” (Fones 1997). Around the same time as 
this announcement, DOJ also took a proactive stance in detecting and preventing antitrust 
violations by suppliers. They communicated with general counsels of corporations 
offering to make presentations on bid rigging, price fixing, and market allocation, and 
distributed a booklet named "What You Should Know About Detecting and Preventing 
Antitrust Violations, Antitrust Primer for Procurement Officials" (1997b).  
DOJ filed a civil complaint against American Airlines based on reputation effects 
in parallel with the DOT guidelines in 1999. American Airlines case was the first DOJ 
brought in more than 20 years. It was seen as a tough case because of the very high 
standards of proof imposed on the plaintiffs since the Brooke Decision (Carney and 
Zellner 2000). The case is detailed in Chapter 6. 
 
3.3.8 Differing Practices among States: 
The Federal courts generally embrace the notion arising from the early work of 
McGee (1958), Koller (1971) and Areeda and Turner (1975) that predatory pricing is 
irrational. Since the Brooke (1993) decision, the Federal courts have required proof of not 
only below-cost pricing but also recoupment of losses suffered through such pricing 
(1993).   
State courts have generally been generally less demanding and more hospitable to 
predatory pricing plaintiffs than the federal courts (Sheffet and Petty 1994). For example, 
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Wal-Mart was found guilty in an Arkansas district court even after the Brooke decision, 
in a verdict that was later reversed by higher courts (Hawker and Petty 1996). Many 
states have laws to treat predatory pricing in form of sales below cost statutes or 
minimum mark-up laws (Haynes 1988). These laws can be generic in nature or may 
address concerns for competition in specific markets such as gasoline sales. Some states 
require proof of below cost sales, and some others still adopt a focus from the populist 
era such as of harm to competitors, rather than harm to competition (Calvani 1999). Cost 
criterion used by the states is usually Average Total Cost (ATC) or a form of AVC or 
ATC. State courts infer intent of predatory pricing action either from the below-cost 
behavior or from other means. The concern for bankruptcy of small competitors is higher 
at the state level than that at the federal level (Guiltinan and Gundlach 1996).  Some 
states use a sliding scale requiring differing levels of proof depending on how much the 
price was below ATC (Bruckmann et al. 1995). Appendix A includes an unexhaustive 
survey of the states regarding their antitrust laws with respect to predatory pricing.  
 
3.3.9 Insights from European Union Regulation: 
Even though the outcomes of the U.S. litigation affect the rest of the world and 
the U.S. appears seemingly unaffected from other country influences, it is still 
worthwhile to take a brief look to how a continent with a long industrial history is dealing 
with the predatory pricing issue.  
Europe appears to be more aggressive in its antitrust enforcement. Whether above 
AVC pricing can be predatory is debated. The European Commission comfortably 
employed AIC cost but one with a longer frame in order to not set the floor too low for 
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predatory claims. Proof of recoupment is not required, hence a defendant may be found 
guilty even when it had no reasonable prospect of recouping losses made through 
predatory pricing (1994c). 
The European Commission also recognizes the uniqueness of network industries 
due to the high overhead involved. For example, there is a general understanding that the 
average variable cost rule does not normally apply to the telecommunications industry 
since “the variable costs of providing access to an already existing network are almost 
zero” (1998b). Similarly, the 1998 Competition Act acknowledges that AVC tests may 
not be relevant for regulated industries since their variable costs may be close to zero. 
There is a general agreement among the policy-makers that alternative approaches may 
be necessary for such industries. Long run incremental cost (LRIC) is considered to be an 
acceptable test for such industries as it includes both capital and operating costs of the 
increments. As long as the price is above LRIC, the decision will be profitable, hence 
rational and non-predatory. In particular, LRIC is the accepted test for the 
telecommunications industry in particular. As for the time frame, neither the very short, 
nor the very long time frame is considered appropriate. However, the Commission has 
admitted that it may have to examine AIC of longer than a year (1998b). 
Moreover, the Commission has employed and is supporting the use of 
combinatorial cost tests for the telecommunications sector. Combinatorial tests can be 
defined as a sequence of tests where the revenue earned from each service or combination 
of services must cover the total incremental cost of adding that collection of services to 
the remaining services (2000a). Unfortunately, combinatorial tests can be very hard to 
calculate since it requires all combinations to be considered (2000a). 
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3.4 Critical Cases for the Evolution of Case Law 
The evolution of predatory pricing can probably be best observed through a study 
of important cases through history. The following cases were selected since they 
represent a summary of the evolution of jurisdiction over time.  
 
3.4.1 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S.  (1911) 
Standard Oil of the Rockefellers was found guilty in this classic case of 
monopolization. A major component of the case involved the allegations that Standard 
Oil had employed predatory pricing to drive its competitors either out of business or to 
force them to sell it to Standard Oil at distressed prices (1911). It had aggressively 
purchased 223 independent companies prior to 1907 (McGee 1958). As a result of the 
case, it was broken up into thirty-three geographically distinct companies (Gibb and 
Knowlton 1965).  
Standard Oil was accused of engaging in predatory pricing (pricing below ATC) 
to drive competitors out of business and then raising price above ATC to recoup losses. 
Standard was also accused of buying key input suppliers (i.e., pipeline companies) to 
control the market, of using its market power position for negotiating discriminatory rail 
freight rates, and of engaging in business espionage. Even though McGee (1958) later 
disputed the verdict of the case and argued that no predation actually took place, other 
researchers have shown that subtle predatory tactics were employed: United Rail charged 
cartel prices to the whole oil industry except for Standard Oil which got rebates. Standard 
Oil and the railroads shared the cartel freight profits. By effectively raising the cost of its 
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rivals, Standard Oil was then able acquire them at distressed prices (Granitz and Klein 
1996). Predatory pricing coupled with acquisition is more viable because the period 
during which the predator incurs losses is shortened and market power is further 
enhanced. Celler-Kefauver Amendment (1950) to the Clayton Act section 7 prohibited 
the creation of monopoly through horizontal merger.  
 
3.4.2 Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co, 386 U.S. (1967) 
In this classical example of the populist era, Utah Pie, the leading vendor of 
frozen pies in its market, brought a suit under Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 
against three national bakeries alleging that they had engaged in a geographically focused 
predatory pricing campaign to increase their local market share. The court concluded that 
the defendants’ charged less for their pies in Utah than elsewhere. The plaintiff’s market 
share had diminished from 66.5% to 45% during the forty-four month price war. The 
Supreme Court reinstated the jury verdict for the plaintiff (1967; Calvani 1999). 
Interestingly, the sales volume of the plaintiff had increased and the firm had 
remained profitable throughout the price war. The court suggested that ATC could be 
considered an appropriate standard for below-cost. It also “left open the possibility that 
prices above cost may be predatory if coupled with evidence of anticompetitive intent 
and a deteriorating price structure. The Court did not comment on whether the evidence 
in that case would support a predatory pricing claim under the Sherman Act” (McCareins 
1996).  
The Utah Pie decision was widely criticized. Nevertheless, it marked the high 
time of early era predation litigation. The winning predation cases of the time were 
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characterized by the large predators, geographic price discrimination, sales below average 
total costs, and predatory intent. Dissenting Justice Stewart then observed about the Utah 
Pie Case that “if we assume that the price discrimination proven against the respondents 
had any effect on competition, that effect must have been beneficent. The Court has 
fallen into the error of reading the [statute] as protecting competitors, instead of 
competition” (cf. Calvani 1999, p.5). 
 
3.4.3 Matsushita Electric Industrial Company v. Zenith Radio Corporation 475 U.S 
 (1986) 
 
In 1986, American television manufacturers sued twenty-one Japanese 
corporations that sell televisions in the United States. Plaintiffs’ argument was that the 
defendants conspired to drive them out of the U.S. market with predatory pricing. The 
court’s logic, and assessment of the Matsushita case became one of the most quoted in 
the following cases to come: 
Any agreement to price below the competitive level requires the 
conspirators to forgo profits that free competition would offer them. The 
forgone profits may be considered an investment in the future. For the 
investment to be rational, the conspirators must have a reasonable 
expectation of recovering, in the form of later monopoly profits, more than 
the losses suffered. . . .[T]he success of such schemes is inherently 
uncertain: the short-run loss is definite, but the long-run gain depends on 
successfully neutralizing the competition. Moreover, it is not simply to 
achieve monopoly power, as monopoly pricing may breed quick entry by 
new competitors eager to share in the excess profits. The success of any 
predatory scheme depends on maintaining monopoly power for long 
enough both to recoup the predator's losses and to harvest some 
additional gain. Absent some assurance that the hoped-for monopoly will 
materialize, and that it can be sustained for a significant period of time, 
"[t]he predator must make a substantial investment with no assurance that 
it will pay off." . . . For this reason, there is a consensus among 
commentators that predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even 
more rarely successful. . . . (underline added) These observations apply 
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even to predatory pricing by a single firm seeking monopoly power 
(1986b). 
Following the above argument, the Supreme Court concluded that the defendants 
did not have a significant chance to achieve monopoly power and subsequently raise 
prices in the U.S. market. The court also did not find that the industry had high barriers to 
entry. Since the court did not find an economic motive for the defendants to predate, it 
demanded the plaintiffs to provide more persuasive evidence. Earlier verdict of the Court 
of Appeals was reversed and remanded. An appropriate measure of cost was not defined 
(McCareins 1996). 
3.4.4 A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc. 881 F.2d (1989) 
 The case was regarding a price war among egg producers. It was testified by the 
plaintiff’s expert that the defendant’s prices were below its average total costs during the 
war. The defendant’s prices had also been less than its average variable costs for a period 
during the price war. Predatory intent of defendant’s executives was also documented: 
“We are going to run you out of…business. Your days are numbered.” (1989, p.1398). 
 The court stated that it was much easier to conclude from the structure of the 
market that recoupment was not probable, than it is to determine the appropriate measure 
of cost and measure cost. Thus, the court decided to first analyze the probability of 
recoupment before applying a cost test. If recoupment was not possible then it could be 
inferred that the low price was not predatory even if it were below cost: 
Predatory prices are an investment in a future monopoly, a sacrifice of 
today’s profits for tomorrow’s. The investment must be recouped. If a 
monopoly price later is impossible, then the sequence is unprofitable and 
we may infer that the low price now is not predatory. More importantly, if 
there can be no “later” in which recoupment could occur, then the 
consumer is an unambiguous beneficiary even if the current price is less 
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than the cost of production. Price less than cost today, followed by the 
competitive price tomorrow, bestows a gift on consumers. Because 
antitrust laws are designed for the benefit of consumers, not 
competitors…, a gift of this kind is not actionable. (1989, p.1401) 
 
 The court also concluded that intent by itself did not help determine the 
probability of recoupment, and in the absence of recoupment, even the most vicious 
intent was harmless to the system: “Entrepreneurs who work hardest to cut their prices 
will do the most damage to their rivals….If courts use the vigorous, nasty pursuit of sales 
as evidence of a forbidden “intent”, they run the risk of penalizing the motive forces of 
competition” (Calvani 1999, p.8). Not surprisingly, the plaintiffs did not prevail in this 
case. 
 
3.4.5 Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 509 U.S. (1993) 
The Supreme Court decision regarding the Brooke case has been considered to be 
“the most important predatory pricing decision in modern times.” No single plaintiff has 
won a case of predatory pricing in the Federal courts since the Brooke Decision was 
made (Bolton et al. 2000). The Supreme Court developed a two-stage proof framework 
for analyzing predatory pricing claims during the Brooke Case that no plaintiff has been 
able to survive since (Bolton et al. 2000).  
Brooke Group (formerly known as Liggett) alleged that Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corporation introduced its own line of cigarettes in the generic segment, which 
Brooke Group had pioneered, and used predatory pricing to stifle price competition in the 
economy segment of the national cigarette market. Liggett argued that the defendant used 
below cost pricing and offered discriminatory volume rebates to wholesalers. The 
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allegation was that the defendant conspired to force Liggett to raise its own generic 
cigarette prices so that it could introduce oligopoly pricing in the economy segment. 
R.J. Reynolds had 28 per cent and Philip Morris 40 per cent market share at the 
time of the trial. The defendant was a distant third with about 12 per cent. The plaintiff’s 
share (once 20 per cent at its peak) was just around two per cent in 1980 and around five 
per cent in 1984. On the verge of bankruptcy, the plaintiff introduced low-cost generic 
(black and white) cigarettes in 1980. This new category of cigarettes was around 30 per 
cent less expensive and it was an immediate success.  
As the success of the generics became apparent, larger firms responded. The 
defendant was the manufacturer that was hit the hardest. Even though they sold around 
11% of the branded cigarettes, their customers were the most price-sensitive and 20% of 
them had switched to plaintiff’s generic cigarettes. The defendant introduced its own 
generic cigarettes in 1984. The defendant was not the first to respond to Brooke’s generic 
cigarettes, indeed R.J. Reynolds had already repositioned one of its existing brands as 
generic by 1984 (1993). 
However, the defendant not only matched the plaintiff’s price at the retail level 
but also consistently undercut it at the wholesale level. A harsh price and rebate 
promotion war took place at the wholesale level. After the war, the plaintiff gave in and 
increased its prices. Generic brand prices increased by 71% and branded cigarettes prices 
increased by 39% (Bolton et al. 2000). 
 The Supreme Court held that Section 2 of the Sherman Act is not violated unless 
plaintiff proves not only that defendant's prices were ‘below an appropriate measure of … 
costs, but also that defendant had a dangerous probability, of recouping its investment in 
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below-cost prices” (1993). Unable to meet the burden of the increased level of proof, the 
plaintiff lost the case despite strong evidence of predation. The defendant had cut its 
prices below costs, had predatory intent, had decreased its output and increased prices 
following the period of price war even though its costs were pretty much constant. The 
parties in Brooke had both agreed that AVC was the appropriate standard therefore the 
Court did not discuss the issue further (Watson 1998).  
 The Brooke case brought clarity to a couple of issues to the disadvantage of the 
plaintiffs: below cost pricing would be a prerequisite to predatory pricing (it followed 
that a firm can not be held liable of predatory pricing if its prices are above its costs), and 
proof of recoupment (in form of a reasonable prospect or a dangerous probability) would 
be required. Condemning above-cost price cuts would be “beyond the practical ability of 
a judicial tribunal to control without courting intolerable risks of chilling legitimate price-
cutting” (1993). Unfortunately, this message enables the incumbents in network 
industries (which have very low AVC structure) to employ predatory pricing legitimately 
with above (variable) cost prices. 
The logic for the recoupment aspect was as follows: the predator needs to recoup 
its losses of predation to be profitable in the long run (i.e., rational), if predatory pricing 
does not result in elimination of the rival, then recoupment cannot occur. If there is no 
recoupment and the competitor is not eliminated, there is no harm to competition and 
consumers have simply benefited from the low prices. If recoupment is not possible then 
summary dismissal of a case should be appropriate. This view also shared by the Chicago 
School of thought, has its flaws, discussed in the Post-Chicago School of thought section 
of this chapter.   
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3.4.6 United States v. AMR Corp. et al. (American Airlines) (1999)  
  --dismissed (2001) 
 
The 1999 DOJ suit against American Airlines was the first predatory pricing suit 
brought forward in more than twenty years (Carney and Zellner 2000). Following the 
DOT guidelines in spirit, the prosecutors wanted to set an example for the industry. DOJ 
basically alleged that American Airlines used a temporary capacity expansion and fare 
reductions to drive new entrants out of its Dallas/Ft. Worth (DFW) hub (1999c). DOJ 
also had evidence of intent: 
“If you are not going to get them [LCCs] out then no point to diminish 
profit.” Don Carty, Chairman and CEO of American Airlines, 1996 
 
DOJ’s complaint alleged that American Airlines dominated many of the routes 
from its Dallas hub and charged monopoly prices. American controlled seventy percent 
of the flight capacity from DFW. Low-cost carriers (LCCs) were proven to have positive 
impact on consumer welfare through lower prices. DOJ complained that American 
Airlines cut its prices to a level that would not make business sense except if it could 
drive LCCs out of DFW before they could get a foothold in the market. Vanguard, Sun 
Jet, and Western Pacific were victims of the alleged predatory strategy (1999c). All of 
them were successfully driven out of the DFW hub and subsequently out of business. The 
DOJ built its case incorporating elements of game theory and strategic economic theory. 
These allegations, if proven, should have met the burden of predation (Piraino 2000). 
 The case was to go on trial in Wichita, Kansas on May 22, 2001. However, the 
Federal court dismissed the case by summary judgment before the trial date. The 
reasoning was derived from the Brooke Decision. The government had failed to show 
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that American’s pricing was below cost and that recoupment was highly probable. DOJ’s 
modern approach to the case was perceived as an attempt to change antitrust law (Priest 
2001), and time-honored rules (case memorandum and order 2001). With the new 
administration in place, it is not likely that DOJ will be aggressive to bring a new case 
forward. However, the decision to simply apply the Brooke philosophy to a network 
industry case basically made parts of the new economy (e.g., airlines, software, 
semiconductors, bio-technology) exempt from antitrust law (Carney 2001). Even so, 
Judge Morten concluded: 
The government's claims in the present case fail because American did not 
price below an appropriate measure of cost, because it at most matched 
the prices of its competitors, and because there is no dangerous 
probability (even assuming below-cost pricing) of recoupment of 
American's supposed profits by means of supra-competitive pricing. With 
respect to costs, the evidence shows that American priced its fares 
consistently above its average variable costs. Alternative, creative 
measures of costs proposed by the government are inconsistent with 
existing law, and inconsistent with an antitrust regime which seeks to 
nurture rather than throttle vigorous price competition. With 
respect to the question of recoupment, the government's claims suffer from 
a pervasive failure of proof…Actual or likely recoupment by supra-
competitive pricing finds no basis in the evidence…The government's 
theory of liability by reputation is not the law, and should not be. A 
fundamental principle of antitrust law is that it be capable of effective and 
accurate administration, and not chill the competition it seeks to foster. 
The government's reputational liability approach would violate this 
principle, permitting claims of predation based solely upon the subjective 
and unverifiable complaints of a defendant's competitors. The low fare 
carriers in question entered the core markets seeking to play a new sort of 
ball game. The government's theory — that an established competitor 
should not, and indeed, cannot deviate from its existing market strategy in 
the face of aggressive price cutting by a new entrant — represents a whole 
new mid-game spin on time-honored rules. Here American played by the 
traditional rules. It competed with the low fare carriers on their own 
terms. It did not price its fares below cost; it did not undercut the other 
carriers' fares... Summary judgment is appropriate (U.S. v. AMR Corp et 
al., Summary Judgment, 2001, pp.136-37). 
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3.5 Legal Elements of Proof 
A look into the legal elements to prove for winning a case is insightful for an 
understanding of the mechanics of the case trials. This section is based on McCareins 
(1996). 
Appropriate Measure of Cost: The courts have not agreed on a definition of an 
appropriate measure for the cost tests. Appendix A: State Law Survey demonstrates that 
the states employ many different standards. Similarly, Federal circuits do not have a 
general standard. AVC and ATC are generally used as thresholds for burdens of proof. 
The reason for the lack of a generally accepted measure is due to the understandable 
hesitation of the Supreme Court to define it (McCareins 1996). However, twelve Federal 
Appellate Courts have typically interpreted the appropriate measure as selling below 
average variable cost. 
Aggregation of Products: Whether cost calculations should be done with respect to a 
single product, a product line, or a particular outlet or production facility has not been 
defined. Some circuits have favored an assessment of predatory pricing based on the 
costs and revenues associated with a full product line, as long as the competition was not 
limited to a narrower scope (McCareins 1996). 
Classification of Costs. There involve heavily debated issues such as determining what is 
an appropriate measure of cost (average variable cost, average total cost, average 
avoidable/incremental cost etc.), and classification of the incurred costs as variable, fixed 
or avoidable depending on the definition of relevant market(s) and choice of time 
horizon. Accounting and inventory systems vary; the distinction between costs and 
investments is not clear cut, and it is hard to attribute costs to a specific product line or a 
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product in the often encountered case of multiple product lines. More recently, the 
complexity of these issues has been further elevated where whether and how above-cost 
pricing can be predatory is being examined (e.g., Edlin 2002; Meeks 1998).  
Feasibility of Recoupment: This element refers to the proof that the predator will actually 
profit from predation. This would require that once the rival is eliminated, the predator 
would be able charge monopoly prices. The predator should be able to exert the 
monopoly prices for a sufficient period of time so that he can recover his losses during 
predation and also make a fair return on its investment in predation. Evidence of 
recoupment was not a required element of predatory pricing in all courts before the 
Brooke decision, which announced that the predator must be able to recoup losses 
through supra-competitive prices for the case to be found predatory in nature. It was also 
inferred that recoupment would not be possible if the markets are competitive, barriers to 
entry are low, and the alleged predator either does not have the capacity or lacks the 
resources to create capacity to capture the market share of an eliminated rival (Watson 
1998).  
There are two general ways that a plaintiff can attempt to prove recoupment. The 
first path is to show that recoupment occurred through actual market data (supra-
competitive pricing for sufficient time to recoup). The second path would be trying to 
prove that the predatory behavior was likely to bring tacit coordination and oligopoly 
pricing. Tacit coordination would depend on similarities between the goals of the 
competing firms, product variety and differentiation in the industry, and likelihood of 
firms successfully signaling each other about price and output (1993).   
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Role of Defendant's Subjective Intent: Whether or not the intent of the defendant will 
play a role in the case depends on the circuit. Predatory intent may be admissible to 
reverse the assumption that above AVC is legal. Some courts have argued that proof of 
intent leads to illegal scrutiny through corporate documents and hence is 
counterproductive. Some have argued that intent is not important as long as the rival 
could not be eliminated through predation. Intent to monopolize may also be derived 
from attempts to create artificial barriers to entry, by entry deterring pricing, restrictive 
marketing practices, acquisition of key inputs, or aggressive expansion of capacity 
(McCareins 1996). 
Role of Barriers to Entry: The Supreme Court view holds that high barriers to entry 
enable the firm to recoup profits over a longer term. However, with low barriers, 
predatory pricing may have limited effect on competition since as soon as the incumbent 
increases prices new rivals will see the opportunity and enter. 
Relevant Market: Last but not least, the relevant market refers to the product, service or 
geographical areas that are involved in the case. Monopoly power of the predator applies 
to the relevant market through its exclusion of rivals in the market and the subsequent 
supra-competitive pricing. A product/service market should have its own elasticity of 
demand, whereas geographic markets can be local, state, national, and even international. 
“Evaluation of actual, probable, or presumed anticompetitive effects can be done only in 
the context of a relevant market. Therefore, one of the first steps in an antitrust analysis is 
determining the boundaries of the relevant market(s)…” (Enders 1986, p.24).  
 The determination of the relevant markets becomes harder when the multi-product 
nature of the markets is taken into account. Most businesses have at least one product 
 76
line, and most large companies have multiple product lines. A static analysis of predatory 
pricing may have indicated that it is irrational in a single market, however it can be 
rational in a multiple market environment where a reputation effect of predation can deter 
potential entrants in related markets (Trujillo 1994). From a legal standpoint, the relevant 
market refers to the product, service, or geographical areas that are involved in the case.  
Market Power: Monopoly power has been defined as “the power to control prices or 
exclude competition” (1956, p.391; 1979, p.272). The existence of market power can be 
simply inferred when a defendant has pre-dominant market share (1966, p.571).  
The structure of a market may be derived from the study of the number and size 
of firms, their cost and demand conditions, product differentiation, the nature of any entry 
barriers, and degree of regulation. Industry Concentration Ratio (percentage of total sales 
of the n (usually four) largest firms in an industry) and the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index 
((HHI) –sum of the squared market shares of all firms) are two commonly used market 
structure indicators. However, the calculations for both measures need to be based on the 
relevant market figures to be meaningful. 
Application of performance based market power tests include practical or 
conceptual difficulties, hence most studies use market structure tests. Previous studies 
have generally shown a positive correlation between market concentration and 
profitability (Shepherd 1970) (though the actual relationship may be more complex due 
to omitted third variables (Bharadwaj and Varadarajan 2004)). 
The U.S. Department of Justice's merger guidelines suggest that an HHI over 
1,000 may raise antitrust concerns (1997a). According to the 1992 DOJ/FTC Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines, markets with an HHI greater than 1800 are considered "highly 
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concentrated," and the DOJ/FTC will not approve mergers and acquisitions in highly 
concentrated markets if there is even a slight increase in the HHI (1997a). Courts will not 
predation credible unless the incumbent has market power.  
 
3.6 The State of the Debate on Predatory Pricing 
The purpose of the Antitrust Act and its application in the courts is a continuously 
debated topic. As mentioned previously, there are two main schools of thought. The 
Chicago School of thought based on the neo-classical theories argues that predatory 
pricing is “rarely tried and even more rarely successful” (1986b). On the other side, the 
emerging Post-Chicago School of thought argues that there is plenty of evidence that new 
approaches such as strategic theory and game theoretic models provide that predatory 
pricing can be rational and profitable for the predator (Bolton et al. 2000). The two 
schools are compared next:  
 
3.6.1 The Chicago School 
In an early work that continues to influence the courts today, McGee (1958) 
studied the 1911 Standard Oil Case, which was considered to be the classic case of 
predation. He found no evidence in the case trial records that Standard Oil had indeed had 
cut its prices below cost to drive out smaller competition and later intended to increase 
prices. He argued that predatory pricing by Standard Oil would have been irrational 
because of the relatively larger losses it would have had to suffer due to its higher market 
share. He also argued that the prey would not be inclined to leave the market since it 
knows that the predator cannot afford such large losses infinitely. Funding for the prey 
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would not be a problem either since capital markets would effectively step in as long as it 
is an efficient producer. He claimed that the predator would not have gained anything 
even if it could drive competition out of the marketplace because the prey, a purchaser of 
prey’s assets or new competition could enter the market as soon as the predator increases 
its prices.  
With the lack of a rival theory, McGee’s (1958) analysis was considered to be the 
only coherent economic theory of predatory pricing (Bolton et al. 2000). Other scholars 
such as Koller (1971; 1978); Areeda and Turner (1975; 1996), Harold Demsetz (1973), 
Demsetz and Weiss (1975); George Stigler (1987); and Wesley Liebeler (1986) expanded 
upon this work and built the foundation of the Chicago School of thought. During the 
nineties however, despite the late effort by John Lott (1999; 1996) the Chicago School 
seems to have lost its dominance in academic journals.2  
Free enterprise institutes carry on the mission of the Chicago School. Institutes 
such as the American Enterprise Institute, Heritage Foundation, and Cato Institute 
(www.cato.org) promote free markets and limited government. They sponsor Chicago 
School stream of research through their funding which comes from foundations, 
corporations, and individuals. They maintain numerous web sites and publish journals, 
magazines, and newsletters to keep the Chicago torch burning. Foer and Lande (1999) 
reported that each of the above institutions spends around up to $30 million and argued 
that their lobbying has resulted in considerable decline in Federal antitrust funding over 
time.  
The courts continue to empathize with the Chicago School and have been 
                                                 
2 I am joined by Bolton et al. (2000), and Sappington and Sidak (2000) in my critical view against 
the validity of Lott’s findings. 
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exercising it as though there are no opposing theories. Judges who have openly sided 
with the Chicago School include judges Bork (1978) and Easterbrook (1984; 1981). 
There seems to be a prejudice that most cases are brought forward by the small 
companies to create heavy litigation costs for large corporations. For example, Judge 
Easterbrook estimated the average cost of a predation case for a major corporation to be 
around $30M and even went as far to argue that the antitrust offense of predation should 
be forgotten (Easterbrook 1981, p.337). 
The general argument of the Chicago School has been summarized here based on 
the work of DiLorenzo (1992). The counter argument of the emerging school of thought 
is presented in the next section.  
7.1.2 Chicago School Claim: Predatory pricing is irrational and very rarely (if ever) 
occurs because: 
1. Predatory practices are more costly for the large firm due to its larger market 
share (it has to incur losses on a larger number of units) (McGee 1980). 
2. It is not possible to continuously charge supra-competitive prices. Potential 
entrants will be lured one after another. The incumbent cannot recoup losses 
(Gomez et al. 1999). 
3. Price wars are inherently uncertain, thus recoupment possibility cannot be 
calculated accurately. A price war could also spread to surrounding markets, 
making predation even more risky. McGee (1980) argued that even though 
predatory pricing is usually irrational, it is generally rational for the victim to hold 
on because predatory pricing strategies represent temporary cuts in prices. 
Furthermore, Easterbrook (1981) argued that the victim has the same incentive as 
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the predator to outlast its rival and possibly collect eventual monopoly rents. In 
expectation of supra-normal price levels and profits that will follow the price war, 
capital markets can step in and help the prey. Thus, deep pockets argument will 
not hold (Gattuso and Boudreaux 1999). 
4. The prey firm can shut down and wait for supra-normal prices. In the meantime, if 
they go out of business, someone else can take over.  
5. There are opportunity costs associated with the funds allegedly used for predation 
by the large firm. 
6. Consumers could potentially stock up during predation; limiting quantity per 
consumer also would not work as competition would step in and supply the 
unserved demand. 
7. Victims can arrange for long term contracts above predation prices with 
customers if they also realize that monopoly prices will follow. Since the 
customers will benefit from the prey’s continued existence as a supplier, they may 
agree to such long term agreements to buy at a truly competitive price. 
8. Anticipated monopoly profits have to be discounted to present value, diminishing 
any value predation may have had. Indeed, the future recoupments must be 
discounted by the probability that monopoly power will not be achieved, and then 
discounted again to present value (Easterbrook 1981, p.272). Acquisition is a 
much more profitable way of eliminating a competitor (Gomez et al. 1999).  
 
According to the Chicago School, economic efficiency of the market should be 
the goal of antitrust (Bork 1978). This interpretation evolves around maximizing 
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productive and allocative efficiency. The productive efficiency is simply defined as the 
ratio of the outputs in relation to the inputs the companies employed. Allocative 
efficiency refers to the general efficiency of the markets and involves how the limited 
societal resources should be allocated across industries. Allocative efficiency in general is 
referred to as the consumer welfare (Gundlach 1995).  
The stance regarding merger and acquisitions is also a very important antitrust 
issue. It is also related to predation since mergers and acquisitions typically lead to 
dominant market power for the firms involved, the prerequisite for predatory pricing. The 
Chicago School view of mergers can be summarized as follows: as long as benefits 
(productive efficiency benefits to merging firms, and allocative efficiency benefits to 
consumers) of a proposed merger is not lower than the potential loss to the competitors, it 
would not be seen as a violation of antitrust. Similarly, the Chicago School claims that in 
an industry with two levels where the production is monopolized and distribution is 
competitive (i.e., gasoline), the monopolist cannot increase its profits by acquiring the 
distributors. Increasing the retail markup will mean decreasing the producer markup by 
the same amount. The monopolist cannot maximize its profits beyond the monopoly 
profits (Posner 1976). 
The intent and drastic price cuts that the populist era emphasized are not 
important for Chicago School: “intent plays no useful role… Firms “intend” to do all the 
business they can, to crush the rivals if they can…[A] desire to extinguish one’s rival’s is 
entirely consistent with, [and] often is the motive behind, competition…[P]rice 
reductions are carried out in a pursuit of sales, at others’ expense. Entrepreneurs who 
work hardest to cut their prices will do the most damage to their rivals…” (1989, 
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pp.1401-1402). It follows that the intention to compete is not different than the intention 
to exclude a rival. 
Some Chicago School extremists take the position even further by claiming that 
below cost pricing should also be legal. It has been argued that meeting price cuts, 
discounting for introducing new products and excess capacity of perishable products are 
already acceptable reasons for below cost pricing (Boudreaux and Kleit 1996). It was 
proposed that all government monopolies including the postal service and public schools 
be deregulated (Boudreaux and Kleit 1996b) and that all direct competitor suits be 
prohibited (Boudreaux and Kleit 1996a). 
The Federal Courts attempt to detect cases of predatory pricing through the 
assumptions and the logic of Chicago School which is derived from the neo-classical 
price theory view (Guiltinan and Gundlach 1996). Figure 3.4 illustrates the decision-
making criteria that the Federal courts use today.  
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Is the defendant sacrificing current profits?
1. Cost-based Tests 
Are the Relevant Competitors Affected?
1. Exit? 
2. Reduce Output? 
3. Decide not to Enter?













Harm to consumer and
competitive process














3.6.2 Post-Chicago School of Thought  
Even though Koller (1971), Areeda and Turner (1975) and other earlier literature 
provided seemingly counter evidence for a rationale of the existence of predatory pricing, 
the claim for a myth of predatory pricing remained unjustified (Bolton et al. 2000). Koller 
had reported that out of 23 cases he studied, actual predation was attempted in seven 
(30%) and achieved in four cases (17%). Zerbe and Mumford (1996) studied the same 
cases since 1940 and updated them until 1982. They detected predatory pricing in 27 out 
of 40 (68%) of the cases. 
Both of these studies probably under-reported the cases of predation because they 
did not include settlements, predatory disciplining where no suit is filed, forced 
acquisitions, and cases that were not filed because supporting theory was not yet 
 84
discovered or known (Bolton et al. 2000). Granitz and Klein (1996) conducted a re-
assessment of the Standard Oil case, and on contrary to McGee's (1958) work found 
evidence that predation had occurred. Perhaps, actual predatory pricing cases are not as 
rare as the courts have concluded (Adams and Brock 1996). “Exclusionary strategies are 
frequent, not exceptional business practices”(Brodley and Hay 1981, p.1045). Bolton et 
al. (2000) argued that there is now a consensus in modern economics that predatory 
pricing can be a rational and successful business practice. They indeed made the claim 
that no major article has had a counter statement during the last three decades. Many 
weaknesses of the Areeda-Turner rule and the Chicago School arguments have been 
reported (McCall 1987). 
Many of the early critics of Areeda-Turner focused on its short run focus. For 
example, Joskow and Klevorick (1979) argued that “...to dismiss entirely an assessment 
of long-run effects, as for example Areeda and Turner seem to do, is to dismiss the 
essence of the predatory pricing problem.” Williamson (1977) argued that temporary 
price cuts have negligible benefits and resulted in long-term social welfare problems. 
The solely cost based approach of Areeda-Turner was also criticized for being 
impractical. Accounting and inventory systems vary; the distinction between costs and 
investments is not clear cut; and it is hard to attribute costs to a specific product line or 
product in the often seen case of multiple product lines. Areeda-Turner cost-based tests 
are difficult to apply due to the multi-product nature of most businesses (Gomez et al. 
1999). The emerging view’s counter arguments of the Chicago School are summarized 
below, and additional points follow. 
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7.2.2 Post-Chicago School Response: Predatory pricing can be rational and may 
frequently occur because: 
1. Predatory practices are not necessarily costly for the large firm due to its larger 
market share because predation does not occur in every segment of the market. It is 
usually geographically or otherwise localized to a segment. Instead, the predator 
may subsidize its local losses by its profits in other segments and wage war much 
longer. 
2. It may be possible to charge supra-competitive prices due to high barriers to entry, 
reputation and other signaling effects. Potentially more efficient entrants see what 
happened to the previous entrant, and may decide not to commit the high level of 
resources needed to fight the incumbent. A valid purpose of predation may be to 
develop a reputation as a tough competitor (Comanor and Frech 1993), (Kreps and 
Wilson 1982). Bad lock-ins in network industries may result in loss of welfare.  
3. Price wars often result in the destruction of the small competitors due to the deeper 
pockets of the predators. Capital markets will not necessarily step in and help the 
prey because of reputation effects. “Each time a start-up is driven out of a market, 
the difficulty of obtaining funding ratches up a notch.” The fact that there is no 
readily available financing for a start-up that has faced predatory practices is a direct 
contradiction of Chicago theory. Lenders normally require substantial security, a 
demonstrated ability to repay. If the loan is perceived to be risky, higher interest 
rates will result. It is not likely for prudent lenders to give credit at all to a small 
prey facing predation by a large and experienced firm (Atwood 1998).  
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4. It is not realistic to argue that the prey firm can shut down and wait for supra-normal 
prices. Brand equity is hard to build up and customers value continuity of products 
and services. 
5. There are opportunity costs associated with the funds allegedly used for predation by 
the large firm, however there are opportunity costs associated to the capital of 
potentially more effective entrants as well. They will not enter the market if they 
have other options where they are not likely to meet with predation. Moreover, the 
opportunity cost argument presents a rationale for predatory pricing. Foregone 
profits, that would have been earned if the monopolist had employed its assets in 
alternative options rather than using them to predate in the subject market, also 
represent costs (Ordover and Willig 1981). Comanor and Frech (1993) argued that 
the predator incurs losses from an economic sense, but not necessarily from an 
accounting sense. The loss is the lower profits than otherwise could have been 
earned. 
6. The argument that consumers could potentially stock up during predation, simply 
does not hold for network industries (e.g., transportation, software, 
telecommunications) and services and is not practical for many other industries. 
Customers would not engage in long-term contracts above predation prices unless 
they realize the full implications of the ongoing predatory pricing. They normally 
would try to maximize their short run returns as long as they believe they have 
alternate suppliers. Moreover, long term contract argument does not hold for 
consumer markets (e.g., airlines). 
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7. Anticipated monopoly profits may have to be discounted, however the strategic 
long-term gains also need to be built into the equation. What would the incumbent’s 
losses be if it had remained inactive? How many potential entries were discouraged 
by the predatory behavior? These are hard to estimate but the long term impact on 
business is not. Recouping the investment may be much easier than thought. Case 
studies have suggested that predators have occasionally succeeded in recouping their 
losses (Adams and Brock 1996). 
8. Contrary to what Easterbrook (1981) argued, litigation can be much more costly for 
smaller companies which throughout the case have to incur legal fees they cannot 
afford. Typically, large firms departmentalize the case as they have the personnel 
and the resources to do so; however, the prey’s management can easily get drawn 
into this side effort and drown in the increasing details of the case. 
 
The arguments above and the emerging Post-Chicago School of thought could be 
observed in the works of Klevorick (1993), Ordover and Saloner (1989), Craswell and 
Ratrik (1985). The Post-Chicago School raised numerous issues that the Chicago School 
theory had not captured before (1998a). Guiltinan and Gundlach (1996) criticized the old 
school of thought because it relies on the assumptions of neo-classical theory such as 
singular motivation of managers for profit maximization, and firms’ possession of 
complete information.  
Sole Profit Maximization: There may be practical objectives other than sole profit 
maximization. Managers may settle for satisfactory rather than optimal levels (Baumol 
1967; Simon 1979). Predatory pricing generally leads to a drastic increase in market 
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share, which if aligned to performance evaluations, may be a motivational factor for 
managers. Maximization of career opportunities has also been offered as an alternative 
for sole profit maximization (Stelzer 1987). Urbany and Peter (1994) have shown 
empirical evidence for a preference for volume rather than profit orientation. Their 
experiment indicated that manufacturing firms held a long-term perspective for customer 
acquisition and in estimating their worth.  
Rational Decision Making: Decision making under uncertainty is not rational. Guiltinan 
(1996) argued that managers do not estimate probabilities accurately when they are 
dealing with risky situations. Simon’s (1957) highly regarded concept of bounded 
rationality implies that: a) buyers/managers are not aware of their comprehensive set of 
alternatives, b) they do not know the outcome of taking a specific alternative with 
certainty, and c) they do not have the mental capacity to rationally process all perceived 
alternatives. Individuals tend to develop noncompensatory preferences (e.g., elimination 
by aspects) when faced with complex decision scenarios (Bettman et al. 1998). 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) have long demonstrated that individuals do not 
necessarily maximize their economic utility in the way predicted and assumed by neo-
classical economics. Their Nobel prize winning prospect theory essentially claims that 
individuals have differing risk preferences and display risk-averse characteristics for 
gains and risk seeking characteristics for losses (i.e., a sure $50 bonus would be preferred 
over a coin toss for $100 or nothing, whereas a coin flip for a $40 parking ticket or 
nothing would be preferred over a sure $20 parking ticket). That is, the utility curve for 
gains is concave whereas the utility curve for losses is convex and also with a steeper 




Meeks (1998) criticized the static nature of the traditional analysis and argued that 
it may lead to unsatisfactory results if cost is used as the main criterion. He argued that 
for anti-competitive conduct to occur, the price need not even be below cost, as long as it 
was low enough to deter entry, and supra-competitive prices would occur once the 
potential competition is eliminated. He proposed a non-cost based approach for detecting 
predatory pricing in transition markets (e.g., telecommunications). It was important to 
consider if the market was recently deregulated or associated with one that is regulated. 
He suggested that if the lower price was offered to a large segment of the market, it was 
probably not a static move aimed at preventing new competition. The predating firm had 
to possess market power (at least 50%). Strategic harm to potential competition had to be 
the most likely explanation for the predatory action and the barriers to entry had to be 
high (Meeks 1998). 
Bolton et al. (2000) in their award winning effort argued that modern economics 
principles should be employed to submit proof of predatory pricing. In particular, they 
suggested that the pro-competitive dynamic gains such as reputation effects should be 
considered, and short and long run incremental costs should be employed for proof of 
below-cost pricing. Essentially, their proposal required the following elements to be 
incorporated: 
1. Facilitating market structure: “Short-run pricing power” had to be present in the 
market. This would be typically observed by the existence of one or more 
dominant firms and high entry and re-entry barriers. 
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2. Scheme of predation and supporting evidence: A persuasive evidence of 
recoupment would have to be presented at the absence of a plausible scheme of 
predatory pricing. 
3. Probable recoupment: Probable recoupment as opposed to actual should be 
sufficient. Moreover, intangible benefits from injury to competition and 
exclusionary effects would be acceptable. 
4. Price below cost: They proposed that AVC should be substituted with Average 
Avoidable Cost3, and ATC should be substituted with long run average 
incremental cost (LRAIC).  
5. Absence of an efficiencies or business defense: A plausible efficiencies gain, no 
less restrictive alternative, and efficiency-enhancing recoupment would have to be 
demonstrated. 
 
This proposal was a novel attempt to incorporate the dynamic strategic 
perspective into the current antitrust policy. Guiltinan and Gundlach (1996) argued that a 
dynamic strategic approach underlines the insufficiency of the current law to cope with 
aggressive and predatory pricing.  
In summary, the Post-Chicago School contends that it may be rational and 
plausible for firms to employ predatory pricing (Hazlett 1995). It examines the relevant 
markets with a strategic perspective, considers impact of opportunity costs, and imperfect 
information (Bolton Brodley, and Riordan 2000; Brodley and Hay 1981; see Bloom and 
                                                 
3 Average Avoidable cost: Average per unit cost that predator would have avoided during the 
period of below cost pricing had it not produced the predatory increment of sales. 
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Gundlach (2001a) for a discussion of differences between Chicago and Post-Chicago 
Schools of thought). Simply put, the Post-Chicago view is that markets are generally not 
perfect, and they are not necessarily self-correcting (Gundlach et al. 2002). Some of the 
prominent names that have supported this stream include Lawrence Sullivan, Paul 
Joskow, Alvine Klevorick, Januzs Ordover, Robert Willig and Joseph Stiglitz (Elhauge 
2003).  
Marketing perspective is well aligned with the Post-Chicago School of thought in 
its basic position. Additional assumptions of marketing to that of the Post-Chicago 
School are alternatives for assessing consumer welfare (e.g., variety, innovation, 
satisfaction), and the possibility of irrational decision making and non-profit maximizing 
goals (Gundlach 2001). Marketing could well assume a complimentary role due to its 
cross-disciplinary nature which has not yet been realized (Gundlach et al. 2002).  
 
3.7 Synthesis and a Marketing Perspective 
3.7.1 The Need for a Marketing Perspective: 
The unique position of marketing to offer public policy insights has been 
observed by several scholars working on the subject (Grewal and Compeau 1999; 
Guiltinan and Gundlach 1996b). It was suggested that a marketing focus on predatory 
pricing is overdue (Grewal and Compeau 1999). The many aspects of consumer welfare, 
which is of key concern to public policy, can be captured with the comprehensive 
marketing measurement and modeling tools that enable the study of the benefits of 
quality, service, variety, and innovation to consumers (Guiltinan and Gundlach 1996). 
The marketing discipline has the potential to further the understanding needed for the 
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development of a more suitable antitrust policy (Gundlach 1995). This potential has not 
been utilized by the courts so far. A review of the marketing mix variables could reveal a 
better understanding of predation than a focus on pricing alone. 
The issue facing legislators of predation is indeed similar to one researchers face 
when designing a scientific study. Defendant’s conduct can be presumed legal (i.e., non-
predatory) for the null hypothesis (stemming from the notion of being innocent until 
proven guilty). Alternate hypothesis would be that the defendant’s conduct is illegal 
(predatory). The risk that an incorrect conclusion may be reached always exists. A 
balance needs to be sought through the manipulation of Type I (rejecting the null 
hypothesis when it is true), and Type II (failing to reject when null hypothesis is false) 
errors, and the respective power (probability of successfully rejecting the null hypothesis 
when it should be rejected) of the test. Legislators set the evaluation criteria (e.g., Areeda 
–Turner AVC rule), imposing rigid parameters that apply to everyone in the name of 
being just. The set criteria, hence the parameters can drastically shift over time as 
differing success rates of plaintiffs for similar cases show.  In some cases, however, the 
judges may have set unfortunate examples when they interpreted these criteria too 
strictly. The influence of these (Supreme Court) decisions may have resulted in the self-
fulfilling prophecy that predatory pricing is a “myth.” Yet, the courts seem to be content 
with this situation due to their comforting assumption that predatory pricing “rarely” 
succeeds and that consumers benefit from failed predation attempts. A minimal standard 
(i.e., higher alpha level) would have been costly for the competition, because a number of 
wrong inferences (i.e., rejections through Type I error) would have a negative impact on 
desirable price cutting behavior (1993, p.226).  
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3.7.2  A Focus on Deregulated Markets: 
It was argued that price discrimination has to accompany strategic predatory 
pricing since predation is usually targeted by geography or other segmentation (Meeks 
1998). Dempsey (1989) discussed how deregulation of an industry facilitates 
discrimination. Brennan (1995) studied deregulation in the telecommunications industry 
and detected potential for predatory pricing. The same hazard was detected for electric 
power, natural gas (Meeks 1998) and airline industries (Kahn 1987). Meeks (1998) 
argued that recently deregulated industries are much more likely to have examples of 
predation than those that are not. This interesting notion is reflected in the following 












Figure 3.5: Framework for Deregulation and Predatory Pricing Relationship 
 
Naturally, industry characteristics influence all factors in this framework 
including deregulation. The number and size distribution of firms, cost and demand 
conditions, and barriers to entry impact firm strategies. However, it is also true that 









firms with high market power. Since no precedent has been set, it can be easy to employ 
price discrimination. It is particularly easy to discriminate in previously regulated service 
industries because there are few arbitrage opportunities for the consumers (e.g., leisure 
traveler cannot transfer plane pre-purchased plane tickets to businessmen on the run). 
Robinson-Patman Act limits price discrimination for commodities and does not generally 
apply to service or lease industries (1936). This enables such industries to set supra-
competitive prices. Kotler and Armstrong (1991, p.343-44) described an airline industry 
that has taken full advantage from the possibilities of price discrimination:  
The passengers on a plane bound from Raleigh to Los Angeles may pay as 
many as ten different round-trip fares for the same flight—first class; first 
class-night; first class-night, child; first class-youth; coach; coach-night; 
coach-night, child; Super-Saver, nonrefundable fare; Super-Saver, 25 
percent cancellation penalty; and military personnel. These fares vary 
from $238 to $1512! 
 
The existence of discrimination could provide rationale for predation because 
discounters with their low cost structure can be very damaging to the incumbent’s 
established price discrimination strategy based on market segmentation. For example, 
revenue management is essential to the success of the hospitality and airline industries, 
and is closely related to marketing through price. Major carriers’ predatory behavior 
against the low cost carriers has been observed in the airline industry (1998c; 1999b; 
1999c; 1999d). Incumbent firms may also employ non-predatory tactics to prevent new 






By all accounts, the 1975 Harvard Law Review article “Predatory Pricing and 
Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act” by Phillip Areeda and Donald F. 
Turner was the seminal article in predatory pricing. All U.S. courts have been influenced 
by this article in one way or another. It has been noted that the widespread acceptance of 
Areeda-Turner and the conservatism in the U.S. courts, especially since the eighties, may 
be explained by judiciary appointments by conservative Presidents, the intellectual 
influence of the Chicago School and the extensive public relations campaigns to 
communicate its aspects to the judges, and the contrasting lack of an organized antitrust 
effort (Foer and Lande 1999). Following Areeda and Turner (1975), that predatory 
pricing is rare and AVC is the measure to test the claims of predatory pricing have been 
generally presumed by the courts with some exceptions mostly on the State level. 
However, Areeda and Turner and the Chicago School have had their share of criticisms: 
Scherer has demonstrated that the Areeda-Turner rule would not promote 
long-run economic welfare, would not ensure an efficient allocation of 
resources, and would encourage firms to maintain excess capacity. Greer 
has shown that the Areeda-Turner rule relying on either an average 
variable or marginal cost floor would be overly lenient in that it would 
allow the destruction of equally (or more) efficient rivals. Dirlam has also 
rejected cost-based rules, noting that they are too rigid and would require 
difficult and ambiguous short-run cost measurements. Finally, 
Beckenstein and Gabel have argued that succinct per se rules are unable 
to deal with some anticompetitive practices and other subtle forms of 
business behavior like predatory investment, economies of scope, vertical 
integration, and experience curve learning (McCall 1987).  
 












• Uses unrealistic assumptions of neo-classical price theory (e.g., Lande 1993; 
Guiltinan and Gundlach 1996) 
• Describes the manufacturing era of the past versus the current knowledge/network 
society (e.g., Bolton, Brodley, and Riordan 2000) 
• Previous empirical findings were flawed (e.g., Granitz and Klein 1996; Zerbe and 
Mumford 1996). 
• Predatory pricing can be rational (e.g., Adams and Brock 1996; Sullivan and Grimes  
(2000) 
• Lacks a strategic perspective (e.g., Williamson 1977; Joskow and Klevorick 1979) 
• Ignores reputation, signaling effects and information asymmetries (e.g., Comanor and 
Frech 1993; Jung, Kagel, and Levin 1994; Milgrom and Roberts 1982) 
• Ignores the nature of network/service industries (e.g., European Commission 1998) 
• Ignores opportunity costs of actions (e.g., Ordover and Willig 1981) 
• May exclude (more) efficient rivals (e.g., Greer 1979) 
• Promotes inefficient allocation of resources and excess capacity (e.g., Sherer 1976) 
 
Legal 
• Cost rules are hard to calculate, impractical (e.g., Sievers and Albery 1991) 
• Short-run cost focus is irrelevant (e.g., Dirlam 1981; Meeks 1998) 
• Per se rule is inapplicable to all cases (e.g., Beckenstein and Gabel 1986) 
• Litigation can be costly for the prey (e.g., Atwood 1998) 
Managerial • Promotes selective and geographic predation (e.g., Allvine 1996) 
• Narrow view of market power (e.g., Trujillo 1994) 
• Ignores deep pockets of predators (e.g., Atwood 1998) 
Buyer • Does not promote long run economic welfare (e.g., Scherer 1976)  
 
 
 Despite these criticisms, the Chicago School has keenly used Areeda-Turner as 
the basis for their static, neo-classical price theory arguments for more than two decades. 
However, not only the contexts of predation and the nature of the problem have changed 
over the years, but also the opposing Post-Chicago views have been growing stronger 
(1998b). Hence, it is worthwhile to revisit the Areeda and Turner (1975) article and 
comment on its key limitations in today’s economy.  
The context in which Areeda and Turner published their article was radically 
different than that of today. In the Areeda and Turner world, the economy was still driven 
by production of oil, steel, and commodities. Sheer output was what mattered most. In the 
manufacturing era, it was presumed that the bigger was better, higher capacity would lead 
to better economies of scale and a better cost structure. Being large enabled them to gain 
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dominant market share and hence market power. Areeda and Turner projected of a 
dominantly manufacturing world where there is either perfect competition (i.e., many 
firms take going price) or monopoly (i.e., one firm sets the price). “The view that 
predatory pricing is rare or even fanciful is based on theoretical constructs that ignore the 
realities of markets in which oligopolistic structure, incomplete information and strategic 
behavior are commonplace” (Sullivan and Grimes 2000, p. 145).  
 The “real world” is almost always somewhere in between a monopoly and perfect 
competition, with differentiated products of oligopolies instead of commodity outputs 
and identical firms. In the real world, the firms do not compete only on quantity and 
price. It is a service-based economy that is pre-dominant in the U.S. society today. The 
small firm can be more efficient and welfare enhancing than the corporate giant. Small 
service companies from catering to transportation, and entertainment to management 
consulting can be as or more efficient than the big players. Southwest in the airline 
industry is one clear example of an efficient firm. The nature of the airline industry 
enables clear illustrations of the new issues facing the policy makers.  
 Areeda and Turner perceive two pre-requisites for predatory pricing: a greater 
financial staying power by the predator and a very substantial prospect of recoupment. 
The use of Chicago School doctrine, made it really easy for Judge Marten to decide that 
American had indeed not violated the law and to dismiss the case by summary judgment. 
American had not priced below AVC, and the recoupment of losses incurred during the 
alleged predation was not probable anyway (memorandum and order) (1999c). Yet, 
looking at the same facts, DOJ and the Post-Chicago School concur otherwise. Modern 
thinking in antitrust, dubbed here as the Post-Chicago School deals with reputation 
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effects, game theory, conspiracies to raise rival’s costs or reduce rival’s revenues and 
even scanner data input analyses where applicable. The Post Chicago School studies the 
relevant markets with a strategic perspective and considers the firm’s opportunity costs of 
its actions. 
 The current antitrust enforcement does not consider the differences in competitive 
reaction to entry by intra- and inter-type companies. This purposeful ignorance extends 
from the Pre-Areeda-Turner enforcement era heavily criticized by the Chicago School. 
The Robinson Patman Act (1936) was passed with the general intent of protecting the 
mom-and-pop stores from the chain-store revolution. Many small stores won cases of 
predatory pricing against the large (and generally more efficient) chains until Areeda-
Turner set the tone for the rest of the century, and the objective of antitrust became 
guarding the competitive process and not the (small) competitors. For example, entrant 
Wall-Mart grew as a discounter by undercutting the high-service/high cost department 
stores and established itself as one of the largest retailers in the world. The incumbent 
local mom-and-pop stores did not have much other than their older but loyal clientele to 
defend themselves against the chains. The stores that were less efficient simply faded 
away.   
 Areeda and Turner (1975) utilized a number of purely theoretical examples to 
illustrate their points, and they readily admitted that some of these scenarios posed threat 
to long-term competition. Areeda and Turner did not believe that a long-term dynamic 
test of predation could be practically developed. They reasoned that their short-term static 
cost focus would be practical. However, the very notion of recoupment represents a 
strategic assessment of a long-term return (supra-normal profits) on a short-term 
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investment (predatory pricing). Thus, the nature of the problem imposes the need to use a 
strategic-dynamic test (rather than a short-run static rule) to assess predatory pricing. 
Today, technology enables market segmentation at the micro-level. Companies 
offer product/service lines with different levels of utility at varying prices (e.g., premium, 
standard, discount). Specialization and focusing on different market segments or niches is 
also common. Customer Relationship Management and other sophisticated marketing 
tools permit customizing the product/service offer even to the individual consumer’s 
needs. However, this targeting capability becomes destructive if predatory pricing is 
pinpointed at a local rival. For example, American Airlines did not cut prices on all or 
even most of its routes on its DFW hub when it faced entry by discounters. It cut its 
prices only on those routes in that it competed head to head with them.  This geographic 
segmentation enabled them to subsidize losses incurred during the time of predation on 
targeted markets. The revenue and losses at stake were insignificant for American but 
vital for the survival of Vanguard (and SunJet and Western Pacific which are now out of 
business). As the American Airlines case justified “devices other than a general price-cut 
may, however, be the subject of suits for predation” (Areeda and Turner 1975). Such 
selective or geographic price cuts provide the major airline next to infinite staying power 
through cross-subsidization.  
 Moreover, American increased capacity on these routes by shifting its aircraft 
from more profitable routes. Any business expanding capacity entails opportunity costs. 
“[A]ny cost calculation that totally ignores the opportunity cost component is likely to be 
illegitimate…it is essential to include all opportunity costs of ownership inputs…” 
(Baumol 1996). Foregone profits that would have been earned if the monopolist had 
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employed its assets in alternative options rather than using them for predation represent 
costs (Ordover and Willig 1981). Ironically, Areeda and Turner rule does not take the 
opportunity costs into account. Predatory pricing analyses appear to be plagued by cost 
issues.  
 Areeda and Turner have advocated the per se AVC rule, however, in their seminal 
work they also asserted that “virtually all costs are variable when a firm, operating at 
capacity, plans to double its output by constructing new plants and purchasing new 
equipment” (1975, p.701). Deep discounts coupled with drastic volume increase can 
indeed be the typical response to market entry depending on industry characteristics (e.g., 
air and truck transportation). Thus, the use of an ATC test (i.e., a less rigorous test than 
that of AVC), may be practically justified under special circumstances.   
 Price discrimination today is a typical practice in service industries and is not 
regulated by the Robinson-Patman Act. It has been shown that economies of scale can 
motivate a price-discriminating monopolist to engage in unprofitable conduct and sell 
even when the average cost is higher than the price. The incurred losses can be 
effectively subsidized with profits from other markets. This can have harmful effects on 
social welfare (Park 2000). 
 Areeda and Turner (1975) argue that “a demonstrated willingness to indulge in 
predatory pricing might itself deter some smaller potential entrants… Repeated predation 
in the same market, moreover, is not only costly but is likely to be easily detectable and 
thus the occasion for severe antitrust sanctions.” Indeed, this argument is the essence of 
the theory of reputation effects. Areeda-Turner is practically the standard rule in courts 
today. Yet, it does not equip us to detect predatory pricing in many cases in a service-
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based economy and makes it almost impossible to detect it in network industries (Carney 
2001).  Even the most deliberate cases of repeated predation may not be detected today 
because of over-reliance on the Areeda-Turner rule. 
 According to the Federal courts, (predatory) intent is at best a secondary criterion 
to consider (A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms 1989). This may have to do 
with the fact that both the Chicago School and the Post-Chicago School agree that the 
firm’s objective is profit maximization. Interestingly, a decision-making perspective 
adopted by marketing, and one that goes beyond both schools is an understanding that 
alternative and multiple managerial objectives such as survival, satisficing (e.g., simply 
meeting the Wall Street numbers), and enhancing sales, personal welfare (i.e., self-
compensation, career advancement), reputation effects, and social welfare do exist 
(Gundlach 2001). Sales management researchers have long studied the optimal employee 
compensation mix for different business objectives such as building, holding, harvesting, 
or divesting market share (Strahle and Spiro 1986). Similarly, top executive 
compensation seems to correlate positively with sales but not necessarily with 
shareholder return (McKnight and Tomkins 2004). The use of a sales/market share 
growth objective typically enhances not only personal welfare but also corporate 
reputation effects (i.e., warranted aggressive/predatory response by incumbent). 
Therefore, the courts should recognize that alternative objectives can be legitimate goals. 
For example, maximizing social welfare can be prevalent in the case of non-profit 
organizations. Often an overlooked research dimension, the nature of competition 
between organizations with contrasting objectives presents challenging issues for policy 
makers. Manufacturers may aggressively cut prices (i.e., market share growth objective) 
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to secure contracts in their main business market (e.g., copiers/high speed printers) to 
make premiums on complementary products (e.g., ink cartridges/services). Not-for-profit 
hospitals have been accused of abusing market power in concentrated markets (Simpson 
and Shin 1998). Competitive bidding/pricing by public universities for government 
contracts may also be considered as unfair competition by the private industry 
members/universities. This interesting phenomenon underlines the necessity of 
undertaking a broader examination of the consumer welfare construct which is discussed 
at a later section.  
 Moreover, the strategic marketing orientation of the aggressor business should be 
examined in the courts. The orientation of the business can directly impact its 
profitability and selection of performance objectives (Gatignon and Xuereb 1997). For 
example, competitor-oriented businesses would likely retaliate more aggressively than 
customer-oriented businesses in the face of competitive entry (Narver and Slater 1990). 
Predatory sacrifice perceived by managers in competitor-oriented businesses is likely to 
be much smaller than that perceived by their customer-oriented counterparts. The notion 
of perception of sacrifice requires a discussion of rationality and risk tolerance as well.  
 The state of marketing and consumer research has progressed beyond the basic 
risk-averse/prone notion and explored the role of multiple and conflicting personas and 
non-financial (e.g., social) risks and moderating roles of risk perceptions on attitude 
formation and decision making (Campbell and Goodstein 2001). Choices can also be 
heavily influenced by the framing/perception of the proposition: a teenager might drive 
through town to save $5 on a single DVD that would have cost $20 but would not do the 
same to save $5 on a pair of athletic shoes that cost $150 (Thaler 1985). Similarly, a 
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purchasing agent/jobber may fly across the world to resolve a $50K dispute on an office-
supply deal worth $1 million, but may be reluctant to do so to save $50K in a $15 million 
worth of automation equipment. Admittedly, the reluctance of the agent/jobber in the 
latter example can also be explained by other factors (e.g., complexity of the deal, 
purchase category etc.) but the point is that there are implications not only for consumer 
and small business contexts but also for million dollar decisions. Organizational buying 
committees consist of individuals with different backgrounds, departments, levels of 
expertise, interest, motivations, power, and so on. The study of the consistencies in 
irrational buyer behavior is currently a hot topic for behavioral economists, 
psychologists, and marketers. It would be fruitful to bring new decision-making insights 
to the courts (Korobkin and Ulen 2000). It was shown that decision-makers may “over-
compete” on price to maximize the profit difference and perform significantly inferior 
than rational price models that maximize the profits (Griffith and Rust 1997). Irrational 
competitive responses such as incumbents’ herding to new markets have also been 
observed (Debruyne and Reibstein 2005). Effects such as information availability (also 
information primacy and recency), biases in representativeness, categorization, and 
optimistic overconfidence can change inferences drastically (Tor 2002). As such, 
temporal, internal and external strategic reference points (historical precedents/cognitive 
constructs) complement prospect theory to explain managerial decision-making and 
predict competitive reactions (Shoham and Fiegenbaum 1999). Accordingly, managers of 
underperforming businesses would be expected to be more risk-prone (increasing 
likelihood of predatory conduct) under pressure than those of businesses that are doing 
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well. Therefore, predatory pricing (e.g., dumping by distressed steel producers in Russia 
and Brazil) may be attributed to high debt and deteriorating performance.  
 
3.7.4 A Reaction Framework for Competitive Price Reductions 
 In Figure 3.6, I integrate the learning from the literature review and present a 
reaction framework for competitive price reductions from a cost-based perspective. The 
framework illustrates how the current law might be interpreted by executives, and has 
implications for business marketers, managers, and policy makers.  
Resource base obviously plays a role but I do not want to convey the message that 
the business with the deeper pockets has the final word in predatory pricing engagements. 
Many small suppliers/manufacturers are able to defend their markets effectively. An 
important reason is that marketers typically develop ongoing relationships with their 
customers. Obviously, developments in the CRM arena have enhanced the effectiveness 
of this key phenomenon. The stronger the relationship, the lower is the price elasticity for 
the product, hence the lower the threat from predatory pricing. A very strong form of pre-
emptive market defense against predatory pricing occurs when these relationships are 
converted into binding commitments in the form of legal contracts (i.e., business cannot 
lose the buyer for a pre-specified time period regardless of predator’s pricing).    
Moreover, many bids are not granted to the lowest cost provider but to the value 
package solution provider. Therefore, bundling becomes a strategic tool and is especially 
effective when the business has differentiated itself. However, careful consideration is 
advised to marketers when employing strategic bundling since the same tool can be used 
for aggression. For example, 3M recently got in trouble for bundling rebates for its office 
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supplies anti-competitively (2003b). 
 In essence, the Post-Chicago School does not yearn for a return to the Pre-Areeda-
Turner era, it rather incorporates the learning from deregulation, modern strategic 
thinking, advanced technology, the new economy and globalization. It concludes that 
Areeda –Turner is inadequate to cope with today’s dynamic and complex environment.  
 It is my contention that the nature of the network industries is such that, when 
considered in an integrated paradigm, the use of pricing strategies for pre- and post-entry 
defense is not only feasible but also rational. I discuss the nature of the network 
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Figure 3.6: Incumbent’s Reaction Framework for Competitive Price Reductions 
Read:  
The Case of Accommodation: The incumbent businesses tend not to compete on price when challenged by 
a company of the same type. Rather, they tend to emphasize quality, design and differentiate their 
products/services. Alternative reactions include temporary price cuts to distract buyer attention on 
competitor or try to cross-sell existing customers.   
The Cases of React and Defend and Predation: These scenarios typically take place between a major 
company and a discounter. Discounter cuts the price to a level that is disturbing for the incumbent. If the 
incumbent chooses to accommodate, the discounter can establish a foothold of the market which it can use 
to drive the prices further down. The incumbents typically choose the other route of aggressive 
competition. 
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  The Network Pricing Strategy framework presented is in Figure 4.1. The 
framework has three features that should be noted. First, it represents a dynamic process a 
la Resource Advantage Theory. That is, two-way knowledge flows (competitive signals) 
and competitive responses are embedded in the framework although not explicitly drawn. 
It follows the logic from empirical industrial organization literature and the PIMS 
paradigm in that the structure of the market, the competitive position, and competitive 
strategies determine a business unit’s performance (Bharadwaj and Varadarajan 2004). 
Incumbents perceive market entry to strategic markets with discounts as acts of 
aggression and will consider retaliation. Similarly, the entrant choice for market entry 
depends on the choice of pricing strategy of the incumbent and strategic assessment of 
the market. The state equilibrium of the model relies on the incumbent’s and the potential 
entrant’s behavior. For example, the optimal pricing strategy for the incumbent may 
change even without new entry, it is only necessary to increase the incremental potential 
likelihood of entry (i.e., aggregate strategic assessment) sufficiently. Equilibrium points 
of dynamic models have been shown to be more realistic than those of static models that 
assume perfect information (Coughlan and Mantrala 1992).  
 Second, the framework is focused on a special but important type of market entry, 
inter-type entry (see section 2.4.2 for a discussion of inter-type competition). Inter-type 
competition is based on price, whereas firms with similar cost structures compete on non-
price factors such as promotion and service (Allvine 1999; Palamountain 1955). The 
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Department of Transportation and independent based analyses have observed this 
phenomenon (Oster and Strong 2001; DOT reports 1997-2000). “Entry by major carrier 
on a point-to-point basis into another carrier’s hub has become very much the exception” 
(Nannes 1999, p.4). The rules of competitive conduct between major (i.e., intra-type) 
firms has been the focus of research in marketing strategy literature. It has been laid out 
that conduct in these markets can be explained by leader-follower pricing system (Roy et 
al. 1994). 
 The framework is domain specific and focuses on price competition among firms 
with inter-type cost structures. In particular, it is assumed that the incumbents are major 
firms with deep pockets and the new entrants are discounters (that are more efficient than 
and have cost advantages over the incumbents but have shallow pockets). Therefore, 
intra-type competitors and inter-type competitors form two strategic groups of 
competition (Hunt 1972). There are “mobility barriers” that prevent changing group 
membership as suggested by the Strategic Groups literature (Bharadwaj and Varadarajan 
2004). 
 Third, the model is designed for network industries (or industries with network 
characteristics –discussed next) which are typically characterized by high barriers to 
entry. Generic (industrial organization school) and sustainable capabilities (R-A theory) 
are also incorporated in the form of market and firm specific barriers. I posit that 
developing a framework by integrating these theories reveal a scenario in which 
predatory strategies can be rational.  
 Three main factors, market power of the incumbent, barriers to entry and strategic 
assessment of the incumbent, act as antecedents for choice of the pricing strategy of the 
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incumbent. This is consistent with the classical industrial organization literature. It is also 
suggested that firm specific factors should be more influential than market and industry 
specific factors, which is consistent with the Resource Advantage theory. 
 The price levels in markets and strategic assessment of the incumbents lead to the 
decision on whether or not to enter any given market. This is consistent with classical 
economics and signaling theory literature.  
 Incumbents are expected to react sharply in markets that they consider to be 
strategic with the intention to drive entrants out of their markets. This is consistent with 
findings from industrial organization and strategy literature. If the inter-entrant is driven 
out of the market as a result of retaliation and or lower strategic prospects, it is expected 
that consumer welfare will be negatively affected. This is consistent with views from 
marketing and Post-Chicago school of thought (see Figure 4.1). 
 Next, I discuss the network industries and then develop my hypotheses following 
the five phases in the model: pre-emptive defense, entry decision, post-entry defense, exit 


































 Figure 4.1: Pre-entry and Post Entry Network Price Competition Framework
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4.1 Network Industries 
 
 Network industries have a unique and dynamic nature of competition. There are 
four main characteristics that differentiate network industries from others: 
complementarity, compatibility, and standards; consumption externalities; switching 
costs and lock-in; and significant economies of scale in production (Shy 2001). 
Complementary products (e.g., PC and mouse) require compatibility for industry-wide 
appeal and this leads to the development and adoption of standards. This notion is 
especially emphasized by firms in information markets. Consumers’ perceived value of a 
network increases as others use or adopt complementary or compatible products or 
services which leads to positive consumption externalities (Katz and Shapiro 1985; 
Lemley and McGowan 1998). High switching costs in three categories (e.g., procedural 
(economic risk, evaluation costs, learning costs, and set-up costs), financial (benefit loss 
costs, monetary loss costs), and relational (personal relationship loss costs, brand 
relationship loss costs)) cause many consumers to continue with their existing providers 
(Burnham et al. 2003). Network industries are also characterized by high start-up (fixed) 
costs, and low unit production (marginal) costs (Watson 1998). Heil and Robertson 
(1991) argued that incumbents’ reaction propensity increases with high fixed costs and 
economies of scale. Network learning dynamics (within firm, between firm and end-user 
based dynamics), surveillance, and shared resources also enhance the capabilities of 
network firms (Dickson et al. 2001). Users in network markets may derive benefits from 
the user network (e.g., e-mail), the complements network (i.e., Windows-based software), 
and the producer network (level of competition) (Frels et al. 2003). 
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Industries such as airlines, telecommunications, and software have been at the core 
of the growth of this society. Network industries are often associated with capital-
intensive industries serving mass markets. Historically, these industries have been heavily 
regulated due to the neo-classical economics argument that the social welfare is better-off 
when these industries are preserved as natural monopolies. However, the positive 
consumer experience after deregulation of several of them (e.g., telecommunications) has 
demonstrated otherwise. Other industries that possess network industry characteristics 
include: broadcasting, cable television, electricity, water, pipelines, sewage systems, oil 
pipelines, natural gas pipelines, road and highway systems, bus transport, truck transport, 
inland water transport, ocean shipping, postal service, package delivery systems, refuse 
pickup systems, airline computer reservation systems, bank automated teller machine 
systems, bank and non-bank credit card systems, bank debit card systems, bank check 
and payment clearance systems, local real estate broker multiple listing services, and the 
Internet (White 1999).  
An important feature of network externalities is the Positive Feedback Cycle (or 
Snowball effect) –the greater the potential for growth, the higher the number of future 
participants. Watson (1998) argued that as in a natural monopoly, a network industry 
would usually converge towards a single product (e.g., Windows computer operating 
system). A lock-in happens when the costs of switching from a network become higher 
than gains due to externalities. A bad lock-in occurs if inferior products win over others. 
Positive feedback cycles can cause bad lock-ins. That is why the Microsoft Case has been 
paid high attention and linked to the future of antitrust (2000b). 
Positive feedback cycles can enable a firm to achieve monopolization very 
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quickly. Once achieved it may be even harder to resolve the monopolization due to 
network effects (Rajiv 1998). Indeed winner-take-all (or most) competition is commonly 
observed in network industries with snowballing --the more the customers, the more 
valuable the product/service, the more the attractiveness of the product/service to even 
more customers (Valente 1995). Customer switching costs become higher over time. 
Also, due to the high-fixed costs of network firms, increasing sales decrease average 
costs substantially. These factors can easily motivate an Internet company to give its 
products for free (e.g., Adobe Acrobat Reader) to penetrate the market and set the 
standard (Evans and Schmalensee 2001). The antitrust standards become irrelevant 
because of the unique dynamic competition in the network industries to capture the 
dominant position in the markets. 
Network industries are very visible and include some that are key to the welfare 
of the society such as utilities, software, telecommunications, cable services, credit cards, 
and transportation (e.g., airlines). Thus, they are of uppermost concern for antitrust 
enforcement bodies. The current antitrust approach is characterized by heavy use of cost 
analysis and is not appropriate for all cases in dynamic markets, especially where high 
level of fixed costs (e.g., networks) are involved (Sievers and Albery 1991).  
Evans and Schmalensee (2001) argued that there is no cost-based test to 
distinguish predatory innovation from non-predatory innovation in a winner-take-all 
setting. The marginal cost of a network firm (with excess capacity) is often negligible. 
Average Variable Cost (AVC) test provides a safe harbor for network firms enabling 
them great flexibility to drop prices for predatory reasons. Network effects can enhance 
the effects of market power particularly in dynamic industries. Stifled innovation may 
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cause bad lock-ins to obsolete technologies, resulting in additional loss of welfare. At 
the same time, it is common for such companies to price their products/services below 
AVC for non-predatory reasons (e.g., introductory low prices to penetrate the market). 
The interconnections in network markets and the high tendency of market power in one 
market to spill-over to other connected markets make the defense of strategic markets 
even more critical.  
 
4.2 Hypotheses    
4.2.1.1 Market Power 
 Typically, the existence of market power has been simply inferred when an 
incumbent has pre-dominant market share (1966, p.571). Firm(s) may use a monopolistic 
market structure or conduct to achieve market power, which it then uses to achieve better 
performance at the expense of its competitors and the competitive process. I define 
market power as the ability to influence (pricing) conduct in the marketplace for the 
purposes of the current research. 
Structure-conduct-performance paradigm implies that higher the concentration in 
a marketplace the further it is from the case of perfect competition, the higher the prices, 
and the lower the societal welfare (Lopez 2001). Previous studies have generally shown a 
positive correlation between market concentration and industry profitability (Shepherd 
1970) among other factors.  
Establishing the relationship between market power and pricing strategy is also 
important from a public policy perspective because, in order to win a case, one of the 
elements that the plaintiff must show is that the incumbent had market power to act upon. 
It must establish that the incumbent used or pursued market power by anti-competitive 
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means.  
Demonstration of market power is typically sought through high market share. 
The structure of a market may be derived from the study of the number and size of firms, 
their cost and demand conditions, product differentiation, the nature of any entry barriers, 
and degree of regulation. Industry Concentration Ratio (percentage of total sales of the n 
(usually four) largest firms in an industry) and the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index ((HHI) 
–sum of the squared market shares of all firms) are two commonly used market structure 
indicators. 
  
 Pre-entry:  
 The incumbent’s pricing strategy for a specific market is heavily influenced by its 
market power for the market in question. Market price premiums are conceptualized at 
the three levels of strategic pricing options: supra-competitive, competitive, and limit 
pricing, which is intuitive and consistent with the microeconomics view of market 
performance. 
1. Supra-competitive pricing: This refers to pricing at levels that yield premium margins 
for the incumbent. This type of pricing is typical of a monopolist. The incumbent is able 
to reap profits at levels that would not otherwise be possible because of a lack of 
competition in the market place. Neo-classical economic theory suggests that supra-
competitive prices cannot exist in the long run because of the threat of potential entrants 
(a.k.a. theory of market contestability). However, industry observations have shown that 
firms can and do differentiate themselves and as a result, they are able exert consistent 
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price premiums in the marketplace especially when barriers to entry are high (Baker and 
Pratt 1989).   
2. Competitive Pricing: This refers to the going price levels in the marketplace in which 
the incumbent makes reasonable profits (i.e., industry average for comparable markets). 
Neo-classical theory would predict that competitive profits would converge towards zero 
in the case of perfect competition. However, since markets are not perfectly competitive, 
we observe modest levels of profits in competitively priced markets.  
3. Limit Pricing: As discussed in the introduction, this strategy is also called entry 
deterring pricing (Porter 1980, p.14). With limit pricing, the incumbent prices its services 
low so as to prevent competition. Thus, the price is intentionally set low so that entry is 
discouraged and (lower) profits are secured for a longer time. The apparent signal is low 
current and future profits (Bain 1956). It should be noted that an entry-deterring price 
does not necessarily have to be below (variable) cost to be anticompetitive. It could 
negatively influence the entry decision of a more efficient firm at above cost levels. 
Potential small scale entrants may assume that the incumbent enjoys economies of scale, 
and potential large scale entrants may assume that the total demand is inelastic (i.e., 
increased supply will lead to even lower prices) (Gruca and Sudharshan 1995). 
 Limit pricing can also be justified by interests in protecting market leadership or 
to prevent competitor growth in strategic territory. In doing so, the incumbent may utilize 
signal-jamming to influence to potential entrants’ to believe that their costs are lower 
than they actually are.  The result would be little or no profits in markets where limit 
pricing is employed. Similar to predatory pricing, the evidence so far is that the use of 
limit pricing is rare (Smiley 1988). Low prices do not deter entry (especially against 
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innovative entrants, e.g., the cases of disruptive technologies or leaps in production 
efficiencies (Christensen 1997; Han et al. 2001)), but they do diminish the chances of the 
entrant’s survival in a given market (Lieberman 1989). Furthermore, limit pricing has 
been documented to be a rational strategy in game-theoretic experiments (LeBlanc 1992; 
Milgrom and Roberts 1982a). Thus, network industries may prove to be the ideal setting 
to show that there may be more limit pricing in practice than meets the eye. If limit 
pricing can stimulate and absorb the demand it stimulates, the residual demand upon new 
entry may be too low to justify the entry effort (Eliashberg and Jeuland 1986).  
 Furthermore, both industrial organization literature and PIMS based studies 
suggest that it pays off to be the dominant firm in an industry (Buzzel and Gale 1987; 
Sudharshan and Kumar 1988). “The superior financial performance of businesses with 
large market shares is attributable to their ability to obtain inputs at lower costs, extract 
concessions from channel members, and set prices rather than be price takers” (cf. 
Bharadwaj and Varadarajan 2004, p.223). Aggregate market concentration and 
performance relationship has been found to be positive and significant in two meta-
analyses (Capon et al. 1990; Dutta and Narayan 1989). There is a well established link 
between market power and price levels in economics and strategy literature (Abunassar 
1994; Borenstein 1989) and it is expected that this will hold true for the network 
industries as well.4 Therefore, 
 H1: Market power of the incumbent and the market price premium will be   




                                                 
4 It should be noted that some scholars have argued that the market share-performance 
relationship does not exist and may be attributed to third factors (e.g., Symnanski et al. 1993). 
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4.2.1.2 Barriers to Entry 
 
“Entry conditions are central to antitrust analysis”  
John M. Nannes, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division (1999). 
 
 Barriers to entry can be defined as factors that prevent an entrant from competing 
on an equal footing with the incumbent(s) (Dolan 1986, p.602). For a particular industry, 
if the barriers to entry are high and retaliation from the incumbents is expected, potential 
entrants are not likely to be enthusiastic about entry (Mintzberg and Quinn 1996). 
Karakaya and Stahl (1989) used a broad categorization of the concept and identified 
nineteen barriers to entry. Their list included cost advantage of incumbents, product 
differentiation of incumbents, capital requirements, customer switching costs, access to 
distribution channels, government policy, advertising, number of competitors, research 
and development, price, technology and technological change, market concentration, 
seller concentration, divisionalization, brand name or trademark, sunk cost, selling 
expenses, incumbent’s expected reaction to entry, and possession of strategic raw 
materials (essential facility). They later advanced this list to 25 items for consumer goods 
markets (Karakaya and Stahl 1992). 
Porter (1980) identified six major categories for barriers to entry. These six 
barriers were cost advantages of incumbents, product advantages of incumbents, capital 
requirements, customer switching costs, access to distribution channels, and government 
policy. Barriers to entry may potentially enable the firm to recoup profits over a longer 
term and make predatory pricing rational. Multiple industry data also indicate that firms 
use entry deterrence less frequently when other barriers exist (Bunch and Smiley 1992).  
 The model posits that the market power of the firm is a primary determinant of its 
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pricing strategy. However, this link should hold true and probably be even stronger with 
the inclusion of the comprehensive barrier to entry measures that include firm specific 
(i.e., brand equity) and those determined by outside forces (e.g., regulation --tobacco 
settlement that requires new entrants to pay additional State taxes along with the industry 
giants that originally caused the case (Forbes 2005)). The industrial organization 
literature argues for the positive effect of barriers to entry whereas the efficiency school 
suggests that barriers are not necessary for superior performance (Bharadwaj and 
Varadarajan 2004). This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H2: The positive relationship between the market power of the incumbent and the  
  market price premiums will be positively moderated by barriers to entry. 
 
 It is also possible that barriers to entry could have a direct effect on the pricing 
strategy of the incumbent, thus forming a quasi-moderation effect. This should be 
investigated as an alternate specification. Therefore, 
 H3: Barriers to entry and the market price premium will be positively associated. 
 
 
 Of particular interest here are the firm specific barriers that can be enhanced as 
opposed to market specific barriers (e.g., regulation) that are generally beyond the control 
of the incumbent. Neoclassical price theory traditionally emphasized the choice for the 
industry as the strategic decision whereas the Resource Advantage theory predicts that 
firm specific barriers would be more important than market specific barriers (Viscusi et 
al. 1995). Varadarajan and Jayachandran (1999) observed that the earlier focus in 
industrial organization literature (Bain 1956) on “why some firms are more profitable” 
later shifted to “why some firms are more profitable” (Demsetz 1973), and ultimately, the 
resource-based view of the firm (Barney 1992) where profitability is determined by 
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competitive advantage. Hunt (2002, p.287) observed the state of the theoretical debate on 
the firm specific versus industry (i.e., market) specific factors:  
By the time of McGahan and Porter (1997), the entire nature of the debate 
over firm performance had changed dramatically. Originally, advocates of 
industry-based strategy (e.g., Montgomery and Porter 1991) were citing 
Schmalensee (1985) to justify their focusing on “choosing industry” as the 
key strategic decision. After Rumelt’s (1991)  replication and extension of 
Schmalensee found firm factors to account for almost six times the 
variance of industry factors (46 percent vs. 8 percent), the debate shifted 
toward whether industry choice at all, Thus, McGahan and Porter’s 
(1997) study, which finds that firm effects dominate industry effects by 
only 36 percent to 19 percent, is interpreted by its authors as confronting 
the challenge from Rumelt and others that industry, far from being key, 
doesn’t seem to matter at all. The point to be emphasized here is that no 
one now claims empirical support for the neoclassical position. That is, 
after Rumelt’s (1991) and other studies, no one argues seriously the 
neoclassical position that either industry is everything or industry effects 
dominate firm effects.   
 
 McGahan and Porter (2002) found even lower influence of industry factors on 
performance than their earlier findings (48 percent business-unit factors and 10 percent 
industry factors). Still, market-specific barriers (e.g., institutional environment) can be 
important from a public policy perspective since all types of barriers can be antecedents 
to monopoly conditions in a market (Yip 1982). Karakaya (2002) reported four major 
underlying dimensions of barriers (i.e., firm specific, product differentiation, cost of 
market entry (financial requirements), and profit expectation of entering firms) with firm 
specific barriers being the most important. His study was in an industrial setting. I inquire 
if this finding will hold true in network industry setting as well. The relative effectiveness 
of these two categories is also interesting to verify good, and potentially bad and ugly 
effects that barriers to entry may have (Han et al. 2001). Therefore,  
 H4: The positive moderating effect of firm specific barriers on the incumbent’s  
  pricing strategy will be higher than that of market specific barriers. 
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 Firm specific barrier influence would also be expected as direct effects. 
Therefore, 
 
 H5: The positive effect of firm specific barriers on the incumbent’s    
  pricing strategy will be higher than that of market specific barriers. 
 
 These hypotheses, if supported would also have managerial implications since 
building firm specific barriers is a prerogative that managers typically do not have with 
market specific barriers.  
 
4.2.1.3 Strategic Assessment 
 The model also alludes to the role of potential entrants’ strategic assessment for 
entry for the market in question. Game theoretical analyses have indicated that 
competitors’ moves are calculated by investigating its resources and entry patterns (e.g., 
Milgrom and Roberts 1982b). The resource-advantage theory advanced by Hunt (2000) 
suggests that resources play a critical role in the long term prosperity of the firm. Firm 
growth is constrained by internal management resources (Penrose 1959). Available 
resources (e.g., human resources, capital) constrain the choice of markets for entry 
(Wernerfelt 1984b). For example, employees (relations), type and capabilities of the 
aircraft, and management leadership that potential entrants have can also be potential 
resources in the airline industry context. The fit of the market with potential entrants’ 
existing portfolio would also be important. It is not likely that an existing airline would 
start flying a route that is not connected to its existing routes on either end (Dixit 2000). 
The attractiveness of the market is also an important part of the strategic assessment 
(Baldwin 1995) as growing markets are more likely to be under the threat of new entrants 
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both in the form of existing or start-up competitors (Gatignon et al. 1989). The successful 
analysis and perception of these issues have been linked to higher performance (Clark 
and Montgomery 1996). The incumbent is less likely to employ supra-competitive 
pricing and make the market more attractive for entry if it deems that the potential for 
entry for a given market by inter-competition is high after strategic assessment. 
Therefore,  
 H6: The positive relationship between the market power of the incumbent   
  and the market price premiums will be negatively moderated by the  
  incumbent’s strategic assessment (i.e., resources, strategic fit,   
  market growth) of the potential entrants. 
 
 H7: Incumbent’s strategic assessment and the market price premium will be  
  negatively associated. 
 
4.2.2 Entry Decision 
  The questions that an incumbent should normally answer before reacting to a 
competitor’s price cut are: “is the price cut likely to have significant impact on our 
sales?” and “is it likely to be a permanent price cut?” If the answer to any of these two is 
negative, then there actually is no need to react to a price cut (Kotler and Armstrong 
1991) (also see Figure 3.8). However, in practice (i.e., with information asymmetry), it is 
not very easy to answer these questions accurately, especially with a strategic perspective 
and that encompasses uncertainty. A price cut insignificant today could reshape the 
industry landscape tomorrow (e.g., the case of Dell Computers). Similarly, price levels 
that are below cost and non-sustainable today could become sustainable with economies 
of scale tomorrow (e.g., eBay.com, Amazon.com). Incumbent firms in network 
industries, especially when challenged by low-cost start-ups with drastically lower cost 
structures, tend to fear the worst (e.g., Microsoft versus Linux; American versus 
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Southwest Airlines). In high–tech industries, this fear is partially transformed into 
defensive acquisitions by leading firms (e.g., acquisitions by Ticketmaster; Microsoft; 
Cisco). However, in recently deregulated industries where merger and acquisitions have 
to be approved after a detailed antitrust scrutiny, it can be quite rational to employ non-
price and predatory pricing schemes. Thus, managers in these firms may answer 
affirmatively when they strategically analyze the two important questions. Recoupment 
may not be feasible in the short run and not even in the foreseeable future. But perhaps 
these firms are sacrificing gains and incurring losses in exchange for lower future losses 
or even survival.   
 The entrant can fairly accurately observe the pricing strategy of the incumbent. 
Upon analysis of its resources, strategic fit, the market growth, and the current pricing 
strategy of the incumbent, the entrant decides whether or not to pursue entry to the 
market. The framework suggests that the response of the incumbent will be heavily 
influenced by its pricing strategy for that market. If the incumbent were using supra-
competitive pricing, it is anticipated that it will predate (sharp price and capacity 
reactions) to protect its market power, if the incumbent were using competitive pricing, it 
is anticipated that it will react competitively (reasonable price and/or capacity reactions), 
and finally if the incumbent was using limit pricing, it is anticipated it will accommodate 
(insignificant price and/or capacity reactions). This structure has not been previously 
empirically tested, however, content analyses of reports from the popular press support 
these assertions. In the predation case, the odds are against the entrant to establish itself 
and succeed in the marketplace (exceptions such as Southwest Airlines can occur 
depending on the strategy, efficiency and the funds available). In the competitive reaction 
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and accommodation cases the entrant is increasingly more likely to survive given that it is 
more efficient than the incumbent and managed well.  
The following set of hypotheses are also supported by the signaling literature 
which suggests that price levels are indicators of market potential and the cost structure 
of the incumbent (Heil and Walters 1993, Prabhu and Stewart 2000). Heil and Robertson 
(1991) argued that that the major benefits from signaling are preemption and 
development of competitive norms of conduct, and proposed that  market power and 
antitrust action due to price signaling would be positively related. This verifies the 
before-during-after price modifications pattern previously mentioned. 
Adam Smith (hence, the classical industrial organization literature) would also 
predict that capital flows into markets with above average returns on investment. This 
capital flow could be in the form of new market entries. Still, this relationship should not 
be taken for granted. Dixit (2000) hypothesized that the higher prices would lead to 
higher probability of entry to markets (in the airline industry) but was perplexed by a 
negative relationship. Therefore, 
 
H8: Incumbents’ pre-entry market price premiums for markets with inter-category 
 entry will be higher than those of markets without inter-category entry. 
 
 The rationale for the consideration of strategic assessment for Hypothesis 
7, and the Resource Advantage theory also applies to the entry decision phase. 
Therefore, 
H9: Potential inter-category entrants’ strategic assessment of the markets will be 
 higher for the markets that they enter.  
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Pre-entry defense summary: The model posits that the main positive effect of market 
power on pricing strategy is moderated by the incumbent’s strategic assessment of 
potential entrants’ and the barriers to entry. The moderating effect of barriers to entry is 
positive. However, the moderating effect of strategic assessment is expected to be 
negative. Direct linkages from both factors to pricing strategy are also plausible. Ceteris 
paribus, the trade-off between these countervailing forces determines the pricing strategy 
of the firm. If the positive effects are dominant, the firm is likely to employ a supra-
competitive pricing strategy resulting in large fare premiums (and loss of consumer 
welfare). If there is a balance between these effects, the firm is likely to employ 
competitive pricing. Finally, if the negative effects are dominant, then the firm is likely to 
engage in limit (entry-deterring) pricing which results in lower prices in the short run but 
has negative welfare effects in the long run due to lessened competition (and decreased 
efficiency due to stifled competition and potential innovation).  
 Potential entrants’ own strategic assessment and the pricing strategy of the 
incumbent lead to entry analysis. The framework flow is interrupted, and equilibrium is 
reached if there is no entry. However, if the challenger decides to enter the market, a 
response by the incumbent is triggered as measured by a price change. This response may 
be categorized at three levels, which are discussed next. The incumbent may choose to 
predate, to react or to accommodate depending on its pre-entry strategy. If the entrant is 
able to endure the retaliatory response of the incumbent, a new market equilibrium will 





4.2.3 Post-entry Defense  
 Trend analysis indicates that the firms react sharply when an entry by a discounter 
(i.e., inter-type entry) occurs in their markets (Oster and Strong 2001). Previous work on 
competitive interaction also suggests that retaliatory actions to entry depend on the 
perception of threats (Kuester et al. 1999). Namely, it is expected that the incumbent 
would react most sharply in cases where its supra-competitive profits are threatened. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the current tests of predatory pricing are based on average 
variable cost, the courts are not effective in distinguishing predatory action from vigorous 
competition in network industries. Therefore, the extent of paired price and capacity 
reaction could easily reach the scale of predation without being detected by the courts. 
The evidence for that would be consistent with observations of market exits by the inter-
category entrants (presumably more efficient than the incumbents) which were likely to 
survive had predatory tactics not been utilized. Supra-competitively priced markets 
improve the profit margins and are more valuable and strategic from the perspective of 
the incumbents. Hence, the expected incumbent retaliation in the case of inter-entry to 
supra-competitively priced markets is predation. The reaction of the incumbent will likely 
not be as drastic in the case of entry to competitively priced markets. Finally, the 
incumbent is expected to react little or not at all in the case of entry to markets where 
limit pricing was employed (i.e., accommodation).  
 The logic of accommodation is supported by the widely established Defender 
model (Hauser and Shugan 1983) which predicts that an opposite reaction such as cutting 
back on advertising or increasing price can be the optimal strategy against market entry. 
Moreover, there are several PIMS based studies that reported that no or limited reaction 
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to market entry is the norm (Biggadike 1979; Robinson 1988; Yip 1982). Retaliation was 
associated simply with high-growth markets.  
 On the other hand, price reduction was found to be the optimal response against 
competitive entries (Gruca et al. 1992). It is well documented that hostile acts trigger 
stronger competitive actions (Heil and Walters 1993). Due to the interconnected nature of 
the networks, the number of markets that are considered strategic could be even higher. 
MacMillan and colleagues (1985) have reported that such strategic challenges accelerated 
competitive response. Swift and more aggressive responses are expected if the focal 
market of entry is viewed important by the incumbent (Chen and MacMillan 1992; Chen 
et al. 1991). Assuming that firms derive their market power from strategic emphasis to a 
given market, and that market power and price are positively correlated, it is only natural 
that the entries to markets that are supra-competitively priced would attract more 
intensive retaliation to entry than others. Bowman and Gatignon (1995) also concur that 
the retaliation is delayed when the incumbent has low market share. An incumbent that 
does not react to entry to markets where its profits lie may send signals of weakness to 
potential competitors and invite further entry. “If the strategy fails and entry occurs, 
consequences for the incumbent firm can vary depending on which strategy was chosen 
[prior to entry]. Certain strategies may leave the incumbent in a worse competitive 
position, whereas others may lead to a stronger posture after entry ” (Gruca and 
Sudharshan 1995, p.44). For example, “the airline industry has certain characteristics that 
make a predatory theory more than plausible” (Nannes 1999). To match a move is a 
strong signal by itself, indicating unwillingness to give up a position without escalating 
the war to mutually destructive levels (Chen and MacMillan 1992). Robinson (1988) 
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observed that the current strategy may influence future as well as the competitive 
conduct. Therefore, 
H10: The magnitude of the incumbent’s response to inter-entry will be 
 positively associated with its pre-entry pricing strategy. 
 
               
4.2.4 Exit Decision 
 As detailed in previous sections, the inter-type entrants are typically subject to 
aggressive price cuts when they enter strategic markets. The incumbents generally target 
their responses so that the inter-entrants are driven out of their key markets before they 
can establish their structure and inflict considerable damage to the incumbents. However, 
since the inter-entrants are presumably more efficient than the incumbents due to their 
operation and cost structures, their exit patterns would also be affected by their financial 
resources and the price elasticity of the market. When discounters enter markets, the 
passenger volume typically increases significantly more than the percentage decrease in 
average price. Therefore, the decision to exit the market will be effected by the 
incumbent’s response and the post-entry strategic assessment of the entrant. 
 Incumbent’s choice for reaction strategy sends a signal to the entrant as to how 
determined the incumbent is to deter entry (Heil and Walters 1993). A price matching 
move is a strong signal in its own right (Shelling 1960), however this move becomes 
even more powerful given the context that the entrant is a discounter with less a 
comprehensive value proposition. Accurately perceiving the intent of competitive 
reactions enhances firm performance (Clark and Montgomery 1996; Day and Nedungadi 
1994). This has further implications than just sheer financial impact of price reductions. 
A sharp price cut may cause the entrant to leave the markets upon strategic assessment 
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even though it might have made more economic sense to fight back due to a more 
efficient structure of the entrant (Gundlach 1995). Successful retaliation has been 
associated with holding a competitive advantage (e.g., brand equity), low scale of new 
entry, and low to medium access to resources by the new entrants (Robertson and 
Gatignon 1991), and all these conditions are met in the inter-type competition framework. 
In essence, the entrant weighs the strategic benefits against the threats posed by the 
incumbent’s retaliation and makes the decision to exit or stay. Therefore,  
H11: The likelihood of inter-category exit from a given market and the magnitude 
 of the incumbent’s competitive response will be positively associated. 
 
H12: The likelihood of inter-category exit from a given market and the entrant’s 
 strategic assessment will be negatively associated. 
 
 
4.2.5 Policy Consequences 
 
 Increased long-term social welfare is the ultimate goal of antitrust. Lower prices 
and competition increase the welfare of the consumers and the society in general (Grewal 
and Compeau 1999, p.3). However, if the consumers feel that the price they have to pay 
is unfair, then social harm may occur (Guiltinan and Gundlach 1996a). The courts 
consider economic harm to consumers as the best way of assessing harm to society (Baer 
1996). However, a long-term assessment of social welfare should not be simplified to 
allocative efficiency  (Guiltinan and Gundlach 1996a). For example, Bloom and 





























 Figure 4.2: Marketing Extension for consumer Welfare Assessment 
 
 
 The long-term consequences of predatory pricing (or any anti-competitive action 
for that matter) on consumer welfare are central to antitrust analysis. Marketing insights 
for a more informed consumer welfare analysis are presented in Figure 4.2 and Table 4.1. 
The shortcomings of just focusing on allocative efficiency for assessing consumer 
welfare, and marketing’s potential contributions for its operationalization and conception 








Marketing Insights Public Policy 
Implications 
Efficiency Local inefficiencies 
may disrupt the general 
efficiency of the 
markets 
An antitrust analysis that 
goes beyond economic 
efficiency 
Affordability Focus on net income is 
too narrow  
Affordability is a better 
measure of welfare than 
income 
Satisfaction  Established scales such 
as SERVQUAL exist 
Track satisfaction from 
market as well as market 
concentration 
Variety Broader definition of 
variety 
Discount for seemingly 
variant offerings. Let the 
consumer define variety. 
Price Stability  Fluctuating prices are a 
great nuisance to 
consumers. Price 
confusion is 




and legislation to prevent 
price confusion 
Convenience Non-cost based tests 
may be relevant; the 
level of convenience 
can serve as such a 
measure  
Monitor the level of 
convenience before/after 
predatory action as well as 
price levels. (side note: 
investigate unjustified 
convenience charges) 
Innovation Product Life Cycle 




Emphasis to prevent bad-
lock-ins to obsolete 
technology. Support 
superior technology by 
adoption/promotion 
Competition Track market share and 
sales but also 
signaling, reputation 
effects, and strategic 
decision making 
Fund and utilize research 
that quantifies the impact 
of signaling, reputation, 









4.2.5.1 Consumer Welfare 
Affordability. There is more to measuring social welfare than efficiency. Purchasing 
power is a classic variable considered by the Chicago School/courts in terms of price 
levels. From a marketing perspective, purchasing power goes beyond the notion of the 
basic price itself, but also encompasses the notion of affordability which includes credits 
terms, payment options, etc.  
Variety. Variety (choice) is a variable that is of paramount importance for consumer 
welfare (Guiltinan 2002; Lande 2001). A high number of players in an industry does not 
necessarily imply variety in commoditized markets. Therefore, perceived (buyer 
defined/unobservable) variety mix is more important to capture than simply supply 
variety. Marketing implications for a choice-centered antitrust policy have been identified 
from both demand and supply perspectives (see Guiltinan 2002). 
Satisfaction. Buyer satisfaction is a key construct in marketing, yet considered to be too 
difficult to deal with and ignored in welfare analyses by economists. Marketing has a 
significant history of research with the satisfaction construct for both products and 
services and has established scales to measure it. Historical data can be used to estimate 
the impact of a predatory strategy on buyer satisfaction in the long run.  
Convenience. Overall convenience associated with the use of a product or consumption 
of service can also be an important dimension of satisfaction and welfare. Related 
dimensions include decision-making, access, transaction, benefit and post-benefit 
convenience (Berry et al. 2002). Levels of convenience provided to the buyers before the 
alleged predatory action should be compared to those of the period following it. 
Price stability. Predatory pricing typically results in drastic price fluctuations especially 
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in network industries. For example, in one DOJ alleged case of predatory pricing, 
American Airlines cut its prices by 26 per cent, but then raised it by 84 per cent after 
driving out the competition (Carney and Zellner 2000). Fluctuating demand and prices 
can prove fatal especially for small manufacturers that do not hedge their risks 
effectively. Similarly, unstable prices can be a source of great inconvenience and 
confusion for the consumers. Buyers may feel the price they paid is unfair (Smith and 
Nagle 1995; Zeithaml 1988) or they may even feel betrayed. At the same time, it is 
common for price-discriminating businesses to fuel price confusion among buyers in 
order to avoid competing on price (Grewal and Compaeau 1999). Since each of these 
options diminishes consumer welfare, the social implication is to communicate/advertise 
and sometimes even intervene to prevent price confusion and unnecessary price 
fluctuations.  
 The positive impact of lower prices on consumer welfare is generally accepted. 
However, predatory pricing is detrimental to consumer welfare in the long run because 
once the competitors exit the market, the predator raises prices with the intention of 
collecting supra-normal profits and recouping its predatory investment. Moreover, the 
problem with predatory pricing is not limited to harm to consumers through the increase 
of prices back to monopoly levels. Predatory pricing, successful or not, can potentially 
reduce incentives for investment and innovation, and prevent new entry or expansion by 
more efficient firms. There are special implications for network industries such as 
telecommunication and software where the value of the product/service increases along 
with the number of users. Innovation can be stifled when predatory prices induce 
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consumers to continue to use an old technology as opposed to a superior alternative 
offered by a new entrant (Guiltinan and Gundlach 1996a).  
 Grewal and Compeau (1999) suggested that marketing researchers have not 
engaged in public policy implications of pricing until recently and that a focus on this 
issue is long overdue. They argued that developments such as the internet, global 
markets, mega-corporations, and cooperative marketing arrangements created the 
necessity of taking a closer look at the pricing and public policy interaction with 
consumer welfare in mind. After all, courts consider economic harm to consumers as the 
best way of assessing harm to society (Baer 1996). Guiltinan and Gundlach (1996a) 
argued that marketing was in a unique position to help form public policy guidelines with 
comprehensive measurement and modeling procedures, and that predation and predatory 
pricing have not been addressed by marketers until recently. Gundlach (1995) suggested 
that the marketing discipline had the potential to further the understanding needed for the 
development of a more suitable antitrust policy.  
  In all cases of exit by inter-entrant there will be a loss to consumer welfare 
stemming from the assumption that the inter-entrant was presumably more efficient. The 
loss to consumer welfare (mainly in terms of purchasing power and price stability) occurs 
because the incumbents are typically able to increase the prices to pre-entry levels and 
sometimes even higher to recoup losses incurred during predation. The long run effect of 
predation is higher prices for the consumers. 
 It appears that there is an increasing gap between the insights from the modern 
economic theory and the enforcement of current judicial policy. Government 
enforcement concern has never been higher in many years.  The new economy requires 
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new rules for the assessment of predation because of the growing importance of 
intellectual property (e.g., Microsoft Case). Increasing market concentration in many 
industries and number of mergers, are also of concern (Bolton et al. 2000). Obviously, 
measuring social welfare with comprehensive measures itself constitutes a dissertation 
topic and is well beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, the market power of the 
incumbent can be practically used as a proxy of long term social welfare and the 
following hypotheses can be tested. Therefore, 
H13: The inter-entrant’s exit will result in loss to consumer welfare (as 
measured by the increase in the incumbent’s post-exit market power). 
 
 If supported, the above hypothesis would undoubtedly generate public policy 




Table 4.2: Summary of the Framework Premises 




Antecedents of Pricing Strategy: 
• Market power leads to higher price 
premiums 
• Incumbents consider threat of potential 
entrants when deciding strategy 
• High barriers to entry prevent market 
contestability 
• Firm specific barriers more influential 
than market specific barriers 
Industrial Organization, Strategy, 






Antecedents of Market Entry: 
• Entrants will consider price levels as 
indicators of efficiency and potential 
• Entrants will conduct strategic analyses 
before entry and exit 
Industrial Organization, 
Signaling, Game Theory, Entry 
Deterring Prices, Reputation 
Effects, Multi-market competition 
 
H10 
Consequences of Entry: 
• Incumbents will respond differently 
depending on the market of entry 
Competitive Interaction, Inter- 
Intra-type Competition, Multi-




Determinants of Market Exit: 
• Entrant is likely to exit in the face of 
drastic response by the incumbent 
Competitive Interaction, 




Consequences of Market Exit: 
• Exit by will have negative 
consequences on long and short-term 
consumer welfare. 
Post-Chicago Economics, Public 
Policy and Marketing Interface 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONTEXT: AN INQUIRY OF THE DYNAMICS OF COMPETITION IN THE 
U.S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY 
 
It was a love of the air and sky and flying, the lure of adventure, the 
appreciation of beauty. It lay beyond the descriptive words of men –where 
immortality is touched through danger, where life meets death on an equal 
plane; where man is more than man.  
 
Charles Lindbergh, The Spirit of St. Louis. 1953 
 
This is a nasty, rotten business.  
 
Robert Crandall, American Airlines, 1994 (Petzinger 1995). 
 
The airline industry has certain characteristics that make a predatory 
theory more than plausible (Nannes 1999). 
 
 An inquiry of price competition in a key network industry –airlines, provides a 
unique perspective into the dynamics of competition. The main contributions of this 
chapter are two-fold: it introduces the deregulated passenger airlines as an ideal context 
for empirical research, and describes the history and competitive landscape of the 
industry. 
 Several unexpected consequences were observed as a result of the airline 
deregulation in 1978. These included increased range of services at the expense of overall 
service quality, the dominance of hub-and-spoke systems, and the subsequent fare 
structure that penalized passengers flying out of major hubs in the form of hub premiums. 
Contrary to popular belief, the effect of deregulation on decreasing fares was not robust. 
In comparison to pre-deregulation era, tickets today cost less on longer haul routes 
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regardless of the nature of competition, but not on shorter routes where low cost carrier 
(LCC –such as Southwest or Air-Tran) competition is absent. Waves of LCC entrants 
were driven out because of cut-throat competition and/or predatory practices of the major 
carriers. The existence of such practices is suggested by the observations and actions of 
the DOT and DOJ. 
 The eighties saw the emergence of yield management systems, frequent flier 
programs and the widespread use of computer reservation systems. The primary 
distribution and sales channel was the travel agencies, which lost much of their power 
after the explosion of the Internet, and the subsequent movement to cut their commissions 
throughout the industry. 
 After September 11, the LCCs have performed better than the major carriers, 
which could not respond to increased pressure to cut costs. Anticipated near future trends 
in the airline industry include consolidation attempts among the major carriers, 
subsequent antitrust action, revision of the hub-and-spoke system and re-organization, 
restructuring of corporate travel policies, and increased market access by LCCs aided 
either by federal or local governments. 
 
5.1 Historical Perspective5 
As the phrase “America on wheels” indicates, cars are often referred to as the 
foundation of American culture. However, by the 1990’s the number of adult individuals 
who owned cars were less then those who had flown (Petzinger 1995, p.i13). Convenient 
access to air service is one of the key considerations for choosing business locations. This 
                                                 
5 The historic facts in sections 5.1.1, 5.1.2 and intro of 5.1.3 have been adopted from the Air Transport 
Association web site (www.air-transport.org) except where cited. 
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chapter will present the rich history of the U.S. Commercial Aviation with its ups and 
downs and bring the reader to date. An overview is provided in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1: The U.S. Airline Industry Timetable 
 The Early Years 
1903  First flight by Wright Brothers at Kitty Hawk, NC. 
1914 The first scheduled air service starts between St. Petersburg and Tampa, 
FL. 
1918 First Airmail delivery 
1925-26 The Contract Air Mail Act and The Air Commerce Act of 1926 passes 
1933 The first modern passenger airliner the Boeing 247 can carry 10 
passengers 
1934 Air Mail Act of 1934 is enacted due to scandal regarding the mail bidding 
process 
1938 The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 is passed. CA Board commences 
1940 The first plane with pressurized cabin, the Stratoliner is introduced by 
Boeing 
1943 The U.S. builds its first jet plane Bell P-59  
 The Jet Age 
1958 Boeing remodels and introduces its KC-135 jet tanker as the first U.S. 
passenger jet, the 707 (capacity 181 passengers) 
The Federal Aviation Act is passed to monitor the growing airline industry 
1963 Sabre Computer Reservation System introduced by American 
1967 Department of Transportation (DOT) is created 
1969 Boeing launched its first widebody jet the 747 in 1969. It could carry 450 
passengers. The first supersonic plane the Concorde is introduced 
1978 The Airline Deregulation Act is passed. A new era begins… 
New Entrant Low Cost Carriers (LCCs) start to compete for markets 
1981 American offers the first frequent flier program: AAdvantage 
1982 Braniff goes bankrupt, the first case for a major airline since 1938 
1984 Deregulation is considered to be successfully completed, and the CAB is 
abolished 
Most remaining functions are transferred to the DOT 
Accusations of predatory pricing occur 
Antitrust ruling enforces equal listing on Computer Reservation Systems 
1986 People Express goes bankrupt mainly as a result of American’s revenue 
management system 
1986-89 Mega-Mergers era: Concentration increases and fortress hubs are formed 
1992 American ignites a price war with its “value pricing” campaign and causes 
many bankruptcies and the worst performance in the industry 
1993 The peak year for Travel Agency share in bookings 
1995 Explosion of the internet 
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ValueJet Crash causes misfortune for discounters 
Majors employ aggressive/predatory pricing to contain/destroy LCCs 
1997-98 Competition stagnation: No new entrants in any markets 
1998 DOT proposes guidelines to prevent anticompetitive practices in the 
industry  
1999 DOJ reviews complaints and files a lawsuit against American 
May 2001 American case dismissed by summary judgment. DOT appeals 
September 
2001 
Terrorist attacks cause turmoil in the industry that was already sending 
alarming signals 
2002- Majors carriers drop commissions to travel agents 
LCCs gain market share and force majors to become more efficient 
 
5.1.1 The Propeller (Early) Era 
 The first flight was accomplished by Orville and Wilbur Wright on December 17, 
1903 at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina. All lasted 12 seconds for 120 feet distance but it 
was the first flight with the exception of balloons and gliders. The first U.S. passenger 
flew with Orville Wright five years later in 1908 and the transportation industry would 
never be the same. 
 The first scheduled air service started in 1914 between St. Petersburg and Tampa, 
Florida. The seaplane had a capacity of one passenger and made two flights a day, and 
the service cost $5 one-way. The company ceased operations after only four months. 
Early flights were always great publicity but commercial aviation did not become 
widespread until much later.  
 World War I necessitated more powerful engines and resulted in planes that could 
fly at 130 mph. Increased power also enabled larger aircraft. However, the end of war left 
a huge surplus of planes (i.e., no demand for new planes) and many aircraft builders went 
out of business. The railroad was still the primary means of transportation for Americans. 
Table 5.1: (continued)
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The U.S. government decided to put the surplus planes to use. In 1917, The Congress 
approved $100,000 for an experimental service and the first airmail was delivered from 
New York to President Wilson in Washington on May 14, 1918. By 1920, the Post Office 
was able to save almost a day on transcontinental deliveries through airmail.  
 The fleet, able to fly at night by mid-1920s, flew an average of 2.5 million miles 
and delivered 14 million letters annually. However, the Post Office typically contracted 
private companies for mail transportation, and had no intention of staying in the airmail 
business. The Contract Air Mail Act (also referred to as the Kelly Act after its main 
supporter, Rep. Clyde Kelly of Pennsylvania) was passed in 1925.  
 The Air Commerce Act of 1926 gave the Secretary of Commerce the authority to 
designate air routes, and license pilots and aircraft. National Air Transport (owned by the 
Curtiss Aeroplane Co.), Varney Air Lines, Western Air Express, Colonial Air Transport 
and Robertson Aircraft Corporation were the initial contract winners. They would form 
the core of the U.S. private airlines: “National and Varney would eventually become 
important parts of United Airlines. Western would merge with Transcontinental Air 
Transport (TAT), another Curtiss subsidiary, to form Transcontinental and Western Air 
(TWA). Robertson would become part of the Universal Aviation Corporation, which in 
turn would merge with Colonial, Southern Air Transport and others, to form American 
Airways, predecessor of American Airlines. Juan Trippe, one of the original partners in 
Colonial, later pioneered international air travel with Pan Am - a carrier he founded in 
1927 to transport mail between Key West, Florida, and Havana, Cuba. Pitcairn Aviation, 
yet another Curtiss subsidiary that got its start transporting mail, would become Eastern 
Air Transport, predecessor of Eastern Air Lines.”  
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 Henry Ford was also among the early contact winners. He carried mail from 
Detroit to Chicago on the same planes that transported spare parts for auto 
manufacturing. In 1927, Ford introduced the Trimotor (also referred to as the Tin Goose). 
The “Tin Goose” was the first plane designed specifically to carry people and had a 
capacity of 12 passengers. The Ford brand was assuring for the public but it took Charles 
Lindbergh’s historic flight across the Atlantic to bring flying to unprecedented public 
attention. Lindbergh became an instant hero when he completed his non-stop trip from 
New York to Paris on May 21, 1927. The Air Age had commenced. 
 The 1930 Watres Act (after one of its main supporters, Rep. Laurance H. Watres 
of Pennsylvania) authorized the Post Office to sign long-term airmail contracts based on 
space or volume as opposed to weight, and to consolidate airmail routes where necessary. 
The idea was to promote larger, hence stronger airlines enabling more frequent and faster 
mail delivery.  The Post Office held a number of meetings attended by select larger 
airline executives (thus, these meetings were later referred to as the Spoils Conference). 
The idea was to have one company operating on each of three transcontinental mail 
routes as opposed to mail changing hands between several smaller airlines until it reached 
its destination.  
 Following the victory of the Democrats in 1932, smaller airlines complained that 
there had been unfair practices in the bidding process. In one case, it was discovered that 
a big airline was favored over a smaller airline even though its bid was three times 
higher. Congressional hearings followed, and by 1934 the scandal had reached such 
proportions that President Roosevelt cancelled all mail contracts and gave the job to the 
Army. Unfortunately, the Army pilots were not familiar with the routes and the 
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corresponding weather conditions. A number of accidents took place during practice runs 
and President Roosevelt had to retreat from his plan just one month later. The result was 
the Air Mail Act of 1934. The airmail services would be run by the private sector but the 
former contractors were not allowed to bid, and the bidding process was re-structured to 
be more competitive. The resulting lower margins mandated that the airlines pay more 
attention to the passenger business. The government also put a halt to vertical integration 
in the industry and manufacturers and operators were separated (e.g., Boeing, Pratt & 
Whitney, and United Airlines) resulting in a more focused and re-organized industry. 
 Arguably, the 1930s were the most innovative period in aviation history. Safer, 
larger, and faster planes were necessary to have a feasible airline business. Air-cooled 
engines, better cockpit instruments (e.g., improved altimeters, airspeed indicators, rate-
of-climb indicators, compasses) and the introduction of artificial horizon were among the 
innovations of the period. Naturally, the wide spread use of radio was also of prime 
importance. Eighty-three radio beacons across the country were fully operational in 1932. 
The first air traffic control tower was established at Newark, New Jersey in 1935.  
 Launched in 1933, the first modern passenger airliner is considered to be Boeing 
247. The 247 had a capacity of 10 passengers and could fly 155 miles per hour. United 
Air Lines purchased sixty 247s. TWA wanted to outdo United and the search for a better 
alternative led them to the Douglas Aircraft Company. Douglas’ prototype DC-1 
incorporated and improved upon many of Boeing’s innovations. The longer version the 
DC-2 could accommodate 14 passengers and was a big hit. However, DC-3, later called 
the plane to change the world, had a capacity of 21 passengers, and was considered cost-
efficient, safer, more comfortable, with more powerful engines. It could complete a coast-
 144
to-coast trip in 16 hours. Following the marketing concept of product development, 
Douglas got American Airlines heavily involved in the design process of DC-3. The 
result was the first plane that enabled airlines the make money from passenger business. 
DC-3 became very popular and introduced many new travelers to the joys of flying. 
Despite the success of DC-3, a technical difficulty remained: The airlines wanted to fly 
higher so that they could avoid air turbulence and storms at lower altitudes. Motion 
sickness was also a problem for many passengers. However, they could not fly higher 
than 10,000 feet because the lack of oxygen made passengers dizzy or even unconscious. 
In 1940 the solution was called Stratoliner by Boeing, the first plane with pressurized 
cabin. First embraced by TWA, the Stratoliner had a capacity of 33 passengers, could fly 
at 20,000 feet at 200 miles per hour. 
 There were also political problems resulting in economic problems for the 
airlines. Before the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, many government agencies were 
involved with the airlines resulting in bureaucracy and no long-term policy for the 
industry. All the airlines were losing money due to the reduced mail revenues since the 
1934 Airmail reform. The wish of the airlines for a rational government regulation 
through an independent agency was granted through the Civil Aeronautics Act (Rhyne 
1939): 
Sec. 2. In the exercise and performance of its powers and duties under this act, the 
Authority shall consider the following, among other things, as being in the public interest, 
and in accordance with the public convenience and necessity: 
a. The encouragement and development of an air transportation system properly 
adapted to the present and future needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of 
the United States, of the Postal Service and of the national defense; 
b. The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to recognize and 
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preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the highest degree of safety in and 
foster sound economic conditions in, such transportation and improve the 
relations between, and coordinate transportation by air carriers; 
c. The promotion of adequate, economical and efficient service by air carriers at 
reasonable charges, without unjust discrimination, undue preferences or 
advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices; 
d. Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound development of an air 
transportation system properly adapted to the needs of foreign and domestic 
commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of national defense; 
e. The regulation of air commerce in such manner as the best promote its 
development and safety; and 
f. The encouragement and development of civil aeronautics.  
 
The Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA) was founded with the Civil Aeronautics Act. 
CAA was empowered to regulate fares, mail rates, inter-line agreements, mergers, and 
routes. CAA had a mission with a double edge. It needed to hold rates at reasonable 
levels for the public but also strengthen the financially weak airline business to help 
develop the commercial air transportation business. First, Air Safety Board was created to 
investigate accidents. However, that function was also transferred to CAA in 1940. CAA 
was then renamed Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). The CAB was modeled after the 
Interstate Commerce Commission so that public utility type of regulation could be 
imposed and the airline industry would not be harmed because of “cut-throat”, wasteful, 
destructive, excessive, unrestrained competition (Dempsey 1989, p.18). 
 There was one remaining factor before the commercial aviation could take off, the 
World War II.  Interestingly, just as aircraft helped efforts of war, warfare helped the 
aircraft industry. In 1939, there were less than 300 air transport planes in the U.S., but by 
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1945, 50,000 planes were produced annually. While the U.S. focused on mass 
production, the breakthrough innovations –radar and jet engines- took place in Europe. 
 
5.1.2 The Jet (Post-war) Era 
 The first jet engine was designed by a British pilot in 1930; but the first to build 
and test a jet plane were the Germans in 1939. However, it would take five more years 
for them to perfect the design –too late to change the outcome of the war. Nevertheless, 
the jet age had arrived. The U.S. built its first jet plane, the Bell P-59 in 1943. The 
breakthroughs in military aircraft were eventually applied to commercial aircraft. For 
example, Boeing remodeled and introduced its KC-135 jet tanker as the first U.S. 
passenger jet, the 707 in 1958. The 707 had a capacity of 181 passengers and could fly 
550 miles per hour. It burned kerosene, which cost half as much as the gasoline the 
traditional planes were using at the time. Pan Am was the first customer of the legendary 
Boeing 707. The same year the Federal Aviation Act was passed to monitor the growing 
airline industry. With this Act, Federal Aviation Agency was founded to establish and run 
the air traffic control system, and to monitor the safety of the overall flights (its name was 
later changed to Federal Aviation Administration when the Department of Transportation 
(DOT) was created in 1967). CAB still had authority over economic issues such as routes 
and fares.  
 Boeing launched its first widebody jet the 747 in 1969. The 747 had a capacity of 
450 passengers. Pan Am was the first customer. Douglas and Lockheed jumped on the 
widebody jet bandwagon with the DC-10 and L1011 respectively. However, these planes 
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were smaller in size, seating about 250 passengers. The supersonic plane, the Concorde 
flew the same year.  
 
 
5.1.3 Deregulation Era 
 Deregulation will be the greatest thing to happen to the airlines since the  
 jet engine.  
 Richard Ferris, President, United Airlines (Peterson and Glab 1994, p.49) 
 
 Before deregulation the U.S. airline industry was run much like a public utility. 
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) was in charge determining who would fly which routes 
and how much they would charge for the service.  The CAB would not permit most new 
companies to fly. For example, it delayed its decision on a proposal to fly coast-to-coast 
for less than half the going rate for eight years and then dismissed it (Peterson and Glab 
1994). As a matter of fact, some of the practices in the regulated airline industry would be 
considered illegal in other industries. For example, the CAB approved a war chest fund in 
which the airlines agreed to support any airline that was suffering from a union strike. By 
mid-70s the mutual aid had amounted to $350 million (Peterson and Glab 1994). In 1970, 
American, TWA, and United jointly decided to cut the capacity on their coast-coast 
services so that they could achieve higher load rates. There were no other competition on 
coast-to-coast routes and this would constitute a deliberate antitrust case for any other 
industry except the airlines. Instead, the CAB approved it and granted antitrust immunity 
for one year (Peterson and Glab 1994, p.30). Similar agreements followed. Regulatory 
structure enabled airlines to fly at half capacity to capture market share. Since carriers 
 148
could not compete on price, they were competing on non-price terms such as “sandwich 
wars.” For example, Delta was alleging that Northeast airlines did not have their steaks 
“cooked to order” as their advertisements stated (Peterson and Glab 1994, p.30). This 
dispute continued until Delta’s acquisition of Northeast (Kuttner 1996). This kind of 
subtle competition did not create winners but an industry with low profitability.  
 The notion of deregulation was becoming stronger as studies showed that 
unregulated interstate fares in Texas and California were significantly lower than 
intrastate flights after controlling for distance (Levine 1987). For example, Southwest 
was able to avoid Federal regulations by servicing the Dallas-San Antonio-Houston 
triangle, which enabled it to offer fares much cheaper than that of the incumbent airlines. 
It was asserted that regulation gave consumers excessive service, but a lack of price 
competition, and inflated fares (Dempsey 1989). Moreover, the increased use of the 
widebody jets coincided with the OPEC oil embargo in 1973. The fuel prices and 
inflation increased drastically. The result was increased capacity and cost but falling 
airline traffic. In order to assure a reasonable rate of return for the airlines, the CAB 
allowed airlines to increase fares. It also decided to not approve any new service on any 
route for four years and limited the overall capacity on major routes. However, the poor 
performance of the airline industry continued despite the fact that it cost more for the 
public to fly. The industry became a target for the Ford Administration, which was after 
regulatory reforms. Hearings of the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and 
Procedure, chaired by Senator Edward Kennedy, concluded that airline prices would fall 
automatically at the absence of government-imposed limits (1977). The major airlines 
had not taken the hearings seriously and had sent their junior executives. On the other 
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hand, Kennedy had enlisted elite academics (e.g., Alfred Kahn of Cornell) and discounter 
heroes such as Freddie Laker (of U.K.’s Laker Airways) (Peterson and Glab 1994). 
Kennedy recognized the political importance of bringing the airfares down and it 
economically seemed to make sense. Alfred Kahn had written two volumes entitled the 
Economics of Regulation and had concluded that even imperfect competition was 
preferable to inherently imperfect regulation (Kahn 1970). Deregulation would allow for 
new and innovative services, increased productivity and efficiency resulting in higher 
consumer welfare.  The CAB admitted to similar conclusions (1975). The airline industry 
“was naturally competitive, not monopolistic” therefore entry and price constraints could 
no longer be justified. Led by John E. Robson, the CAB started to loosen its grip on its 
own. Cornell University Economics Professor Alfred E. Kahn became the chairman of 
the CAB in 1977. Kahn was not happy with the existing CAB regulation. He argued that 
the system inflated fares, and caused misallocation of resources, carrier inefficiency, 
excess capacity, and acute range of services and prices (Dempsey 1989, p.20).  
 Kahn actively participated in an effort for reform by effectively using the 
preliminary results of flexible regulation under his leadership for convincing political 
figures and media. Behind the scenes, United Airlines6, and Federal Express were also 
supporting the idea of deregulation. Each trusted that the size of their fleet would give 
them an edge over competition in an unregulated industry (Petzinger 1995).   
 The theory of contestable markets in which potential market entry would prevent 
monopolies was going to be tested with deregulation. Kahn was confident that the results 
                                                 
6 Worldwide, only Aeroflot had a larger fleet than United Airlines at that time.  
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would benefit all constituents including consumers, all communities, and the airlines --its 
employees, stockholders, and creditors (1978, p.8).  
 Kahn would be dubbed the father of the U.S. airline deregulation a year later in 
1978. Deregulation first commenced on the cargo side of the business. The express 
package delivery service experienced tremendous growth since deregulation. Fed-Ex, 
UPS, DHL are all considered owners of major airlines today. 
The Airline Deregulation Act:  
The Airline Deregulation Act, a milestone for the airline industry, was approved 
by Congress on October 24, 1978 and signed soon after by President Jimmy Carter. 
Government Controls on domestic routes and schedules were discarded and the free 
market economics took over. Congress had scheduled that route and rate regulations to be 
phased out in four years. However, CAB moved very liberally with Kahn on board, and 
all restrictions on routes were practically abolished within one year.  
There was also much deregulation in the international arena. The U.S. had signed 
45 “Open Skies” agreements by mid-2000. “Open Skies” agreements abolish limitations 
on routes including those on capacity, frequency, and provide flexibility for pricing, 
charters, cooperative marketing agreements, and other joint operations. The DOT 
continues to monitor the remaining regulated international routes. 
After deregulation was successfully completed, the CAB was abolished at the end 
of 1984 and most of its remaining functions were transferred to the DOT. Among the 
most important of these inherited functions was to review and grant antitrust immunity to 
merger and acquisition activities. However, the role of the government on safety has not 
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been abandoned, and the FAA continues to regulate safety issues. Deregulation sparked a 
wave of change in many aspects of the airline business including many that were not 
forecasted. For example, the rise and fortification of the hub-and-spoke networks, more 
complex fare structures, and the survival of major firms at the expense of entrants were 
all unforeseen (2001g). These changes are discussed next. 
 
5.1.4 Consequences 
Transportation was the first industry in the nation to be regulated, and the first to 
enjoy significant deregulation (Dempsey 1989). While the evaluation regarding the 
success of deregulation has been mixed, the evidence has been encouraging. Yet the 
experience was far from perfect, and there were criticisms: 
Of the six intellectual assumptions behind the airline deregulation, four 
have been proven completely false. Deregulators believed that airline size 
was not critical to efficient operations. The marketplace, to the contrary, 
has ruled that bigger is better. Deregulators believed that barriers to entry 
are low in the airline business. Experience has demonstrated that they are 
very high. Deregulators believed that increased competition would 
produce low unrestricted fares. In fact, it has produced a bewildering 
array of discriminatory prices. Deregulators believed that travel agencies 
were obsolete as well as potentially misleading channels of information 
and distribution. But travel agencies became more powerful than ever. A 
fifth assumption, that  antitrust laws would restrain competitive abuses, 
has been negated by the policy default of two administrations…(Kuttner 
1996). 
 
Despite the above criticisms “Deregulation has been one of the most successful 
regulatory and economic policy reforms in the late 20th century” (Kasper 1998). Kahn 
himself admitted that he had surprises in the deregulation process including the 
turbulence and painfulness of the process, the reconcentration of the industry, the 
intensification of price discrimination and the deterioration in quality of airline service 
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(Kahn 1988). He asserted that deregulation resulted in lower fares, increased range of 
price-quality options and improvements in efficiency but that the competition was 
unevenly distributed across markets and that congestion and delays were causing 
problems (Kahn 1988). Several consequences of deregulation are investigated next. 
 
5.1.4.1 Service and Quality 
Serious concern about the decreasing level of safety and service quality and 
increasing concentration levels after deregulation has been voiced (Dempsey 1989):  
 
The industry rapidly became an oligopoly, with an unprecedented wave of 
mergers consolidations, and bankruptcies. Today, the top 8 airlines 
dominate more than 94% of the domestic passenger market… [F]unneling 
of aircraft into “hub-and-choke” bottlenecks… have significantly 
narrowed the margin of safety and sent the number of near misses 
skyrocketing. Airline service has gone to hell in the 1980s. We are headed 
aboard aerial slums, served cardboard food, overbooked, bumped, and 
misconnected. Our luggage is routed through the Twilight Zone, never to 
be seen during our natural lives… We can either spend an arm and a leg 
or sleep in a strange city on a Saturday night. 
 
The number of departures have increased by 50% for small community, 57% for 
medium, and 68% for large community airports since deregulation (1996a). The DOT 
indicated that the number of domestic passengers tripled since deregulation and that more 
than 80% of domestic passengers enjoy two or more carriers alternatives (2001g). 
However, Dempsey (2000a) points put that 61% of the non-hub communities suffered 
from decreases in service. 28% of them lost all the service they had and only 6% enjoyed 
new services (Dempsey 2000a). Meanwhile customer satisfaction was also deteriorating 




Flight Problems: Cancellations, delays or other deviations, 
 
Baggage handling: Claims for lost, damaged, or delayed baggage; charges for 
excess baggage; carry-on problems; difficulties with claim procedures, 
 
Refunds: Problems in obtaining refunds for unused or lost tickets or fare 
adjustments, 
 
Customer Service: Rude or unhelpful employees, unpleasant meals or cabin 
service, and treatment of delayed passengers 
 
Reservations, ticketing and boarding: Airline or travel agent mistakes in 
reservations and ticketing; problems in making reservations and obtaining tickets 
due to busy phone lines or waiting in line; delays in mailing tickets; and problems 
boarding the aircraft, 
 
Oversales: Bumping problems, whether or not the airline complied with DOT 
oversale regulations, 
 
Other: Cargo problems, security, airport facilities, claims for bodily injury, and 
other miscellaneous problems, 
 
Fares: Incorrect or incomplete information about fares, discount fare conditions 
and availability, overcharges, fare increases, and the level of fares in general, 
 
Smoking: Inadequate segregation of smokers, failure of the airline to enforce no-
smoking rules, 
 
Advertising: Ads that are unfair, misleading, or offensive. 
Source: (Coleman 1987) in (Dempsey 1989) 
 
One of the major concerns about deregulation was that smaller communities 
would lose air service after deregulation. Despite the ongoing program, (Dempsey 1989) 
notes that many smaller communities have either lost all air services or the services were 
downgraded to commuter carriers and suffered from a sharp decrease in quality. Forty 
percent of small communities have suffered from decreasing service and increasing 
prices after deregulation (Moore 1986). 
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As a potential remedy, the DOT administers the Essential Air Service Program, 
which was launched with deregulation. Essential Air Service Program was designed to 
provide subsidies to carriers to fly to certain smaller communities to which service would 
be not feasible otherwise. Section 419 of the Federal Aviation Act ensures that smaller 
communities remain linked to the national aviation system. This program was initially 
approved by the Congress for a period of ten years (expiring in 1988) but was later 
extended for another ten years (until 1998). Seventy-eight communities were still being 
subsidized under this program as of May 1998 (1998d). In 1998, the end date for the 
program was also abolished and its annual budget was increased and set to $50 million 
with Rural Air Service Survival Act. The program continues to this day. Some 113 
communities were being subsidized as of October 2001 (2001b; 2001j). The carriers 
under the Essential Air Service program are usually assigned for a period of two years. 
The following is expected from the basic essential air service: 
(a) service to a hub airport, defined as an FAA-designated medium- or large-hub 
airport, 
(b) service with no more than one intermediate stop to the hub, 
 (c) service with aircraft having at least 15 passenger seats at communities that 
averaged more than 11 passenger enplanements a day in any calendar year from 1976-
1986, 
(d) under certain circumstances, service with pressurized aircraft, and 
(e) flights at reasonable times taking into account the needs of passengers with 
connecting flights (1998d). 
 
Currently, communities are eligible to be a part of this program if they are further 
than 70 driving miles of an FAA-designated Large or Medium Hub airport, unless the 
subsidy per passenger exceeds $200 (with certain exception for communities that are 
further than 210 highway miles from the nearest Medium or Large Hub) (2001f). 
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In conclusion, it can be said that while service in hub markets increased in 
frequency, some community markets suffered from a loss of service as a result of 
deregulation. While the range of the quality of services (e.g., first class, business, coach) 
increased, it can be argued that the average service level also decreased. However, this 
issue should be taken into consideration along with the fare levels, which generally were 
reduced due to heavy competition following deregulation.  
5.1.4.2 Fare Levels 
Numerous low cost carriers (LCCs) challenged the major carriers following 
deregulation. Major carriers7 responded by price cuts, and airfares (adjusted for inflation) 
fell by 33% from 1976 (the dawn of deregulation) to 1993 (Morrison and Winston 1995). 
Thus, benefits of new entrants included lower fares and increased frequency. Dropping 
fares ignited demand: “For example, when AirTran entered the Atlanta-Buffalo market, 
average fares declined by 36%, from $185 to $119, and the number of the passengers in 
the market increased by 65%, from 23,000 per month to 38,000 per month. Similarly, 
when Vanguard re-entered the Kansas City-Minneapolis market in late 1996, average 
fares declined by 59%, from $246 to $101, and the traffic more than doubled, increasing 
from about 12,000 passengers per month to 25,000 per month” (2001g, p.6). The DOT 
estimated that consumers saved $6.3 billion per year due to low fare carriers (1996c). 
“Most upstarts have average seat mile costs in the 7 cent range, compared to the 10 cent 
                                                 
7 A major airline is defined by the DOT as airlines with annual operating revenues of over $ 1,000,000,000. 
(Oster and Strong 2001) There were 12 major U.S. passenger airlines in 2000: Alaska, America West, 
American, American Eagle, American Trans Air, Continental, Delta, Northwest, Southwest, Trans World, 
United and US Airways. In addition, three all-cargo airlines were classified as majors: DHL Airways, 
FedEx and United Parcel Service.  
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range of traditional carriers. Upstarts maintain their low costs by a number of strategies, 
including lower labor costs, direct marketing and “no frills” service” (Fones 1997). Thus, 
discount airlines have approximately 30% cost advantage over network carriers.  
 However, the increase of concentration in hub markets limited the extent of 
benefits that discount carriers could offer. The average number of carriers per route was 
2.2 (most routes are served by major carriers only) and those routes that Southwest flies 
were 47.2% cheaper than comparable routes (Kuttner 2000). DOT reported that 
passengers paid $54 less, on average, if a low cost carrier served the same market 
(Dempsey 2000a). On the other hand, while the public has been getting better deals, it 
was reported that unrestricted fares (i.e., fares that mainly business class passengers pay) 
have increased by 73% after deregulation (Dempsey 2000a, p.485). 
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Figure 5.1: Demonstration of fare level differences 1998Q2 
Note: SIFL stands for Standard Industry Fare Level. It is the pre-deregulation fare level (adjusted 




Figure 5.1 powerfully demonstrates the impact of low fares carriers and 
deregulation has had on fare levels. The 100% base line represents the prices in 1978 
(pre-deregulation) adjusted for inflation. 
The implication is that the overall fare levels are indeed lower than they would 
have been under regulated pricing for distance blocks longer than 750 miles. The prices 
are lower than the regulation era for low-fare carrier markets for all distance blocks. 
Finally, the major carriers’ fares are lower than regulation era only for distance blocks 
longer than 1500 miles. The figure applies to the second quarter of 1998 but the 
implications can be generalized to other time frames. For example, Figure 5.2 presents 
the same notion for the third quarter of 2001. 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Demonstration of fare level differences: Top 1000 markets, 2001 Q3 
 
Note: SIFL stands Standard Industry Fare Level. It is the pre-deregulation fare level 




5.1.4.3 Market Concentration and Power 
Despite the early success, ten years into deregulation, the increasing levels of 
concentration were causing concern. The DOT observed that the number of carriers had 
increased from 39 to 131 from 1978 to 1987 (1987a). However, this observation was 
misleading since “nearly two-thirds of city-pairs were airline monopolies and another 
20% were duopolies” (Dempsey 1989, p.87). “The 11 major airlines have shrunk to eight; 
the eight local former local service carriers are now two and they are trying to merge; the 
eight original low-cost charter airlines have been reduced to one, through bankruptcy and 
abandonment; 14 former regional airlines have shrunk to only four; over 100 new upstart 
airlines were certified by the CAB and about 32 got off the ground and most of these 
crashed, leaving only a handful still operating; of the 50 top commuters in existence in 
1978, 29 have disappeared… Today, the top 50 carriers who constitute 90 percent of that 
industry are captives of the major airlines and relegated to serving the big airlines at their 
hubs” (1987b, p.61-62).  
A major reason for increased market concentration was the DOT’s relaxed merger 
evaluations in the 80’s. Particularly in the second half of the 80s, the DOT approved a 
number of mergers based on the notion that there were no barriers to entry even tough the 
mergers resulted in dominant markets shares. The analysis overlooked the issue of 
whether or not those potential entries would be economically feasible (Nannes 1999). 
Despite the warnings in the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 against “unreasonable 
industry concentration, excessive market domination”, the DOT “never met a merger it 
didn’t like” (Dempsey 1989, p.87): 
DOT approved them all. It approved Texas Air’s (i.e. Continental and 
New York Air) acquisition of both People Express (which included 
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Frontier) and Eastern Airlines (which included Braniff’s Latin American 
routes); United acquisition of Pan Am’s transpacific routes; American’s 
acquisition of AirCal; Delta’s acquisition of Western; Northwest’s 
acquisition of Republic: TWA’s acquisition of Ozark; and US Air’s 
acquisition of PSA and Piedmont, to mention only a few. This has sharply 
increased national levels of concentration to the point that the eight 
largest carriers control over 94% of the domestic passenger 
market…Under deregulation, [charter flights] virtually vanished 
(Dempsey 1989, p.88)    
 
A critical review can indeed establish that the mergers in the Reagan era 
started an irreversible process and were an important reason of the increase in 
market concentration in the airline industry. Table 5.2 demonstrates that twelve 
mergers took place in a matter of two years:  
 





Acquired Airline Passengers 
(thousands) 
Final Bid 
Southwest 10698 Muse 1980 March 11, 1985 
Piedmont 14274 Empire 1084 October 3, 1985 
People 9100 Frontier 7068 October 9, 1985 
Northwest 14539 Republic 17465 January 24, 1986 
Texas 19640 Eastern 41662 February 24, 1986 
TWA 20876 Ozark 5541 February 28, 1986 
Alaska 3132 Jet America 774 September 8, 1986 
Delta 39804 Western 9062 September 10, 1986 
Texas 19640 People 11907 September 16, 1986 
American 41165 Air Cal 4451 November18, 1986 
Alaska 3132 Horizon 942 November20, 1986 
US Air 19278 Pacific Southwest 9049 December 9, 1986 
Us Air 21725 Piedmont 22800 March, 1987 
Braniff 2557 Florida Express 1415 December 15, 1987 
Source: DOT Air Carrier Traffic Statistics (Oster and Strong 2001, p.7). 
 
Other major mergers since deregulation have included (1993a, p.459): 
American: TWA, Air Cal, Eastern (Latin America), Reno 
United: Pan Am (transpacific), Pan Am (Latin America), Pan Am (Heathrow) 
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Delta: Pan Am (Europe) 
Continental: Texas International, Frontier, New York Air, Rocky Mountain, Britt, PBA 
Pan Am: Pan American World, National, Ransome 
Eastern: Braniff (Latin America) 
Republic: North Central, Southern, Hughes Airwest 
US Airways: US Air (Allegheny), PSA, Empire, Henson 
Southwest: Morris Air 
TWA: TWA, Ozark 
 
Former CAB chairman Alfred Kahn heavily criticized DOT for their hasty 
approval of the mergers: “It is absurd to blame deregulation for this abysmal 
dereliction.”(Kahn 1988). Empirical research has also indicated that the airline 
consolidation has led to market power (Kim and Singal 1993). The ten largest airlines 
accumulated 88% of the revenue passenger miles flown; that figure had risen to 94% by 
1990 (Sheehan 1993). General Accounting Office reported that consumers flying from 
small to major airports had to pay 34% more if the major airport was concentrated and 
42% more if both airports were concentrated (Dempsey 2000a, p.485).  However, 
mergers were probably not the primary reason for the increased concentration in the 80’s. 
Market concentration and the resulting power was a consequence of the rise of the hub-
and-spoke system. 
 
5.1.4.4 Hub-and-Spoke Networks 
I never heard a word spoken about hub and spoke in the entire debate 
leading up to deregulation.  
Congressman James Oberstar, Ranking Minority Member, U.S. House of 
Representatives Aviation Subcommittee (Dempsey 2000a) 
 One of the unforeseen results of airline deregulation was the emergence of the 
hub-and-spoke networks. The hub and spoke concept lies at the heart of any network 
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carrier. Securing hubs enables the dominant carrier to charge “hub premiums” (Hecker 
2001). The following statistics should clarify their importance: U.S. General Accounting 
Office (GAO) compared prices at concentrated hub airports and relatively unconcentrated 
airports, and found that prices were 27% higher in the concentrated hubs (Dempsey 
2000b). Adjusting for the average trip distance and the size of the markets, the 
concentrated hub fares were on average 18.7% higher than for similar markets in other 
airports. In the absence of LCC competition, the major carrier was able to charge fares 
that exceeded its fares in non-hub markets of comparable distance and density by 
upwards of 40% (Dempsey 2000b). 
 The incumbent hub carrier has an advantage over their competitors because they 
are able offer a wider range of flights and services. In effect, they are able to attract a 
larger portion of business travelers and obtain a higher yield than their rivals (2001g). 
There is also higher brand recognition and the advertising costs are spread across more 
markets than that of the rivals (Levine 1987). Robert Crandall, CEO of American airlines 
summarized the benefits of the system as follows: 
While a hub and-spoke system is admittedly more expensive to operate 
than a comparably sized system of point-to-point routes, the system’s 
incremental costs are more than offset by its enormous revenue benefits. 
For example, we estimate that there are fewer than 500 city pair markets 
in the United States big enough to adequately support point-to-point jet 
service. However, our hub-and-spoke system makes it possible for 
American to effectively serve over 10,000 markets –and realize a large 
revenue per available seat mile premium relative to point-to-point 
carriers. (1993a, p.3) 
 
 However, the efficiency of using hub and spoke networks for short-haul flights is 
questionable. For example, Southwest has an average of 20.4 minutes ground time as 
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opposed to American’s 50.3 minutes (Dempsey 2000a). The result is a 22% better 
utilization of aircraft for Southwest plus additional gains from personnel productivity 
(Dempsey 2000a). The hub-and-spoke system also led to the use of smaller aircraft, 
which meant relatively poor seat-mile cost efficiency. The same pattern of increasing 
concentration of fortress hubs has been observed over and over again (Dempsey 1990; 
1997). Table 5.3 demonstrates the increase of market share by hub carriers particularly 
during the decade following deregulation. These figures continued to be alarmingly high 
in the 90’s. 
Table 5.3: Single Carrier Market Shares at Major Airports Pre and Post Deregulation 
Airport   1977   1987   1997* 
Baltimore/Washington  24.5% US Air   60.0% US Air    33.7% US Air 
Cincinnati   35.0% Delta  67.6% Delta      79.4% Delta 
Detroit Metropolitan  21.2% Delta  64.9% Northwest   63.4% NW 
Houston Intercontinental 20.4% Continental 71.5% Continental  39.1% CO 
Memphis   40.2% Delta  86.7% Northwest   52.2% NW   
Minneapolis/St. Paul  45.9% Northwest 81.6% Northwest   69.7% NW 
Nashville Metropolitan  28.2% American 60.2%American     29.3%SW 
Pittsburgh   43.7% US Air  82.8% US Air        73.3% US 
St. Louis – Lambert  39.1% TWA  82.3% TWA          48.7% TWA 
Salt Lake City   39.6% Western  74.5% Delta           55.5% Delta 
Average   33.8%   73.2%       54.4% 
 
Source: Extended from Consumer Reports (June 1988), at 362-367 (Dempsey 1989, p.89) 
* 1997 figures were retrieved from the DBP database and may not be fully compatible 
with earlier figures. The loss of market share at the hubs were typically due to Southwest 
competition. 
 
Hubs enable the incumbent to have more frequent service on the spokes than 
would otherwise be economically feasible (Levine 1987). Therefore, they are generally 
beneficial for the public, however, their disadvantages include increased barriers to entry 
(2001g; Anderson 1997). The resulting market power may also lead to supra-competitive 
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pricing (i.e., higher prices than would be considered normal for the market) and decrease 
the welfare of consumers especially for those living in hub markets (Brown 1991). A 
major concern regarding competition was that the major carriers stifled competition in 
their hub airports. The incumbents carry the majority passengers in and out of their hub 
markets (2001g). “The hub carrier dominates city pairs it serves directly from its hub, 
except to other cities that are also hubs for other carriers, in which case the two carriers 
providing hub service dominate. Entry by a major carrier on a point-to-point basis into 
another carrier’s hub has become very much the exception” (Nannes 1999, p. 4). One 
2001 DOT report concluded that remaining passengers pay 41% more than those flying 
in hubs with low-cost carrier presence (2001e). The situation in short-haul hub markets 
was even worse, with its 54% price premium over comparable routes with low fare 
competition.  
5.1.4.5 Hub Premiums 
Federal Aviation Administration categorizes airports into four categories: large 
hubs, medium hubs, small hubs and non-hubs (Morrison and Winston 1997): 
  
 Categorization   Total U.S. Traffic Accounted by Hub 
 Large Hubs     1% or more 
 Medium Hubs     0.25% to 0.99% 
 Small Hubs     0.05% to 0.24% 
 Non-hubs     less than 0.05% 
 
When the fare levels are compared to non-hubs, fare premium effects are robust 
and present. A hub premium is the increased fares that the consumers have to pay for 
flying from a certain hub and is defined in percentages. Premiums have been observed to 
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be 62% for Charlotte, 51% for Cincinnati and Pittsburgh and 41% for Minneapolis/St. 
Paul (Oster and Strong 1996). These premium effects were “persistent” over time 
(2001g). 
Interestingly, hub premiums are either mild or non-existing for hubs that are 
served by Southwest (hence, the phrase “Southwest effect”) (2001g). For example, one 
year after Southwest began serving Providence, RI markets, fares fell by almost 50% and 
traffic more than tripled (Slater 2001). In summary, hub-and spoke networks enable the 
use of market power and act as barriers to entry (Leigh 1990).  Table 5.4 demonstrates 
the consistent increase of hub premiums for the leading hub airports in the nation on an 
airline basis. For example, it shows that consumers in Atlanta have had to pay 20-40% 
higher fares for the privilege of flying out of Hartsfield airport in comparison to the rest 
of the nation for the same distances. 
Table 5.4: Changes in Hub Premiums over Time 
Source: (Oster and Strong 2001, p.33)   
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The trends in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 indicate that the hub premium effect is persistent 
over time. It should be noted that the occasional negative premiums may be either due to 
presence of discounters or due to low entry barriers and limit pricing (e.g., St. Louis, 
Baltimore). 
Examining the HHI index at the national level can be misleading. A more 
accurate assessment would be possible through an examination at the hub airport level. It 
was found that the concentration for the airline industry had increased to an alarming 
3877 (above 1800 is considered highly concentrated by the DOJ) and thirty-three airports 
were assessed to be highly concentrated (1997a). It should be noted that only La Guardia 
and Los Angeles International airports are below the 1800 threshold for high 
concentration. There has been a general trend for more concentration fueled by the 
mergers as explained previously. 
Table 5.5: Sample HHI Index for the 10 largest US Airports 1985-1996 
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Chicago O’Hare 2449 2836 3263 3491 3526 3591 3617 3427 3557 3474 3505 3445 
Atlanta 4190 4468 4569 4619 5420 5489 7586 7604 7058 6223 5585 6233 
Dallas/Fort Worth 4143 4500 4519 4759 4906 4927 4833 5008 4541 4451 4581 4684 
Detroit 2189 2151 3903 3793 4655 5124 5557 5973 6188 5949 6240 6465 
Los Angeles 852 911 1025 1066 1131 1156 1297 1376 1393 1379 1528 1524 
Denver 2356 3015 3767 3674 3504 3562 3587 3661 3787 4307 4980 4892 
Phoenix 1601 2000 2395 2459 2507 2700 2849 2679 2645 2556 2544 2451 
San Francisco 1437 1723 1847 1715 1903 2134 2552 2685 3073 3448 3760 3831 
Newark 2821 2395 2154 2400 2815 2933 3092 3143 3222 3287 2929 3060 
NewYork 
LaGuardia 1368 1384 1320 1175 990 1102 1293 1662 1763 1733 1688 1777 
Source: DOT Form 11 Data (1997a)  
 
Professor Allvine observed that the major airlines widely employ predatory 
pricing in the name of defending their “fortress hubs”: 
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Government study after study shows that airline industry is not perfectly 
competitive… These studies show that the major airlines employ many 
monopolistic practices that contribute to the market power to raise and 
maintain prices above the competitive level. In imperfect competitive 
markets, it makes perfectly good sense for large firms to use predatory 
pricing to destroy competition that threatens the monopoly prices charged 
(cf. Dempsey 2000a, p.474). 
 
5.1.5 Marketing 
Deregulation has resulted in stiff competition for the airlines and marketing 
efforts became key as airlines scrambled to differentiate themselves from competition. 
The airlines spent in excess of $10 billion for domestic sales and promotion activities in 
2000 which was almost twice their operating profits (2001c). The following section 
investigates the impact deregulation had on important elements of airline marketing. 
5.1.5.1 Yield Management 
 
“It was a typical flight in the era of deregulation: United Airlines flight 
815 from Chicago to Los Angeles, with 204 tickets sold at almost as many 
prices.”  
(the range of prices on that flight was from $87.21 to $1258.51) 
NY Times Reporter Matthew Wald (Wald 1998) 
 
 Bob Crandall of American Airlines allegedly is the innovator of the airline yield 
(a.k.a. revenue) management. Based on the concept that the cost of additional seats on 
scheduled flight was negligible, he ordered his staff to study the demand and price 
elasticity patterns from its computer reservations system “Sabre”. The result came in the 
form of 35% “Super-Saver” discounts in 1977 all around the nation. Unable to compete 
without a price advantage many charter services were soon bankrupt (Petzinger 1995). 
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American training manual stated the new objective “to sell the highest priced product that 
the customer is willing to buy” (Peterson and Glab 1994, p.59). The minds behind 
regulation and economists had anticipated that deregulation would lead to a simpler fare 
structure (2001g). However, the yield management systems led the industry in the 
opposite direction.  
Yield management essentially uses the power of price to communicate with the 
customer and to lure them from one service (own or competitors’) to another. The 
demand for different products/services is monitored continuously and price and 
promotional adjustments are made to maximize revenues, thus the profits of a company 
through segmentation of the market. Many companies in other industries have also 
realized the benefits of revenue management. Examples include the hotel industry, 
railroads, telecommunications, and broadcasting. Certain conditions need to be satisfied 
for revenue management to be useful (Daudel and Vialle 1994). The product should be 
perishable, it should be possible to price target different customers. It should be possible 
to sell the product in advance. The variable costs should be low. The demand should be 
cyclical or it should vary so that it can be smoothed by revenue management. Typically, 
segmentation by time is key. Needless to say, the airline industry is ideal for the 
application of revenue management. Today, virtually every successful airline is using 
yield management in some form.  
 
5.1.5.2 Frequent Flyer Programs  
Among the innovations that deregulation inspired, a most important marketing 
tool became the frequent flier programs. In its purest form, the frequent flier programs 
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attempt to create brand loyalty by inducing a passenger to fly on only the owner of the 
program or one of its affiliates (through code-sharing). As with yield management, the 
Frequent Flier Miles concept was also innovated by American Airlines (Peterson and 
Glab 1994, p.60) in May 1, 1981. Five days later United Airlines responded by 
introducing Mileage Plus (Woodyard 2001). All major airlines developed their own 
programs shortly thereafter.  
Table 5.6 demonstrates the scope of the frequent flier programs in the U.S.. For 
example, American’s AAdvantage program has induced some 35 million members 
resulting in 2.3 million travel awards redeemed during 1998.    






Number of travel 
awards redeemed in 
1998 
American Aadvantage 35 NA 2.3 million 
US Airways Dividend Miles 20 4.4 million 900K 
Continental OnePass 16 NA 1 million 
Northwest WorldPerks 18.5 6.1 million 1.2 million 
United MileagePlus 27 6.1 million 2.1 million 
America West FlightFund 2.9 NA NA 
Alaska Mileage Plan 3 812K 191K 
TWA Aviators 12 1.1 million NA 
Delta Skymiles 24 9.6 million 1.9 million 
Southwest Rapid Rewards 1.2 NA 927K 
Source: InsideFlyer (Stoller 1999) 
 
 Frequent flier programs have advanced into more sophisticated forms and 
consumers can earn mileage points through several means including credit card purchases 
or long-distance phone calls. As perfectly acceptable as they are as a marketing tool, a 
potential anticompetitive problem with the frequent flier programs is that they can be 
effectively used to target new entrants. Additional bonus miles on certain routes can 
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effectively bring down the fare without being detected and then be revoked (Oster and 
Strong 2001). It has been argued that having a reward program tied in with an excellent 
customer service will help take the customer’s eye off the price (Mohs 1999).  
 A current snapshot of the frequent flier campaigns is presented below8:  
• There are more than 120 million members worldwide, 74 million members of whom 
are from the U.S.  
• 27-28% of the members are active. 
• AAdvantage of American Airlines remains as the largest frequent flier program with 
more than 45 million members. On average, more than 11 thousand new members 
enrolled in AAdvantage per day in 2001.  
• The programs grew by 11% on average with the fastest growing segment being 
“mileage consumers.” 
• Approximately 40% of the miles earned are not from flying and credit cards are the 
most popular form of earning such miles. 
• An award is estimated to cost airlines $13.93 on average. 
• 14 million free tickets were awarded in 2001.  
• 82-87% of members have web access. 
 
5.1.5.3 Distribution: The Rise (and Fall) of Travel Agents 
There is no doubt that the travel agencies grew in importance after deregulation. 
As the choice of flights available to the public increased in number, the influence that the 
agents had in the decision making also increased. The airlines tried to get the leading 
agents on their side by use of commissions. Two main conflicting forces are at work 
when the motives of travel agents are considered. On one side is the issue of the override 
commission and the percentage baseline commission, which motivates the agent to 
influence the customer to buy the most expensive ticket from the airline that offers the 
                                                 
8 Source: http://www.webflyer.com/company/press_room/facts_and_stats/frequent_flyer_facts.php 
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best override commission, on the other hand is the need to keep their customers satisfied 
and happy to succeed in the long run. Travel Agent Commission Overrides (TACOs) are 
special bonus commissions paid to travel agents by a specific airline for meeting a 
targeted proportion or number of passengers booked (Oster and Strong 2001). It appears 
that this scenario was more beneficial to major airlines who offered better commission 
rates than low-cost carriers. Another public policy concern is that travel commission 
overrides were typically designed to be in favor of the carrier with the largest market 
share (1996a).  
The inability of the new entrants to cope with commission overrides (TACOs) 
was a main reason why they exited certain markets. Southwest airlines’ decision to pull 
out of Indianapolis – Detroit (one of the rare exit events for Southwest) and Midwest 
Express’ exit from Milwaukee-Detroit and other markets have been linked to commission 
overrides (Oster and Strong 2001). The largest travel agencies also admitted that 
overrides had an important effect on the booking patterns (1996a). The sophistication in 
the computer reservation systems also fueled the need for agents. 
However, the growth of discounting and the explosion of the internet as a viable 
distribution medium drastically changed the equilibrium as the major airlines were being 
forced to cut their commissions due to increasing cost pressures. Namely, Delta, 
American and Continental decided to drop the commissions altogether and others 
followed suit (Brannigan and Stringer 2002). Some major airlines have announced that 
they will start for charging extra for paper tickets. Major airlines also realize that selling a 
ticket through their own web site costs them 25% of what it cost through a travel agent, 
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therefore the travel agencies who typically sold 80% of the tickets face a gloomy future 
(Fonti 1999). This trend can be readily observed in Figure 5.3. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: US Travel Agency Overall Airline Commission Rates and the Number of 
 Agency Offices, 1976-2000 
 
Source: Harris / Travel Weekly, 2000 Travel Agent Survey 
 
 
5.1.5.3.1 Computer Reservation Systems (CRS) 
The CRS systems had tremendous impact on the development of complex pricing 
strategies and revenue management systems. These systems enabled the travel agents to 
track fare and capacity changes instantaneously. Although several competing systems 
were initially introduced (American’s Sabre vs. United’s Apollo), many of these systems 
(as well as the largest travel agencies) later merged. Some airlines chose to join existing 
systems and pay fees for listings rather than develop their own systems. Table 5.7 
presents the travel agents’ market share of competing systems:  
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       Table 5.7:  1999 Market Share for CRS  
CRS Market 
Share 
Sabre  34% 
WorldSpan 24% 
Apollo 24% 
System One 20% 
Note: Some travel agents use more than one system 
Source: Harris / Travel Weekly 2000 Travel Agent Survey 
 
 The DOJ actually sued the airlines and owners of the systems because of 
signaling and price fixing (1994b). That the systems were designed to give their owners 
certain (anti-)competitive advantages was a concern: 
An airline whose CRS is used by travel agents has access to a very 
accurate picture of both its own and its rivals’ business patterns. Through 
the CRS an airline can track the effect of price changes, see roughly how 
much of a rival’s seat inventory is assigned to a given discount fare 
classification, measure how much full-fare business it attracts compared 
to rivals, and track changes in city-pair flows… It can even see how loyal 
its own frequent flyers are. A CRS owner can then use this information to 
distort market signals to its rivals, leading them to make incorrect 
decisions. When a CRS owner sees travel agents making bookings on a 
rival airline’s flights, it can intervene through targeted incentive programs 
in an attempt to switch business. By responding selectively, it can 
temporarily distort signals the market sends to competitors, in order to 
persuade the rivals to abandon fares, schedules, or even routes where, 
absent these secret interventions, its offerings would be preferred by 
customers (Kuttner 1996, p.261). 
 
Computer Reservation Systems (CRS) provide much of the information needed 
for a competitive response. Competitors, prices, capacity and availability can be observed 
through these systems. The incumbents can even gather the scope of new entry because 
the schedule and fares are filed before they are put in effect (Oster and Strong 2001). 
Therefore, the incumbent has much of the knowledge it needs for a competitive response 
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decision. It can target its direct (e.g., price, capacity on route) and indirect predatory 
weapons (e.g., frequent flier miles, commission overrides) discussed earlier to coordinate 
a successful campaign against the entrant (Oster and Strong 2001). Since these efforts can 
be highly targeted, they do no not signal hostility to provoke retaliatory response from 
other major carriers.  
 
5.1.5.4 Discounting and Competition 
“Today, one of every seven domestic passengers is flying because of the 
increased competitiveness resulting from low fare service.”  (1996c) 
 
In April 1996, the DOT released a report full of hope for the airline industry. Its 
title read “The Low Cost Airline Service Revolution.”(1996c). One conclusion of the 
report was that the consumers heavily benefited from the efficiency and competition that 
the low cost carriers (LCCs) were bringing in the airline industry.  It was also suggested 
that there was evidence that network (major) carriers and low cost carriers could co-exist. 
The fundamental cost advantages that low cost carriers have over network carriers were 
emphasized and the global implications were discussed. Other positive implications 
included those on industry labor force (e.g., union relations) and economic growth and 
benefits to consumers, communities, travel related industries and the aerospace industry 
in general.  The report also included a warning that the premiums at network hubs where 
there was no low-cost competition were high and increasing.  
It can be argued that the discounter LCCs entered the market in two waves. The 
first wave emerged right after deregulation in 1978 and continued roughly until 1982. 
Even though these discounters helped reshape the industry and brought many benefits to 
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consumers, the pre-deregulation incumbents did not let the LCCs steal away their 
customers. They responded with price discrimination utilizing sophisticated revenue 
management techniques. Some of their deep-discount fares were coded “FU” and the 
signal to the new entrants could not get clearer than that! (Kuttner 1996). As a result 
many LCCs went out of business before they got a fair chance to compete.  
The classic example of a discounter during the first wave was undoubtedly People 
Express. People Express was founded in April 1981. Don Burr’s strategy was simple: 
very low operating costs and offering flight experience to the masses (Peterson and Glab 
1994). The service might not be extensive but it would be warm (Petzinger 1996). Every 
employee was required to have a second job and many employees (e.g., the CFO) served 
as a flight attendant in their second jobs. Don Burr was a charismatic leader and the 
employees embraced his style of his leadership. He announced the precepts –the code of 
behavior for every employee of People Express:  
One: Service –Commitment to the growth and development of our people. 
Two: To be the best provider of air transportation. 
Three: The provide the highest quality of leadership. 
Four: To serve as a role model for others. 
Five: Simplicity. 
Six: Maximization of profits. (Petzinger 1996, p.134)  
 
As the most successful airline launch ever, the company grew from 3 to 17 planes 
and was flying to 17 destinations out of Newark by the end of the same year. In five 
years, it had 217 planes operating in domestic and international routes (Pearson 1996). 
Their target market was the middle-class, working class, and students. “At one point it 
was cheaper to fly to Florida than to take a bus or drive” (1994a, p.35; Pearson 1996). 
The prices were fixed and you bought tickets as you boarded the plane, on a first come, 
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first serve basis. However, unable to respond to fierce price competition and revenue 
management by American, it was already bankrupt in 1986. In fact, the same fate was 
typical of the LCC of the era, among the 58 start-ups launched between 1978 and 1990, 
only America West and Midwest Express have survived (McBride 1999). 
The second wave of LCC entries happened after the industry once again became 
profitable in 1993 and continued until the ValueJet crash in 1996. Ironically, the typical 
example of a second wave entry would be ValuJet which started its operations in Atlanta 
in 1993 and had grown from 5 to 30 cities until the crash. Second wave entries were also 
effectively stopped by the major players because they were already fortified in their hubs 
and were not about to give up the premiums. The typical competition pattern, also called 
the “homicidal cycle” (Dempsey 2000a; Dempsey 2000b) was observed in the airline 
industry in these five steps: 
1. Incumbent (major carrier) monopolizes a hub and raises prices to supra-
competitive levels. 
2. Low Cost Carrier (discounter) enters the market with low fares. 
3. Incumbent responds by matching fares regardless of its cost structure, and often 
couples the response with increased capacity and/or frequency. Incumbent also 
uses TACOs (commission overrides) and other tactics to drive the entrant out 
before it can establish a foothold in the market. 
4. LCC, not having the deep pockets as the incumbent is forced to withdraw. 
5. Incumbent increases price to previous or higher levels and decreases capacity. 
 
As the same pattern was observed over and over again, the reputation effects 
become more than a theory and new entry to markets were stifled. New market 
entries diminished in the nineties (Dresner et al. 2001) and there were no new entry 
applications to DOT during 1997 and 1998 (see Figures 5.4 and 5.5 below). However, 
the tremendous effect discounting has had on fares levels is probably most apparent 
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      Figure 5.4: New Entry Applications 
      Data Source: (1999b) 
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Figure 5.5: Entry/Exit Patterns in the Airline Industry 
 
Note: The bottom (blue) stack represents new entering and remaining airlines for 




Table 5.8: Average Fares in Markets With and Without Low-Fare Competition 
 
Market Type 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Without Low-Fare Competition $168 $183 $177 $180 
With Low-Fare Competition $86 $95 $91 $100 
% Difference 97% 92% 93% 80% 
  
  Source: Domestic Airline Fares Consumer Report 1997 (Q4) 
 
Low-fare carriers usually do not fly longer distances so it may be argued that a 
comparison between long haul and short haul market fares may not be justified. 
However, a deeper look in any given year indicates that the benefits of low-fare 
competition exist over the range of flights: 
Table 5.9: Average Fares Sorted by Distance 















 $142 $165 $171 $167 $179 $198 $223 
With Low-Fare 
Competition 
$67 $75 $101 $121 $133 $163 $176 
% Difference 111% 121% 70% 38% 35% 22% 27% 
Source: Domestic Airline Fares Consumer Report 1997 (Q4) (1997c) 
 
The above Tables 5.8 and 5.9 demonstrate that discounting has a robust negative 
impact on the prices. Focus on specific markets is also telling in that it reveals the 






Case in point: Air-Tran Entry and Exits 



















Buffalo, NY 269 443 65% $169 $119 -30% 
Dayton, OH 261 521 100% $178 $116 -35% 
Greensboro, 
NC 
310 575 85% $229 $113 -51% 
Hartford, CT 514 885 72% $242 $124 -49% 
Houston, TX 974 1409 45% $211 $130 -38% 
Richmond, VA 426 700 64% $223 $118 -47% 
Group 
Average 






















Charlotte, NC 875 623 -29% $110 $181 65% 
Columbus, OH 728 546 -25% $114 $182 60% 
Louisville, KY 589 391 -34% $101 $188 86% 
Group 
Average 
730 520 -29% $108 $184 70% 
Source: Domestic Airline Fares Consumer Report 1998 (Fourth Quarter); (2001e) 
  
LCCs grew rapidly over time in spite of anti-competitive practices in the industry. 
Their market share grew to almost 15% in 1999 from 8.8% in 1986 (2001a). This growth 
is also evident in Table 5.12 below: 
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Table 5.12: Airports with Most U.S. Destinations Served by Low Fare Airlines 
Low Fare Services 1992 2002 
           Phoenix 48 84 
Las Vegas 33 59 
Chicago Midway 9 54 
Orlando 5 40 
Atlanta 2 39 
Baltimore 3 38 
Kansas City, Mo. 6 35 
Denver 2 33 
Tampa 2 32 
Nashville 4 28 
Houston 14 25 
Los Angeles 6 25 
Fort Lauderdale 1 23 
Albuquerque 11 22 
Oakland 7 22 
St. Louis 13 20 
New Orleans 3 19 
New York JFK 3 19 
Austin 7 17 
Columbus, Ohio 11 17 
Seattle/Tacoma 3 17 
Indianapolis 6 16 
Salt Lake City 2 15 
San Diego 6 15 
Detroit 2 14 
Portland, Oregon 3 14 
Dallas Love Field 13 13 
El Paso 12 13 
San Antonio 6 13 
Birmingham 2 12 
Dallas/Fort Worth 2 12 
San Jose 1 12 
   Source: (Adams 2002) 
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5.1.5.5 Price Wars 
“I knew the industry would be ruggedly competitive, but I did not expect 
its leaders to engage in extended kamikaze behavior.”  
Warren Buffet regretting his investment in USAir in 1989 to his 
shareholders (Labich 1993). 
 
The competition between the major airlines seems to have stagnated during the 
last ten years or so. However, this was not always the case, and irrational price wars have 
also taken place in the colorful history of the airlines. Dempsey (2000b) describes one 
such war between American and Northwest. In April 1992, American Airlines launched 
its “value pricing” campaign. They had concluded that the price structures had become 
too complex for the consumer to comprehend. Their new value pricing had only four 
levels (first class, regular coach, 14-day advance purchase, 21-day advance purchase). 
The unrestricted coach fares went down by almost 40% on average. The Economist 
argued that American was pricing below operating costs and could cause more chapter 11 
files in the industry (1992a). American anticipated that the newly stimulated demand 
would more than offset the reduction in prices. However in May 1992, Northwest 
announced its “Grown-Ups Fly Free” campaign (i.e., an adult flying with a fare paying 
child would fly for free) to steal the thunder from American. American responded by 
cutting its lowest fares by 50%. As a result, the prices went down and the industry 
experienced the worst times in its history. Northwest and Continental sued American 
airlines with claims of predatory pricing, but as it has been the case in almost any 
predatory pricing case since Areeda-Turner, they could not get a verdict against the 
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defendant. However, American had to spend in excess of $20 million to cover legal costs 
(Clouatre 1995). Eventually, complex fare structures resurfaced. Accusing American 
Airlines with predatory pricing, Northwest CEO John Dasburg then stated: 
In the long run, predatory pricing will reduce the number of airlines, 
ultimately cutting the number of flights and choices available, particularly 
in smaller markets. This will leave the few surviving airlines free to price 
just as high as they want for just as long as they want.  
(Dempsey 2000b, p.3). 
 
A Relatively Recent Incident:  
American seems to take the lead in most price changes but sometimes with 
differing results. In March 2002, American eliminated a three-day advance fare 
(Woodyard and DeLollis 2002). The impact of this would be to force the customers who 
used to buy this class of tickets (i.e., mostly business travelers) into buying a higher class 
fare (i.e., 10% fare increase). However, other major carriers, which usually readily went 
along with price increases, did not think that the increase was justified this time. They 
already had low load factors, and with the exception of Continental, they did not comply 
with American’s price increase. Surprisingly, rather than taking the increase back to its 
previous level, American “retaliated” to the refusal to follow suit by dropping its three-
day-advance fares by as much as $99 on routes where it competed with the rebel carriers 
and required no Saturday-night stay (Woodyard and DeLollis 2002). It offered these 
discounted fares in ten markets that it competed with United, Delta, and US Airways each 
(McCartney 2002), but not with Continental. Normally, this type of big brother 
punishment would be expected if a member breaks the rules of a cartel such as OPEC. 
This was a case of blatant signaling and retaliation in the face of refusal to comply. This 
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incident demonstrates the unhealthy nature of competition in the airline industry. 
However, this time the end result was beneficial to consumers. Northwest would not take 
any of American’s swashbuckling and reacted by offering round trips for $198 in 10 
American markets, and when American did not give in, it offered the same discounts in 
20 markets. American insisted on its discounts so Northwest finally offered $189 round 
trips in some 160 American markets (Woodyard and DeLollis 2002) while American’s 
comparable prices were averaging $1650 (McCartney 2002). Southwest, always in search 
of an opportunity, joined the battle by re-offering its “friends fly for free” campaign after 
five years (Woodyard and DeLollis 2002).  
 
Southwest Effect: Southwest undoubtedly proved to be the most successful LCC after 
deregulation. It actually had begun its operation as an intra-state carrier before 
deregulation but quickly extended its operations to more states. Southwest does not use 
major hubs and relies on secondary airport for its operations. It also typically does not 
serve long distance markets and focuses on short and medium haul instead. Most entries 
by Southwest are to markets with connecting service by incumbents. Southwest enters 
these markets with non-stop service and lower prices. The result is an overall decrease in 
the fare levels in the market, also called the “Southwest effect.” (1998a).When the price 
wars got tough in mid 90’s because of competing discount services such as Calite 
(Continental), Shuttle (United), and Reno Air, Southwest’s Pilots Union accepted no 
increases for five years in return for options, which in effect enabled the airline to cut its 
costs by hundreds of millions of dollars (Banks 1995). At the height of the battle, United 
Shuttle even purchased 1-800-Southwest and used it as its reservations number.  
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The major carriers were not successful in their campaigns against Southwest 
because Southwest had both lower costs and deep pockets. “In the 1998 calendar year, 
the total domestic operating cost in cents per available seat-mile for the network airlines, 
adjusted for distance, ranged from 7.737 cents for America West and 9.123 cents for 
Delta to 11.582 cents for US Airways. The comparable costs for the low-fare airlines 
ranged from 6.083 cents for Southwest to 8.626 cents for Frontier. Thus every low-fare 
airline had adjusted costs per available seat-mile that were significantly below the costs 
of any network airline except America West.” (2001g). Therefore, the major carriers 
admitted failure against Southwest’s strategy and attempted to contain it rather than 
defeat it. “When major network airlines were subject to entry by either Southwest or by 
another major network airline, the response was typically either a very slight fare 
reduction with no significant increase in capacity or a fare increase. We did not find cases 
where the response was as aggressive as when a new-entrant low fare carrier entered a 
market.” (Oster and Strong 2001, p.15).  
 
A Word on a Market Niche: It should be noted that not every new entrant in the airline 
industry has attempted to be a discounter. Despite the tough competition with the 
incumbents, several start-ups have attempted to carve themselves a niche in the first class 
business travelers’ market. For example, Midwest Express has secured itself a niche in 
the tough industry. Its formula is offering superior service at slightly higher fares. The 
seats are leather, and there is no center row. As a result, there are 30% fewer seats on its 
DC-9s than expected (Oliver 1995). Meals come in china with silverware and “crystal 
salt and pepper shakers” (though how this was impacted after September 11 remains a 
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question) (Oliver 1995). Midwest spends twice as much on its meals than other airlines 
(Oliver 1995). Midwest had been owned by Kimberly-Clark Corporation but went public 
in September 1995 (Oliver 1995). Recently, JetBlue, National, and Legend were among 
the other names who attempted to capture the same niche in different markets. So far, 
JetBlue seems to be successful, and Legend is already out of business due to aggressive 
responses by American. 
 
5.2 Competitive Outlook  
“Capacity is how we compete in this business”  
 Bob Crandall CEO, American (Labich 1993) 
 
The revenue of the U.S. airline industry was around $97 billion in 2001. The 
profit margins have not been impressive. Revenue management is used to subsidize 
discounted tickets with the gains from first and business class fares. When the demand 
falls for cyclical or other reasons, the industry experiences red ink. The following section 
exposes the industry with some factual information. 
 
5.2.1 Industry Snapshot 
 
On the day the Wright Brothers flew at Kitty Hawk if there had been a capitalist 
down there, the guy should have shot down Wilbur.  
Warren Buffet. (Smith 1995) 
Due to increased competition from LCCs and price wars, the profitability of the 
airline industry has displayed a highly cyclical pattern over the years. Table 5.13 
illustrates this point. It should be noted that the price wars in 1982 and 1992 happened 




Table 5.13: The Cyclical Nature of the U.S. Airline Industry 
Cycle Years Duration Airlines 
Boom 1960-68 9 years Expansion 
Bust 1969-74 6 years Recession 
Boom 1975-79 5 years Expansion 
Bust 1980-82 3 years Recession 
Boom 1983-89 7 years Expansion 
Bust 1990-94 5 years Recession 
Boom 1995-2000 6 years Expansion 
Bust 2001-2005 5 years Recession 
Note: 1995-2000 expansion was a forecast which eventually proved to be accurate. 2000-
2005 recession was predicted by AirTran CEO Joe Leonard at his speech at Georgia 
Pacific Headquarters on Aug 19, 2002. 
Source: Aviation Week and Space Technology, 13 March 1995 
 
 
One recent trend has been international growth through global alliances. For 
example, American Airlines and British Airways; United Airlines and Lufthansa; Delta 
Air Lines, Air France and Aero Mexico all joined forces for international expansion. The 
industry appears to be leading to a new wave of consolidation. However, the merger 
between United and U.S. Airways was blocked by the DOJ. Alternative expansion 
strategy for the majors has been controlling some or all of regional start-ups. For 
example, Delta owns Delta Express, Atlantic Southeast, Comair and has launched Song.  
Another interesting response by major airlines to low cost carriers was in the form 
of founding their own low-cost versions. United Airlines was the first airline to try this 
strategy in October 1994, and the service was called “The Shuttle” by United (Oster and 
Strong 2001).9 Delta started Delta Express and US Airways started Metrojet in October 
                                                 
9 Continental had had an earlier effort with Continental Lite but the initiative lacked a consistent strategy 
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1996 and June 1998 respectively (2001g; Oster and Strong 2001). These efforts were 
generally defensive in nature but also allowed the majors to use the low-cost model of the 
entrants through their flexible labor agreements. Pilot unions ultimately restrained the 
expansion of most of these initiatives by imposing limits on total hours that could be 
flown as a proportion of total flights. 
Table 5.14 illustrates the aggregate income statement of the industry over time. 
The expansion and recession periods of the industry can be tracked within this Table as 
well. 
                                                                                                                                                 
and eventually failed (Oster and Strong 2001). 
Table 5.14: Aggregate Industry Snapshot Over time 
 
Source: Air Transport Association Annual Report (2001c)
188 
The table illustrates that the profit margins of the industry have not been 
impressive even in good years. Airlines have earned a net profit between one and two 
percent on average, compared to an average of five percent or more for other industries. 
Only 15 have survived among the 43 pre-deregulation airlines, and two thirds of 226 
post-deregulation airlines have not been able to succeed (Dempsey 2000a). On the 
positive side, the airlines were highly profitable in the late 90’s and their net profits 
totaled $23 billion from 1995 through 2000 Q3. The Average passenger load was around 
72% percent for the same year while the break-even load for most carriers was around 
65% (2001g).  
More than 130 airlines have gone bankrupt since deregulation, and currently there 
is little incentive for new entrants (Wysocki Jr 2001). Airlines already schedule more 
flights than the eight most crowded airports in the nation can handle, which only adds to 
the congestion problems at the hubs (Wald 2001). The recent activities (e.g., reports, 
DOT proposed guidelines, complaints and finally the DOJ lawsuit) in the airline industry 
strongly suggest that anticompetitive practices (e.g., predatory pricing) may indeed be an 
issue.  
The unique nature of the airline industry enables the network carriers to engage in 
predation in a variety of ways. Observed tactics have included: “dropping prices sharply; 
eliminating advance purchase and Saturday night stay-over restrictions; expanding the 
inventory of low-fare seats offered; increasing the number of flights and/or the size of 
aircraft; scheduling departures in close proximity to the new entrant’s flights, sometimes 
boxing them in; offering passengers bonus frequent flyer miles; paying travel agent 
commission overrides to steer traffic toward the incumbent in the new entrant’s markets; 
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paying higher upfront commission rates on routes where it competes with a new entrant; 
biasing its computer reservations systems against non-affiliated interline connections; 
refusing to enter into ticketing-and-baggage, joint-fare, and code-sharing relationships 
with the new entrant; refusing to lease gates, provide services, or sell parts to the new 
entrant; restricting airport operators with majority-in-interest clauses to prohibit the 
construction of gates and other infrastructure for new entrants; and prohibiting affiliated 
regional feeder airlines from entering into marketing agreements with the new entrant” 
(Cooper 1999; Dempsey 2000b, p. 24). Half of the informal complaints received by DOT 
between 1993-1999 were regarding unfair pricing and capacity increases, where as more 
than 30% were regarding restrained access to gates and other facilities or services 
(1999d).  
Increasing complaints and actual observations of unfair conduct motivated 
the DOT to propose a set of guidelines to protect competition in the airline 
industry in 1998. The guidelines essentially proposed that predation would be 
inferred if: 
(1) the major carrier adds capacity and sells such a large number of seats 
at very low fares that the ensuing self-diversion of revenue results in lower 
local revenue than would a reasonable alternative response, 
(2) the number of local passengers that the major carrier carries at the 
new entrant’s low fares (or at similar fares that are substantially below 
the major carrier’s previous fares) exceeds the new entrant’s total seat 
capacity, resulting, through self-diversion, in lower local revenue than 
would a reasonable alternative response, or 
(3) the number of local passengers that the major carrier carries at the 
new entrant’s low fares (or at similar fares that are substantially below 
the major carrier’s previous fares) exceeds the number of low-fare 
passengers carried by the new entrant, resulting, through self-diversion, in 
lower local revenue than would a reasonable alternative response 
(1998c). 
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The responses for the above guidelines were mixed, and generally the 
parties who would be distracted by the application of it opposed to it while those 
who suffered from/disturbed by anticompetitive practices supported it. Therefore, 
the major airlines, their trade association, certain academics, and unions opposed 
the guidelines (Gattuso and Boudreaux 1999), whereas the low-fare airlines, 
GAO, and Alfred Kahn (1998) supported them. 
An interesting counter-proposal to the DOT guidelines came from Foer (1999). 
He argued that the DOT guidelines would not be effective since the courts take too long 
to resolve the cases (if ever) and that the low-cost carriers go out of business long before 
then. He emphasized the need for greater predictability and proposed a “Safe Harbor” 
option. A major carrier (defined as 50% or more marker share from a hub) could take the 
Safe Harbor option when challenged by a new entrant. A major carrier that chose to 
comply with the Safe Harbor option would not be subject to any predation lawsuits. That 
option would require them to make a public statement that they will commit to their 
response level (low) fares and increased level of capacity for at least two years. They 
would have to file a public notice to the DOT.  And with certain exceptions, they would 
not be able to increase their prices or decrease their capacity for a period of two years. He 
suggested that the majors would not alter their price and capacity unless they were 
willing to live with it and suffer the losses for two years. The pattern where the major 
goes back to the high (monopoly) levels of pricing and capacity would be effectively 
constrained with the Safe Harbor (Foer 1999). Naturally, ongoing antitrust law would 
have to be modified before Safe Harbor could become successful. Otherwise, no major 
carrier would opt for it when they have the option to predate and not be found guilty 
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under existing laws. 
 Canada, facing similar predatory problems in their airline industry passed 
Regulations Respecting Anti-competitive Acts of Persons Operating a Domestic Service, 
S.O.R./00-324 in year 2000. Predation by incumbent would be detected based on two 
rules with respect to AAC:  
(a) operating capacity on a route or routes at fares that do not cover the  
avoidable cost of providing the service; and  
(b) increasing capacity on a route or routes at fares that do not cover the 
avoidable cost of providing the service (cf. West 2000). 
Even though an average avoidable cost test has its own complexities such as 
determining which costs were avoidable and the appropriate time frame, it has been 
successfully employed in at least one case in Canada (West 2000). 
An impartial body, the Transportation Research Board of the National Research 
Council encouraged DOT to continue their investigations. They observed that “a cursory 
review revealed some actions that were difficult to reconcile with fair and efficient 
competition. Particularly difficult to reconcile were cases in which incumbent carriers 
added nonstop service in low- to moderate-density markets they had not previously 
served directly, coincident with a new entry. In some of these cases, the incumbent 
bypassed its own hub to initiate the service, a strategy seldom employed outside of high-
density markets. The logical inference is that such responses are probably temporary—
possibly calculated to protect the incumbent’s hub traffic and to dissuade similar 
challenges elsewhere—and would seem to warrant additional scrutiny” (1999d, p.33). 
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Inspired by DOT’s guideline proposal, DOJ decided to file a lawsuit against 
American Airlines in 1999. This was the first DOJ predatory pricing lawsuit in the airline 
industry since deregulation (Nannes 1999). DOJ alleged that American had used 
predatory tactics in order to drive Vanguard, Western Pacific, and Sunjet out of its 
markets (1999e, para 23-28): 
American has monopoly power in most of its DFW city pairs and faces 
little current competition and little prospect of entry on those routes. Its 
monopoly power allows it to charge supracompetitive fares. American’s 
fares on DFW city pairs are substantially higher then its fares on 
otherwise comparable routes where it faces competition….[W]hen a [low 
cost carrier] entered a DFW route and it appeared the [low cost carrier] 
would be economically viable if American simply followed a profit-
maximizing business strategy, American would instead saturate the route 
with enough additional capacity at low fares to keep the entrant from 
operating profitably. American would also take further steps, such as 
matching the [low cost carrier’s] connecting fares with its own nonstop 
fares, to keep traffic away from the [low cost carrier]. To evaluate the 
success of its strategy and determine whether to intensify its response, 
American would investigate the financial resources of [low cost carriers], 
determine their break-even factors, and conduct head counts at the 
departure gate to monitor their passenger loads.  
As a result of these practices all three entrants had to leave the markets 
they entered, and all were bankrupt before September 11, 2001. 
      Table 5.15: American Airlines’ Actions Relevant for the DOJ Lawsuit 
American  Before During After 
From Dallas 
To 
Flights Price Flights Price Flights Price 
Kansas City 8 $108 14 $80 11 $147 
Long Beach 0 --- 3 $86 0 --- 
Colorado 
Springs 
5 $150 7 $81 6 $137 
Source: (Carney and Zellner 2000). 
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Vanguard markets: American operating at 65% load factor charged $108 before 
Vanguard’s entry on DFW to Kansas route. They reduced their rates to $80 following the 
entry matching the fares. American also added 6 more round trips to the route, driving 
Vanguard out of the market in the process. After Vanguard pulled out, American 
decreased the daily round-trips to 11 from 14 and increased the prices by 80%. It was 
also documented that the route went from the worst performing to the best performing 
American route after the exit of Vanguard.  
 
SunJet markets: American responded to the entry announcement of SunJet to the DFW – 
Oakland route. They matched SunJet’s fares and also entered the DFW-Long Beach route 
in which it also matched Sun Jet. SunJet was forced to move out of all DFW routes. 
American increased prices by over 30% in the two months following Sun Jet’s exit. 
 
Western Pacific markets: American increased its capacity significantly to put pressure on 
Western Pacific. The frequency was increased from 5 to 7 flights per day. As a result of 
this response, Western pulled out of the routes and declared bankruptcy. American’s fares 
were in the range of $81-105 when Western was in the market. After they pulled out 
American went back to its original frequency of 6 and increased the prices to $137 on 
average. 
As it was discussed previously, cases of predatory pricing a very hard to prove in 
the airline industry, and the judge of DOJ’s American lawsuit dismissed it by summary 
judgment in May, 2001. DOJ appealed the decision but cold not overturn the ruling. 
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The DOT issued a series of reports in January 2001 re-stating their concern about 
the anti-competitive practices in the airline industry (2001e; 2001g; Oster and Strong 
2001). They concluded that “incumbent airlines at times have responded to new 
competition with fare cuts, capacity increases, and other practices that are apparently 
designed to eliminate or reduce competition” (2001g). The DOT reminded that they were 
authorized by the Congress to prevent unfair practices in the airline industry and warned 
that they had the right and the obligation to prevent such practices even if they do not 
violate antitrust laws. After studying thousands of responses their proposed guidelines 
generated, the DOT concluded that they would examine each case independently due to 
the complexities and differentials in the marketplace, and one governing guideline would 
be too simple of an approach. Instead, the DOT expressed a wish to develop a “body of 
caselaw based on a more thorough examination of cases of apparent predatory-type 
behavior” (2001g, p.11).  
The second report was entitled Predatory Practices in the U.S. Airline Industry by 
Professors Oster and Strong (2001). It described the patterns of entry and competition, 
and included an analysis of predatory conduct and predatory pricing with examples from 
the airline industry. This report examines the potential for predatory practices, or unfair 
methods of competition, in the U.S. domestic airline industry. One of their two main 
conclusions was that “predatory practices may have occurred in the past and are a 
recurring possibility in the U.S. domestic airline industry.” They detected high use of 
market power in the airline industry, hub premiums and recoupment of losses suffered 
during predation against new entrants. Their second conclusion was that the antitrust 
laws, as they have been applied in other industries, may not be sufficient to identify some 
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types of predatory practices in the airline industry. Their work is highly relevant to 
understand he competitive context of the airline industry, and several of their figures have 
been cited and reproduced in this chapter.  
The third report issued by the DOT in January 2001 was entitled Dominated Hub 
Fares (2001e). This report summarized, updated, and provided new support for the 
existence and demonstration of hub fares and the effects of LCC service on fare levels. It 
argued that quality service and reasonable fares can co-exist just like major carriers and 
LCCs can. Atlanta and Salt Lake City were provided as examples for co-existence. The 
report concluded that “the key to eliminating market power and fare premiums is to 
encourage entry into as many uncontested markets as possible.” 
The DOT received 32 informal complaints from 1992 until 1999. Half of these 
were allegations of unfair pricing and capacity responses –the dumping of low-fare 
capacity in the city-pair market and, in some cases, added flights. Others were about 
unfair marketing, airport handling relationships (higher travel agent commissions) (Oster 
and Strong 2001, p.10). The administration concluded that “apparent unfair practices 
have occurred in the airlines industry”(2001g, p.114). “Free markets do not exist in a 
state of nature. Free markets are things that have to be defined by custom and law” 
(Dempsey 2000a, p.487). 
 
5.2.2 The Role of Barriers to Entry 
 It has been shown that the theory of market contestability did not apply to the 
airline industry because of high barriers to entry (Baker and Pratt 1989; Hurdle et al. 
1989). The threat of potential entry may not force the airlines to cut their prices since 
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they can readily and effectively react to any entry with price cuts and capacity increases 
(Levine 1987). Instead, the incumbents may attempt to raise the barriers to entry and 
develop a reputation for predation by competitive and aggressive reactions to entry to 
their hub markets. Therefore, these barriers gains special importance when conducting 
research in this industry. Among the six generic barriers identified by Porter (1980), 
several either do not apply or take on a proxy form in the airline context. For example, 
cost advantage of incumbents’ would not necessarily apply since the LCC entrants are 
presumably more efficient within this framework. However, barriers such as product 
advantages of incumbents are captured by hub formation and code-share agreements. 
Both hubs and code-share agreements have been associated with higher fares (2001e; 
Hassin and Shy 2000). Figure 5.6 presents proposed proxies for Porter’s barriers to entry 
for the airline context.  
Porter’s six generic barriers to 
entry: 
Barriers as reflected in the Airline Industry: 
Cost advantages of incumbents The LCC entrants have cost advantages  
Product advantages of incumbents Hub Formation 
Capital requirements Airport Congestion, Reputation Effects 
Customer switching costs Code-Share agreements, Frequent Flier Miles 
Access to distribution channels Gate, Slot and Noise Controls and Availability 
Government policy Gate, Slot, and Noise Controls 
Figure 5.6: A Comparison of Generic and Industry Specific Barriers to Entry 
 
As discussed in a prior section, Karakaya and Stahl (1989) have proposed an 
extended list of generic barriers to entry. Several of the items among their extended list 
are of interest and captured either in different components of the proposed framework 
(e.g., market concentration, price) or under the current proxies of barriers to entry (e.g., 
gate and slot controls and availability is a proxy for limited access to essential facilities). 
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Another barrier to entry suggested by Karakaya and Stahl (1989) is incumbent’s expected 
reaction to entry and this has been included in the framework in the form of reputation 
effects of incumbent’s predation. It might also be interesting to consider advertising, 
product differentiation of incumbents and brand name or trademark as potential barriers 
to entry from a marketing perspective. However, these involve further complications in 
terms of measurement.  
 
Slot and Gate controls: Certain airports are considered high-density airports. This 
indicates that in these airports, an airline must have slots to schedule a flight (take-off or 
landing) between 6 a.m. and midnight. For example, FAA’s high density rule permits 48 
slots at LaGuardia from 6 am to midnight every day, resulting in (48x18) 864 slots per 
day (1995b). Slot controls have been imposed in four major airports (Chicago O’Hare, 
New York La Guardia, New York Kennedy, and Washington National) since late 1960s. 
It has been estimated that the fares in slot-controlled airports have been 11-15% higher 
than non-controlled comparable airports with the exception of New York Kennedy 
(Morrison and Winston 1997). Congestion pricing (charging aircraft for their take-offs 
and landings according to the delays it imposes) has been offered as an alternative to slot-
controls (Morrison and Winston 1997). 
Joe Leonard, CEO of AirTran, has noted that they are able to serve Atlanta with 
cheap fares because Eastern Airlines went bankrupt and freed up 22 gates for AirTran 
(2001h). Similarly, JetBlue is serving New Yorkers because they were awarded 75 slots 
at JFK airport by the FAA (2001h). Landing slots in most major airports are not 
available. The incumbent is rarely, if ever, willing to lease extra slots to a new entrant. 
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Even in the rare case of lease, monopoly rents may be collected. The FAA “Buy-Sell” 
slot rule lets deeper pockets ensure market share by getting the slots and enjoy 
monopolistic pricing (Dempsey 1989). Slot control regulation needs to be significantly 
revised so that LCC access to markets is possible and not left to coincidence or awards by 
officials. Before the DOT permitted the landing slots to be resold, the largest eight 
airlines controlled about 70% of the slots at Chicago O’Hare, New York La Guardia, 
Kennedy, Washington National. In a couple of years the figure increased to 96% 
(Dempsey 2000a, p.450). 
 
Table 5.16:  Percentage of Domestic Air Carrier Slots Held by Selected Groups 
Airport Holding Entity 1986 1991 1996 
O’Hare American and United 66 83 87 
 Other Established airlines 28 13 9 
 Financial Institutions 0 3 2 
 Post-deregulation airlines 6 1 1 
     
Kennedy Shawmut Bank, American, and Delta 43 60 75 
 Other Established airlines 49 18 13 
 Other Financial Institutions 0 19 6 
 Post-deregulation airlines 9 3 7 
     
LaGuardia American, Delta and US Airways 27 43 59 
 Other Established airlines 58 39 14 
 Financial Institutions 0 7 20 
 Post-deregulation airlines 15 12 2 
     
National American, Delta and US Airways 25 43 59 
 Other Established airlines 58 42 20 
 Financial Institutions 0 7 19 
 Post-deregulation airlines 17 8 3 
Note: Some Financial institutions have taken control of slots when incumbent carriers 
went bankrupt. 
Source: Anderson (1997) 
 
 Similarly gate controls are an issue, and the dominance of major carriers in 
controlling the gates is illustrated in Appendix D (1999a). Low Fare carriers who cannot 
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secure access to gates are left to the mercy of the major carriers and have to pay hundred 
per cent to two hundred per cent premiums to use the gates (Woellert 1998). Spirit 
Airlines was reported to face such a fate since it had been outbid by the majors in Detroit 
continuously for almost a decade (Ingersoll 1999). Thus, slot and gate controls can also 
effectively serve as barriers to entry and lead to increased fares (Hurdle et al. 1989; 
Morrison and Winston 1990).  
 
5.2.3 After September 11, 2001 
The general belief about the airline industry is that it is not really a profitable 
industry and that it should be left alone. Although examples of apparently unfair practices 
seem to be common, this general belief has provided the industry some relief with respect 
to antitrust investigations. Such empathy regarding the industry is higher than ever after 
September 11. The industry has received around $15 billion worth in direct aid and 
guaranteed loans. The total direct aid payments by October 2002 have exceeded 
$4,299,852,435.3 to some 382 airlines. Table 5.17 illustrates the direct aid that the larger 
carriers have been provided by the federal government as of July 25, 2002.  
Table 5.17: Direct Aids to Major Airlines by the Federal Government 
UNITED AIR LINES, INC. $724,485,485.8 
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. $656,032,849.3 
DELTA AIR LINES, INC. $594,894,536.4 
NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC. $405,525,526.3 
CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC. $343,398,895.9 
US AIRWAYS, INC. $287,219,674.0 
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO. $264,642,089.9 




The airlines also laid-off employees and cut back on services in response to 
falling demand and increasing security costs. However, the future of the major airlines 
still looks gloomy. The consumers save $6.3 billion annually due to low-fare airline 
competition (1996). On June 18 2002, The Wall Street Journal reported that ‘Wal-Mart’ 
airlines were crunching the biggest carriers. The number of passengers carried by the five 
major airlines was 10% lower in May 2002 than it was in 2001. One would consider this 
a result of September 11, and the turmoil it created, but the traffic of the five biggest low-
cost carriers increased by 11% in the meantime.  
The future of the surviving LCCs looks brighter than it did before September 11. 
Obviously, the same conclusion cannot be drawn for the major carriers who have yet to 
re-structure their costs. Union relations play a big role in restructuring and labor expenses 
represent up to 40% of the revenue of a major airline but only 25% of the revenues of 
low-cost carriers (Trottman and McCartney 2002). Another advantage of low-cost 
carriers is their higher aircraft utilization due to their point-to-point and secondary airport 
operations. The transparency of (low) prices and distribution of tickets (e-tickets) have 
also helped the low cost carriers. More than 40% of Southwest tickets are booked online 
whereas the same figure is around 5% for majors (Trottman and McCartney 2002).  
The fare difference between flying business class on a major carrier and 
discounter has become so wide that some employers allow their employees to purchase 
two discounter seats so that they can get some extra space to stretch out (and still spend 
less money than it would cost on a major carrier) (Trottman and McCartney 2002). While 
the passenger traffic in April 2002 was down by 10.5% from two years earlier, the major 
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carriers had increased the average cost of a 1000 mile coach ticket had by 14.7% 
(Trottman and McCartney 2002).  
 
5.2.3.1 Anticipating Trends 
Our major competition over the last fifteen years was other people doing 
 the same things we do. That’s not the case anymore. 
    Don Carty, CEO, American Airlines (2002)  
 In July 2002, Delta announced that the competitive threat is not from the big 
players such as American but from the discounters (Fonti 2002). It devised low-fare 
competition strategy with McKinsey and Co. (Fonti 2002). In the meantime, Southwest 
announced an aggressive expansion plan “connecting the dots” between city pairs 
common for business travel (e.g., Baltimore to LA, the highest Southwest round-trip fare 
was $598 as opposed to $1127 of United) (Trottman 2002).  
 In August 2002, Delta, Northwest and Continental announced a marketing 
agreement which links flight schedules, frequent flier programs, and access to airport 
clubs. A similar deal was earlier announced by United and US Airways (Woodyard 
2002). In the meantime, the share of revenues from premium passengers (i.e., business 
and first class), average industry yield and revenues have been decreasing (Hazel 2003).  
Deriving from the above sections, I anticipate that the following trends could be 
observed in the industry in the near future. 
 
1. Industry Consolidation Attempts: As the competition and pressure for 
profitability increases, the majors will attempt to consolidate. US Airways is 
not in a position to compete with either majors or LCCs. It is likely that it will 
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either shrink to its roots as a regional carrier or be taken over by a major 
carrier (Sheth and Sisodia 2001). If the second option is realized, other 
mergers would follow. The CEO of America West Airlines recently predicted 
that United, Delta and Northwest would remain as major network carriers, and 
AirTran, Southwest, and Jet Blue would remain as discount carriers following 
anticipated mergers (Sunnucks 2005).  
2. Antitrust Action: In relation to the above scenario, the DOJ will have to revise 
its criteria for evaluating mergers. DOT reports have shown the effect of the 
presence of LCCs on fare levels, and their current measure (HHI) does not 
take this into consideration. A new set of criteria could enable consolidation 
action as long as there is sufficient LCC presence in the markets. 
3. Revision of the Hub-and-Spoke System: The efficiency and cost of managing a 
large scale hub-and-spoke system is being questioned. Major carriers may be 
better off concentrating on medium and long haul markets and leaving the 
short-haul spoke (feeding) operations to regional operators that they own or 
control. Regional carriers have better cost structures that can effectively 
compete with other LCCs. 
4. Restructuring of Corporate Travel Policies: As audio and video conferencing 
becomes widespread, corporations will revise what constitutes a need for 
travel for whom and at what cost. More and more companies are already 
booking flights on LCCs (Woodyard 1999). LCCs will want to get a larger 
share of the corporate pie, and they will arrange umbrella deals with them. For 
example, ProAir offered unlimited business trips for a flat rate, and Vanguard 
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offered 10-15% discounts for businesses that buy 10 or more trips (Woodyard 
1999).  
5. Increased Market Access and Growth for LCCs:  Permission of the mergers 
with special access conditions for LCCs could serve to increase their presence 
in key markets. The Federal government has already asked the airports to 
reveal their plans for increased competition. More than a dozen hub airports 
with high concentration were requested to file “competition plans” in order to 
secure federal expansion funding or increase facility charges (Pinkston 2000). 
These plans would include new gate plans, ticket counters, and strategy to 
attract new (i.e., LCC) airlines. Slot controls are also likely to be revised and 
relaxed for the benefit of LCCs. However, the presence of LCCs in bringing 
lower fares and stimulating economic growth in communities is well 
understood. If the Federal government acts slowly in opening up the markets 
to LCCs, the communities are likely to take the matter in their own hands. The 
following section demonstrates such a case. This is a very important 
phenomenon as it demonstrates the insufficiency of public policy at the 
federal level. 
 
Case in point: Communities want LCC Service. Sam Williams, the President of Metro 
Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, commissioned a study to examine the fare levels with 
benchmark cities and stated “We want more airlines brought in here” (Saporta 1998). 
More and more communities are becoming aware of the substantial effect that the 
discounters have on prices. Since the public policy makers have been slow to open up 
markets to LCCs, some communities have decided to be proactive and have taken the 
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matter in their own hands. For example, the business community in Wichita, Kansas have 
raised $4.7 million so that they could attract AirTran (Fonti 2002). The money would be 
solely committed for ticket purchases on AirTran for the next two years (Fonti 2002). 
Air-Tran would also be able to draw funds if ticket sales fall below expectations. Finally, 
the community would spend $600K for marketing AirTran flights in Wichita (Fonti 
2002). Wichita was previously served by three majors: Delta, American, and United, and 
the community’s multimillion dollar investment would bring much lower fares in return. 
Similar deals with AirTran have already been successfully employed in six other markets: 
Gulfport/Biloxi-Mississippi, Pensacola-Florida, Tallahassee-Florida, Grand Bahama, 
Newport News, Va., and Rochester-New York (Fonti 2002). Admitting the failure of 
current policy, the DOT itself stated that communities that have little or no service by 
LCCs should actively seek their presence. The communities would have to market 
themselves to LCCs, and it was advised that they seek advice from aviation consultants 
(1996c).  
 
5.2.4 European Landscape 
 
European policy makers have observed the deregulation process in the US 
closely. Unrestricted cross-border flights have been allowed since 1993 (McCormick and 
Field 1997). The new start-ups in Europe have adopted Southwest’s business model and 
tried to emulate its success. Successful European low cost carriers include Ryanair, 
EasyJet, Virgin Express, and Debon Air:10 
 
                                                 
10 This section draws heavily from (McCormick 1997) March 31 3B. 
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Ryanair: RyanAir is the oldest of the LCCs in Europe. It took advantage of early 
deregulation and started its operation in 1985 flying between Britain and Ireland. It is the 
leading carrier on the Dublin-London route. Continental Airlines chairman David 
Bonderman owns 20% of Ryanair. Like Southwest, Ryanair intentionally ignores the 
major airports due to their congestion and aircraft turnaround times. No frequent flyer 
miles, no free snacks. However, this structure enables Ryanair to be able to break even at 
50% utilization (and its load factors are around 75%) (Michaels 2000). Ryanair uses only 
one type of aircraft (the Boeing 737) and is based in Dublin. 
  
EasyJet: It appears that Easyjet is trying to emulate a combination of People Express and 
Southwest. It offers a no-frills service: seats are not assigned (first come first serve), no 
free meals, and casually dressed flight attendants. EasyJet also does not use travel agents 
or a CRS system for ticket sales. The result is 25% cost savings per ticket and also fewer 
employees per aircraft. Its base is London-Luton airport. 
 
Virgin Express: Virgin Express was created when Richard Bronson (Founder and 
Chairman of Virgin Group including Virgin Atlantic Airways) purchased European 
Business Airlines. The initial problem Virgin Express faced was the high tax and cost 
structure in its base, Brussels, Belgium. They also faced the problem of not getting the 
slots they needed for efficient operations to their destinations. However, Richard Bronson 
is reputed as a tough competitor, and Virgin Express is a strong brand throughout the 
European Union. Its current base is Brussels-Zaventem airport. 
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Debonair: Debonair attempts to use a hybrid strategy: quality service at an affordable 
price. They do offer quality snacks on board but no meals. Debonair has in-flight 
entertainment at every seat and plans to introduce video-on-demand and in-flight gaming. 
Like EasyJet, Debonair’s base is London-Luton airport. 
 
As a result of increasing pressure from the emerging LCCs, some large players 
who could not adopt to the new competitive field are facing trouble (e.g., Iberia, Alitalia, 
Olympic). On the other hand, British Airways has aggressively made acquisitions in 
Germany and France to increase its presence. Concentration and prices are expected to 





DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
6.1 Data Set  
 The Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) is a 10% sample of airline 
tickets from reporting carriers collected by the Office of Airline Information of the 
Bureau of Transportation Statistics. This database is used to determine air traffic patterns, 
air carrier market shares and passenger flows. The data includes origin and destination, 
distances, passengers per day, average one way and round trip fares for all carriers, fared 
pasangers, market shares per city-pair and airport, average yields, market ranks, and 
revenues. The data can be aggregated for airport, for markets within an airport or at city-
pair detail. The Database Products Inc. makes the data commercially available in the 
form of several CD-ROMs. Access was gained to these databases through industry 
contacts. This available data of 28 quarters (from 1st quarter of 1993 to fourth quarter of 
1999) allows for analysis of aggregate and individual markets. From this analysis, one 
could understand and identify market defense behavior in light of the principles discussed 
in this dissertation. The content of the databases has been summarized as follows in Table 







 Table 6.1: Contents of O&D databases  





Passengers yes yes yes 
Market Share yes yes yes 
Distance yes yes yes 
Revenues yes yes no 
Yield (cents per 
passenger mile) 
yes yes no 
Onboard Passengers no no yes 
Seats available no no yes 
Market Rank Yes yes yes 
Fared passengers yes yes no 
Fare yes  yes no 
Enplaned Passengers yes yes yes 
   
 Other data for code-share agreements among carriers, gate and slot controls and 
usage agreements, carrier financial resources, employees etc. come from various DOT 
reports (see section on measures) and have been manually and built into the database 
extracted through a cumbersome process.  
 
6.2 Methodologies 
Most empirical work to date seems to have utilized standard approaches such as 
regression analysis as their methodology (e.g., Abunassar 1994). One exception is Dixit 
(2000) who used neural networks and binary logit analysis. I have considered a wide 
array of methodologies to ensure robust and unbiased results and to strengthen the 
validity of the findings a la triangulation. Sophisticated methods such as binary and 
ordered logit analysis, multi-level modeling with mixed coefficients (HLM), and event-
history analysis were determined to be feasible. Logit models enabled the analysis of 
limited dependent variables; HLM enabled to account for the hierarchical structure in the 
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data; and even-history analysis overcomes the issues with right-censoring (i.e., exits 
unobserved in the database). Split sample and double-cross validation have been 
employed for validation purposes where applicable. 
 
6.2.1 Logit models 
The applicability of logit models to the airline industry context has been shown by 
Dixit (2000). The model is quite robust, and its use is familiar in marketing. 
The ordinal categorical/binary nature of the dependent variables in the model 
(e.g., supra-competitive, competitive, entry/no entry; exit/no exit) facilitates the use of 
ordered/binary logit models. Ordered logit implies that the dependent variable can be 
ranked but the distance between the categories is not known (Aldrich and Nelson 1984; 
Menard 2002). Binary logit implies a dependent variable with two known states. 
The assumptions of the limited dependent variable models, similar to multiple 
regression models, are as follows (Long 1997): 
a. The x’s and ε  are not correlated ( \ ) 0E xε =  
b. Error terms have constant variance 
c. Error terms are normally (or logistically) distributed with a mean of zero. 
 An ordered regression model such as logit (or probit) can be derived when an 
infinite range for y is mapped to an observable variable and cut-off points (thresholds) are 
established (Long 1997). For example, an ordered logit model with three levels for the 
dependent variable would be specified as follows (Borooah 2002): 
    Yi = 1, if Fi ≤ δ1 
    Yi = 2, if δ1 ≤Fi ≤ δ2 
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    Yi = 3, if Fi ≥ δ2 
 
where δ1, δ2 ≥ 0; δ1 < δ2, and represent unknown parameters. Te classification for pricing 
strategy depends on whether the observed fares surpass the respective thresholds. The 
probabilities for Yi for each pricing strategy are: 
 
 Pr(Yi=1) = Pr(Zi+εi ≤ δ1) = Pr(εi ≤ δ1 – Zi) 
 Pr(Yi=2) = Pr(δ1≤ Zi +εi ≤ δ2) = Pr(δ1 – Zi < εi ≤ δ2 – Zi) 
 Pr(Yi=3) = Pr(Zi+εi ≥ δ2) = Pr(εi ≥ δ2 – Zi) 
 
 The ordered logit model assumes that the error term (εi) is logistically distributed 
(on the hand, an ordered probit model would assume the error term to be normally 
distributed. Greene (2000) suggests that while it is hard to specify this distribution based 
on theory, the results are equivalent in most applications). Therefore, the cumulative 
distribution function of the random variable X is: 
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The binary model is simpler in that only one threshold point has to be defined for 
the dependent variable.  
 
6.2.2 Multi-level mixed coefficient models (Hierarchical linear modeling) 
 Multilevel analysis focuses on the analysis of data with complex patterns of 
variability, with a focus on its nested sources (Luke 2004; Snijders and Bosker 1999). 
Much of the phenomena in social and behavioral sciences consist of nested layers (Kreft 
and Leeuw 2002). Variables may relate to individuals, groups, teams, departments, 
organizations, countries, trading blocks and so forth. Multilevel models have been 
developed to deal with hierarchically structured data. These models are referred to as 
mixed-effect and random effect models in biometric applications, random coefficient 
regression models in econometrics, and covariance component models in statistics 
literature (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). It is also referred to as Hierarchical linear 
modeling in the social sciences because of popular software package with the same name. 
A random coefficients multi-level model is said to exist when there are at least two 
levels, and the coefficients at the lowest (micro) level are treated as random variables at 
the second level. In contrast, mixed effect models assume that some of the coefficients 
are fixed and some are random (Snijders and Bosker 1999). 
 213
 Adding new level(s) to the model renders it more general and often more useful 
(Kreft and Leeuw 2002). Analysis from data aggregated at different levels may produce 
different results when a hierarchy exists. This can be determined by intra-class 
correlations. If intra-class correlation is practically zero, then group differences do not 
exist and can be ignored in the analysis. However, by assuming and modeling this 
correlation, the implicit nested structure of the data is accounted for. On the other hand, if 
this correlation is substantial and is ignored, the reliability of the results become 
questionable (Kreft and Leeuw 2002). Therefore, the choice for the level of aggregation 
used to analyze the data becomes important. If we aggregate the data, we may potentially 
discard meaningful data and also introduce an aggregation bias. On the other hand, if we 
conduct our analysis at the individual (i.e., micro) level, we violate the independence 
assumption. 
Overall, multi-level models help the researcher in three main ways (Raudenbush 
and Bryk 2002, p.7): 
1. Improved estimation of effects within individual units (e.g., developing an 
improved estimate of a regression model for an individual school by borrowing strength 
from the fact that similar estimates exist for other schools) 
2. The formulation and testing of hypotheses about cross-level effects (e.g., how 
varying school size might effect the relationship between social class and academic 
achievement within schools) 
3. Partitioning of variance and covariance components among levels (e.g., 
decomposing the covariation among set of student-level variables into within- and 
between-school components).  
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 These features enable researchers to construct more realistic models and test 
hypotheses across levels with greater accuracy and reliability. The use of multilevel 
models has been recommended unless there is reason to believe that hierarchical structure 
in the data is not an issue. The method is emerging and more and more researchers in 
marketing have been utilizing it (e.g., Malhouse et al. 2004; Van den Bulte 2000).  
Luke (2004, p.13-14) categorized multilevel models in three main classes: 
1. Unconstrained  
1: ij oj ijLevel Y rβ= +  
00 02 : oj jLevel uβ γ= +  
Mixed-Effects model becomes 00 0ij j ijY u rγ= + +  
This model is used as a null model to estimate between group effects. 
2. Random intercepts: 
1: ij oj ijLevel Y rβ= +  
00 01 02 : oj j jLevel W uβ γ γ= + +  
or with explanatory variable 
11: ij oj j ij ijLevel Y X rβ β= + +  
00 02 : oj jLevel uβ γ= + ; 1 10jβ γ=  
Mixed-Effects Models are 00 01ij j oj ijY W u rγ γ= + + + and 00 01ij ij oj ijY X u rγ γ= + + +  
respectively. 
3. Random intercepts and slopes 
0 11: ij j j j ijLevel Y X rβ β= + +  
0 002 : j ojLevel uβ γ= + ; 1 10 1j juβ γ= +  
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with cross-level interaction terms (Wj represents the interaction term): 
0 11: ij j j j ijLevel Y X rβ β= + +  
0 00 012 : j j ojLevel W uβ γ γ= + + ; 1 10 11 1j j jW uβ γ γ= + +  
The mixed effects models are 00 10 0ij ij j ij ij ijY X u u X rγ γ= + + + +  and 
00 01 10 11 0 1ij j ij j ij j j ij ijY W X W X u u X rγ γ γ γ= + + + + + +  respectively. 
 
 
6.2.3 Event-History analysis 11 
An event is described as a qualitative change that occurs at a specific point in 
time. Therefore, while a price change no matter how drastic, does not necessarily 
constitute an event, market entry and exit are considered events. It has been suggested 
that the best way to examine the causes and consequences of such events is through 
event-history analysis. If standard methods are applied to event-history data, the results 
can be severely biased due to censoring and time-varying explanatory variables. The 
event-history analysis has found many applications including but not limited to 
unemployment studies, consumer behavior studies (i.e., brand choice over time), medical 
studies on the course of illness, learning experiments in psychology and instruction 
research, insurance and accident studies, studies of migration, analysis of family 
formation and fertility, criminology studies ad legal research, organization and 
management research (cf. Blossfeld et al. 1989). There are several dimensions that need 
to be considered before one can apply event-history analysis. I consider these in view of 
my model and data set.  
                                                 
11 This section is based on Allison (1984) except where cited otherwise. 
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Distributional versus regression methods. Most of the early research that used 
event-history analysis has focused on the distributional issues such as the time until an 
event or the time between events. More recently, the focus has shifted to regression 
models in which the event is the dependent variable where its occurrence depends on 
explanatory variables. Similarly, the factors that lead to market entry/exit rather than the 
time that passes until a market entry is of interest for the current research.  
Repeated versus nonrepeated events. Events can be repeated (i.e., marriage) or 
non-repeated (i.e., death). Not surprisingly, repeatable events are more complex to model 
but can be handled with event-history analysis. There can be more than one entry/exit in a 
given market in a longitudinal study or one can simply assume that it is a one-time event 
for a market. 
Single versus multiple kinds of events. Events can be treated as identical or 
distinguished from one another (i.e., voluntary versus involuntary job termination). As 
such, market entry and exit in my models can be treated as identical or categorized as 
inter-entry and intra-entry. 
Parametric versus nonparametric methods. Non-parametric methods make few or 
no assumptions about the distribution of the data. Alternatively, the researcher can 
assume a specific distribution (e.g., Weibull). Hybrid approaches have also been 
developed in which the regression model has a specific functional form but the 
distribution of the event times is not specified (resembles the linear models where no 
distribution is assumed for the error term).  
Discrete versus continuous time. If the researcher is able to measure the “exact” 
event time or assume a continuous scale, then continuous models can be used. Otherwise, 
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discrete units (e.g., quarterly data) can also be handled by the event-history method.  
Discrete time models are also easier to implement.  
 In simple form event-history analysis is conducted in the form of life-tables. This 
essentially implies that the survival time data is grouped. 
 If we define time intervals as Ij where j=1,….J : Ij : [tj, tj+1), where 
 Dj: the number of failures observed in interval Ij 
 Mj: the number of censored spell endings observed in interval Ij 
 Nj: the number at riskof failure at start of interval 
 Sj, Fj: survival and failure functions for interval j respectively 
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hazard rate is estimate for mid-point of the interval becomes  
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 While the notation becomes more complex when we introduce explanatory 
variables to the model, a Cox proportional hazards model with two time-constant 
variables can be simply generalized as: 
 
Log h(t) = a(t) + b1X1+b2X2 ; 
 





 The main methods that are utilized are contrasted with each other and other 
alternatives in Table 6.2 in order to demonstrate their relative advantages. 
 
Table 6.2: Comparison of Alternative Methodologies 
Methodologies Pros Cons 
Multiple Linear 
Regression 
• Easy to interpret and 
communicate 
• Interaction and dummy 
variable coding  
• Not suitable for binary 
dependent variables 
Logit Models  • Can effectively deal with 
binary/ordered/ multinomial 
dependent variables 
• Arbitrary choice for 
dependent variable 




• Considers the nested structure 
of the data and cross-level 
correlations 




• Can effectively deal with 
censored observations 
• Utilizes full information for 
the dependent variable 
• No assumptions on the nature 
and shape of the hazard 
function (Cox) 
• Can deal with time-varying 
explanatory variables  
• Data hard to get and time 
consuming to prepare 
• Feasible only for qualitative 
changes with known times 
Structural 
Equation Modeling 
• Tests the full model rather 
than a stepwise approach 
• Not feasible when the 
variables have single 
indicators or formed of 
formative (not reflective) 
scales 
Time-Series Models • Considers autocorrelation in 
the data and can establish 
cause and effect relationships 
• Data hard to get and very 
time consuming to prepare  
Game-Theoretic 
experiments 
• Enables precise modeling of 
timing and information levels 
• Difficulty with complex 
models prohibits 
construction of a 
generalizable model 











Relevant markets: An inquiry of market defense immediately raises the question as to 
what constitutes a relevant market in the airline industry. One possible approach would 
be to assess the whole nation as the market. It may be argued that even though no carrier 
serves every city, there are no such restrictions prohibiting from doing so. However, with 
this definition of the relevant market --six major carriers, three of which are about equal 
size, and dozens of smaller carriers-- one would be misled to conclude that the industry is 
indeed not concentrated. For all practical purposes, considering regional markets as the 
relevant market level does not clarify the customer’s dilemma either. Let us consider the 
case of the Southeast region: For a passenger who wants to fly from Atlanta to Savannah, 
the competitive service that Air-Tran offers on its Atlanta-Orlando flights provide little 
relief. A product/service market should have its own elasticity of demand as derived from 
consumer preferences. Therefore, from a marketing perspective, the relevant market for 
the consumers is the substitutable airport/city pairs. It should be noted that several DOT 
reports and recent literature have also taken this view regarding the definition of the 
relevant market in the airline industry (e.g., 2001d; Dempsey 2000b; Dixit 2000; Nannes 
1999; e.g., Oster and Strong 2001). “We have consistently found that relevant airline 
markets are generally no larger than city-pair routes” (1996b, p.5).12  
Pricing Strategy: This was the average yield (Average price / distance) for the incumbent 
for the market in question for a given quarter.  
Distance: is the physical distance in miles between the two cities that make the market 
                                                 
12 The relevant airline markets may be narrower than city pairs (1996b, p.6). A relevant 
market investigation at the segment level (e.g. business class city-pair market, coach class city-




Market Size: Number of total passengers in the market for a given time frame (i.e., 
quarter). 
Market Power: The market power of the incumbent was measured by the Herfindahl-
Hirschman (HHI) index. The index is essentially the sum of the squared market shares of 
all firms in a market (i.e., revealing 10000 maximum for a pure monopoly). The primary 
advantage of the HHI is that it is more sensitive to the size distribution of firms than a 
four firm concentration ratio. HHI performed better than simple market share during 
preliminary analysis. An alternative measure to the HHI index was developed but did not 
perform better (see Appendix B).  
Barriers to Entry: Barriers to entry were formed as a composite variable. The factors that 
were considered in the formation of the variable were as follows:  
Market-specific barriers: Whether any of the cities that form the market is a hub; is 
subject to slot and noise controls; whether the gates are utilized at capacity; whether the 
gates are predominantly leased for exclusive use by one carrier (1999a; 1999d; Dresner et 
al. 2001). 
Firm-specific barriers: Content analysis was undertaken in trade press to identify carriers 
with a reputation for predation for a period of ten years (1989-1999, i.e., pre-dating 
DOJ’s American Airlines case). Keyword searches were conducted for “predatory”, 
“aggressive”, “anticompetitive”, and “antitrust.” The results consistently revealed the 
same pattern of frequency associations. American Airlines had its own a cluster with the 
highest frequency count (3), Continental, Northwest and United were grouped together 
next (2), Delta, TWA, and U.S. Airways (1) were grouped third.  
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 Code-share agreements that were in effect for the major carriers were identified 
from the DOT reports. Code-share agreement barriers were coded to exist if the 
incumbent and one of its code-share partners operated in the same market. 
 
Strategic Assessment: Strategic assessment was the sum of the composite variables for 
entrant resources, strategic fits, and market growth. 
Resources: This was the sum of the full-time employees of the low cost carriers that 
operated at either end of the market (i.e., either city pair). It was transformed into a 
composite variable. Alternative financial measures such as resource slack (working 
capital over total assets) were employed as well but did not produce satisfactory results. 
For example, the working capital for Southwest airlines was consistently negative, 
whereas some smaller airlines’ were positive. Therefore, I have opted for employees as a 
measure of potential entrant resources.  
 
Strategic fit: This was the sum of the aggregate market shares of the low cost carriers that 
operated at either end of the market. This was transformed into a composite variable. 
Market growth: For quarter n, this was measured as the percentage of growth in the 








− . This was 
transformed into a composite variable. 
 
Entry event: Entries by the following carriers, JetBlue Airways, Frontier Airlines, Tower 
Air, AirTran Airways, ValueJet Airlines, Kiwi International, Carnival Airlines, Nations 
Air Express, National Airlines, Vanguard Airlines, Spirit Airlines, Pro Air, Reno Air, Sun 
Country Airlines, American Trans Air, Western Pacific Airlines, Air South, and Casino 
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Express (list acquired from the DOT officials, identical with that in the DOT special 
feature study (2003a)) with more than twenty passengers per day (2000c). Pioneer entries 
into markets that did not exist before were excluded. Entries by Southwest airlines were 
excluded because of the previously discussed “Southwest effect.” Competitors do not 
retaliate against Southwest and Southwest very rarely exits from markets it enters. 
Southwest’s market capitalization is more than double the rest of the industry combined 
(Hazel 2003, p.13). 
Incumbent’s response: This was calculated as the percentage difference between the 
average incumbent yield before entry (Qn-1), and the average of the incumbent yield at 
entry and four quarters following entry (Average Qn to Qn+4). The signs were reversed so 
that they measure retaliation rather than change, which makes it easier to interpret. 
 Incumbent’s retaliation response for exit hypothesis was the percentage difference 
between the average yield of the incumbent in the quarter before exit (or the quarter of 
last observation) and the average incumbent yield before entry. Use of average responses 
(i.e., average of yields after entry) would not necessarily support hypothesized 
relationships for the retaliation–exit linkage because an incumbent may keep prices high 
for a few quarters and then decrease it sharply (in multiple markets) to drive the entrant 
out (which was an observed pattern in the data). Such predatory actions would not be 
captured by an average response measure. 
 
Other variables: 
Hubs: Major and regional airline Hubs for the purposes of this research are listed in 
Appendix C. 
HubPower: Weighed average HHI of all markets linked to the hub. 
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HubPremium: Weighed average yield for the hub 
 
HubSpecificBarriers: These are market specific barriers excluding hub formation. 
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CHAPTER 7 
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
 H1: Market power of the incumbent and the market price premium will be   
  positively associated. 
 
 H2: The positive relationship between the market power of the incumbent and the  
  market price premiums will be positively moderated by barriers to entry. 
 H3: Barriers to entry and the market price premium will be positively associated. 
 
 H4: The positive moderating effect of firm specific barriers on the incumbent’s  
  pricing strategy will be higher than that of market specific barriers. 
 H5: The positive effect of firm specific barriers on the incumbent’s    
  pricing strategy will be higher than that of market specific barriers. 
 H6: The positive relationship between the market power of the incumbent   
  and the market price premiums will be negatively moderated by the  
  incumbent’s strategic assessment (i.e., resources, strategic fit,   
  market growth) of the potential entrants. 
 
 H7: Incumbent’s strategic assessment and the market price premium will be  
  negatively associated. 
 
 These hypothesis were tested using multiple linear regression, logit and HLM 
models. Top 4000 markets in the U.S. by passenger volume for the 4th quarter of 1999 
(the most recent quarterly data available) were chosen for the analyses.13 This was also 
the quarter by which extensive code-share agreements had come in effect. The general 
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 Where Yi is the average yield for the incumbent for market i 
 Xi1 is the distance between city pairs that form market i (control variable) 
                                                 
13 This represented a comprehensive approach as the top 2500 markets approximately account for 
90% of passenger traffic. 
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 Xi2 is market size for market i (control variable) 
 Xi3 is market power of the incumbent for market i  
 Xi4 is strategic assessment of the incumbent for market i  
 Xi5 is firm specific barriers to entry for market i  
 Xi6 is market specific barriers to entry for market i  
 
 After cases with missing data and outliers were excluded, the final sample 
consisted of 3948 markets. A quick preliminary run showed that the main effects existed 
in the expected directions. All entered variables were significant (p<0.01). However, 
transformations were undertaken to ensure that the data satisfies the assumptions of the 
method (this procedure is detailed in Appendix E). Due to non-normal distribution of 
market power, 374 cases where the market power was extremely high (above 9000) were 
excluded in order to achieve a normal distribution.14 The data was then split into two 
subsets of identical size (n1=n2=1787) using the random split procedure to inquire if the 
results are robust.  
 The model was highly significant (p<0.01) and the variables were able to explain 
69 percent of the variance in incumbent’s yield (adjR2=0.688). Variance inflation factor 
(VIF) is between one and two for all variables so multicollinearity was not anticipated to 
present a problem (VIF values higher than 10 should be taken as a sign of 
multicollinearity (Neter et al. 1996, p.387)). Control variables were significant with 
negative coefficients consistent with a priori expectations (e.g., both increasing distance 
between cities and market size are expected to be negatively correlated with an 
incumbent’s yield in a given market). Market Power of the incumbent was highly 
significant (p<0.01) with a positive coefficient as expected. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was 
supported. 
                                                 
14 The runs without this exclusion revealed identical results for significance. 
 226
 The coefficient for firm specific barriers to entry and market specific barriers to 
entry were highly significant and positive (p<0.01) thus indicating a main effect on 
incumbent’s yield. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 was supported. In both models, the 
coefficient for firm specific barriers is higher than that of market specific barriers. Neter 
et al. (1996, p. 273) describe the formal test as one where   
 
 H0 :  βfirm specific barriers ≤  βmarket specific barriers 
 
 Ha :  βfirm specific barriers >  βmarket specific barriers 
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stands for total barriers to entry (i.e., Xi5 + Xi6). F* statistic of 314.77 was highly 
significant (p<0.01) (see Appendix E for details). Therefore, Hypothesis 5 was supported. 
 The coefficient for Strategic Assessment was highly significant and negative as 
anticipated (p<0.01). Therefore, Hypothesis 7 was supported. On the other hand, none of 
the moderating effects were significant (p<0.05) with presence of main effects in the 
model. Therefore, moderation related hypotheses 2, 4, and 6 were not supported.  
The MLR results for both split samples are presented in Table 7.1. The results were 
robust for the two samples. Double cross-sample validation revealed little shrinkage 






Table 7.1: Multiple Linear Regression Results 
MLR results Split Sample 1 Split Sample 2 
 Beta Significance VIF Beta Significance VIF 
Constant -.145   -.140   
Distance -.720 p<0.01 1.298 -.745 p<0.01 1.346 
MarketSize -.039 p<0.05 1.394 -.027 p<0.10 1.350 
MarketPower(MP) .127 p<0.01 1.372 .106 p<0.01 1.402 
FirmBarriers(FB) .173 p<0.01 1.444 .141 p<0.01 1.371 
MarketBarriers(MB) .130 p<0.01 1.446 .119 p<0.01 1.405 
Str.Assessment(SA) -.222 p<0.01 1.395 -.221 p<0.01 1.333 
FBXMP -.018 n.s. 1.293 .01 n.s. 1.252 
MBXMP -.007 n.s. 1.287 -.016 n.s. 1.233 
SAXMP .021 n.s. 1.187 .026 n.s. 1.163 





 It is very hard to justify arbitrary cut off points to determine different types of 
pricing strategy (i.e., supra-competitive, competitive, and limit) and any choice would be 
criticized. Therefore, rather than trying to justify the two arbitrarily chosen cut-offs, I 
would like to argue that the results of logit models should be similar to those of the MLR 
models as long as the cut-offs chosen for average yield (i.e., dependent variable) reveal a 
near-normal distribution (highest mode in the middle for competitive pricing) as opposed 
to a bi-model distribution (i.e., two high modes on the tails). The reality should be near-
normal anyway: in all likelihood, the highest mode in all deregulated consumer network 
industries is competitive pricing.15 Indeed, if we cannot make the assumption that most 
products/services are competitively priced in any unregulated industry, it would mean 
that public policy has grossly failed. To illustrate this point, several logit runs were 
                                                 
15 In a perfectly competitive market, all prices would be expected to be competitive whereas in a 
regulated monopoly, all prices would be expected to be supra-competitive. 
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undertaken with different cut-off points for the three categories of pricing strategy and 
the results were compared: 
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The cut off point for supra-competitive pricing was determined to be 25 cents per mile 
and the cut-off for limit pricing was set at 10 cents per mile. Pseudo-R-square was 45%; 
Log likelihood was -2127.9159; LR chi-square (9)=3534 was highly significant 
(p<0.001). Full results for the model are presented in Table 7.2. 
 
Table 7.2: Main Logit Model Results 
Variables Coefficient Std. Err. Z P>|z|   95% Conf. Interval
Distance -.3534 .01063    -33.24  .000 -.3743 ;  -.3326 
Market size -.0000 .00002    -1.44   .0149 -.0001 ;   8.67e-06 
Market Power(MP) .0001 .00002     4.68    .000 .0001  ;  .0002 
Firm Barriers .4131 .03795    10.89   .000 .3387 ;    .4875 
Market barriers .2872 .03647     7.87    .000 .2157 ;   .3587 
StrategicAssessment -.2645  .01638    -16.14  .000 -.2966 ;  -.2324 
FirmBarriersXMP -.0000 .00002    -1.48   .139 -.0001 ;   7.57e-06 
MarketBarriersXMP -.0000 .00001    -1.75   .08 -.0001 ;  3.38e-06 













Next, the model was run with different cut-off points. The results are presented in Table 
7.3: 
 















Pseudo-R2 .4901 .4462 .4940 .4529 .4552 .4906 
Distance -.3724 -.3695    -.3814  -.3767  -.3408    -.3637   
MarketSize n.s. -.000044  n.s.    -.00007  -.00004†    n.s. 
MarketPower .0002 .0001 .0001  .0001    .0002    .0002 
Firm Barriers .4220  .4137 .5104    .4332   .3918    .4285 
MarketBarriers .2495 .3079 .2254  .3173    .2770    .2406 
StrategicAssessment -.3013  -.2746 -.2978  -.2312   -.2475    -.2938 
 Note: All models were significant p<0.001. All coefficients significant at p<0.01 
 except where noted  † for p<0.05 or n.s. 
 
 
 It should be noted that even though both cut-offs are modified by as much as 
twenty percent in both directions, the results were very robust. The significance of the 
results was also identical to those of MLR. All coefficients were highly significant and 
were in the expected directions with the exception of market size which was often non-
significant. Therefore, main effect Hypotheses 1, 3, 5, and 7 were supported as in MLR 
analysis. This would indicate that the findings can be interpreted for the three categories 
of pricing strategy as conceptualized in the model. Furthermore, firm specific barriers 
appeared to be the most influential variable in all models, further supporting Hypothesis 
5. The only surprise result was the positive and significant but much smaller coefficient 
for market power. This raised the possibility that the market power of the incumbent may 







Multi-level mixed coefficient model: 
 
The evidence on competitive interaction suggests that the overall market share of 
the incumbent for the city (hub) that the route connects should also be an important 
indicator of market power. Many smaller routes (i.e., spokes) that feed the hub system 
have been observed to have higher price levels than those that can feed higher levels of 
traffic. Major carriers typically set up their hubs at cities where the market size is large. 
The price levels should come down due to economies of scale as market size increases. 
However, hub systems are costly to operate and they have been shown to have a positive 
effect on prices in form of hub premiums (1999b; Allvine 1996b).  
Although typically not stated explicitly, the airline industry possesses a 
hierarchical structure: the airlines compete with each other in individual markets (city-
pairs), and these markets reside in hubs (collection of markets). The framework is 
developed from an incumbent defender’s perspective (i.e., one defender per market, the 
dependent variable is the incumbent’s yield for the market). The markets that connect 
hubs to each other (e.g., Atlanta-Dallas) were removed from the database to achieve a 
single incumbent. The new full data set consisted of 2024 markets nested in 36 hubs 
(please see appendix C for a list of the hubs included in the analyses; Appendix F for 
further tables with respect to HLM analyses.). The end result is a pioneer application of 
multi-level mixed coefficient modeling in the airline context. The base model with a 
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 The empty model was significant and suggested that the total variability that can 
be attributed to the group level variables is 24% (i.e., intra-class-correlation coefficient 
(ICC)) (Snijders and Bosker 1999). This justified the nested structure of the data 
(Appendix F). The sample was randomly split into two groups for split-sample validation. 
Group-centering was employed for level one variables and grand-mean centering was 
employed for level 2 variables (Snijders and Bosker 1999). Similar to previous tests, the 
moderating effects were mostly non-existent. However, the HLM models should not be 
compared with the earlier results per se. For example, the measure for hub barriers (i.e., 
market specific barriers for HLM) does not include hub formation since all level two 
variables are at hubs. Thus, hub barriers were not significant potentially due to issues 
with its weaker measure. Similarly, Hub resources and hub growth became proxies for 
strategic assessment. After several runs, the cross level interaction of market power that 
was found to be significant was with Hub Premium. It should be noted that firm specific 
barriers again have the highest positive coefficient in the model. Therefore, similar to 
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MLR results, the HLM model supports Hypotheses 1, 3, 5 and partially supports 
Hypothesis 7. 
The results from the two split samples are presented below.  
 
 
Table 7.4: Main HLM Results 
Variables/Coefficients Split 
Sample 1 
Significance Split  
Sample 2 
Significance
σ2 0.1296  0.11861  
τ(intercept) 0.0325  0.02279  
Reliability  0.828 0.788  
Intercept 2.9529 0.000 2.8944 0.000 
Hub Premium 0.0567 0.000 0.0676 0.000 
Hub Resource -0.000010 .004 -0.000004 0.097 
Hub Barriers 0.016253 n.s. 0.007218 n.s. 
Distance -0.0543 0.000 -0.0559 0.000 
Market Size -0.000038 0.003 -0.000052 0.000 
Market Growth -0.062 0.020 -0.1031 0.002 
Market Power 0.000071 0.000 0.000074 0.000 
MP X Hub Premium 0.000007 0.001 0.000007 0.006 
Firm Barriers 0.1002 0.000 0.126 0.000 




H8: Incumbents’ pre-entry market price premiums for markets with inter-category 
 entry will be higher than those of markets without inter-category entry. 
 
H9: Potential inter-category entrants’ strategic assessment of the markets will be 
 higher for the markets that they enter.  
 
 Markets with inter-entries in a given quarter are not expected to exceed a small 
fraction of the population (less than 5 percent). The need to examine this small end-tail of 
the distribution causes estimation problems (Dixit 2000). A binary logit model for the 
overall data set did not reveal satisfactory results (the null and full models consistently 
predicted no entry for all markets and achieved 98%+ prediction accuracy). Therefore, a 
subset of the data had to be specifically developed to test the hypotheses. Markets that an 
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inter-entry occurred within the calendar year 1995 (randomly chosen) were sought. 
Seventy-seven inter-entries were identified.16 Using the exact distribution of the entries 
among quarters, a comparable subset of markets where entry did not occur during the 
same period was generated. The two subsets were then combined, revealing a binary 
dependent variable (no-entry=0/entry=1) for 154 cases. The even distribution between 
market entry/no entry rates enabled the development of a binary logit model with 
sufficient power. Dummy variables were used to denote quarters to capture seasonal 
variation (Shaffer et al. 2000) but none were significant (Appendix G). Therefore, the 
entries in 1995 were pooled together. The model was significant with a Nagelkerke R-
square of 60%. The results are presented in Table 7.5. 
 
Table 7.5: Logit Model Results for Hypotheses 8 and 9 
DV: Entry Beta Std. Error Wald Significance Exp (Beta) 
Distance -1.377 .541 6.475 .011 .252 
Market Size 1.050 .212 24.424 .000 2.858 
Str. Asses. .298 .142 4.434 .035 1.347 
PricingStrategy 1.865 .142 8.251 .004 6.455 
Constant -4.314 4.806 .806 n.s. .013 
 
 All variables in the equation were significant (p<0.05). The negative coefficient 
for distance indicates that inter-entries occur in markets with shorter hauls. The positive 
coefficient for market size indicates that LCC entrants prefer larger markets for entry. 
The coefficient for Strategic Assessment is significant and positive. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 9 is supported. The coefficient for Pricing Strategy is also positive and highly 
significant. Therefore, Hypotheses 8 is supported. It should be noted that Pricing Strategy 
                                                 
16 Entries to entirely new markets (i.e., pioneer entries) were not included. Market entry and exit 
analyses with fewer than a hundred cases are common due to the manual labor involved in 
constructing the databases. See Dixit (2000) for an example with sixty-nine cases of entry, 
Dresner et al. (2001) for a study with fifty-eight entries, and Fournier and Zuehlke (2001) for a 
study with forty-three entries. 
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has the highest beta coefficient against entry likelihood. Therefore, limit pricing may be 
an effective strategy to deter entry in markets. The model predicts 81% of market entries 
correctly as opposed to 50% a priori (see Table 7.6).  
 




















H10: The magnitude of the incumbent’s response to inter-entry will be 
 positively associated with its pre-entry pricing strategy. 
 
 
 The same data set as above was used to test Hypothesis 10. Dependent variable 
was the price response of the incumbent in proportion to its pre-entry yield. The 
independent variables were the pre-entry yield of the incumbent (Pricing Strat.), Market 
Size, Distance, and entrant’s yield at entry (Entry Yield). The model was significant and 
the adjusted R-square suggested that roughly one third of variance in price responses to 
entry could explained by these variables alone. 
 The coefficient of Distance was positive and significant, suggesting that the 
incumbents retaliate to entries in longer haul markets more intensively. The negative and 
significant coefficient for market size suggested that the incumbent’s average price 
response becomes less intense as market size increases. This could be related to the 
business passenger traffic that creates a significant share of the incumbent’s revenues in 
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large markets. The coefficient for the entrant’s yield is negative but not significant with 
incumbent’s yield in the equation. Finally, Pricing Strategy has the highest and 
significant coefficient in the model. Therefore, it appears that the single most important 
variable in predicting the price response of the incumbent facing entry is its own pre-
entry prices. Thus, Hypothesis 10 is supported. Alternative models that included entrant’s 
yield and entrant’s price cut percentage as independent variables were run but their 
coefficients were not significant, further supporting Hypothesis 10. 
 
Table 7.7: MLR Results for Hypothesis 10 
DV: Incumbent 
Response 
Beta Std. Error Significance 
Constant  .444 .183 
Distance .502 .063 .012 
Market size -.400 .012 .000 
Entry Yield -.010 .007 .939 




H11: The likelihood of inter-category exit from a given market and the magnitude 
 of the incumbent’s competitive response will be positively associated. 
 
H12: The likelihood of inter-category exit from a given market and the entrant’s 
 strategic assessment will be negatively associated. 
 
 In order to conduct these tests, binary logit analysis in similar fashion to the test 
of Hypotheses 8 and 9 were undertaken. This time the binary dependent variable was the 
Exit event within three years of entry (exit=1/no-exit=0). A new set of strategic 
assessment variables were created for the entrants in market (i.e., while the previous 
strategic assessment variable was aggregate for all potential entrants, this assessment is 
specific for the actual entrant in the market) (Appendix G). The model was significant 
with a Nagelkerke R-square of 83%. The coefficient for the control variable Market Size 
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was negative and significant indicating that the entrants are less likely to exit from larger 
markets. Strategic Assessment was also significant and negative. Higher strategic 
assessment by the entrant decreases likelihood of exit. Therefore, H12 is supported. 
Finally, the retaliation variable is positive and significant, and its coefficient has the 
highest absolute value in the equation. 10% increase in retaliation (i.e., 10% price cut 
with respect to pre-entry yield) increases the likelihood of exit by more than 10 times. 
Therefore, Hypotheses 11 is supported. The data suggests that predatory retaliation can 
be effective. Note that the Distance variable was omitted from the model as it was neither 
significant nor correlated with any of the variables in the model, and there was no 
theoretical reason that it would impact the exit decision. The contingency table predicted 
91.3% of the exits correctly (as opposed to 71.7% for exits a priori). 
Table 7.8: Logit Analysis Results for Hypotheses 11 and 12 
 Beta Std. Error Wald Significance Exp (Beta) 
Market Size -3.646 1.628 5.012 .025 .026 
Str. Asses. -2.419 1.228 3.880 .049 .089 
Retaliation 4.636 2.287 4.110 .043 103.083 




 Rather than pre-specifying an exit event and creating a binary variable for exit, 
one can also look at the time to exit from a market and its relationship with the 
incumbent’s response. This objective can be achieved with life-table analysis which can 
also handle right-censored data (i.e., cases where the entrant did not yet exit by the time 
of the last observation). In order to avoid misspecification of cut-off points, two 
categories of the incumbent’s response (high and low) were compared against one 
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another (i.e., medium levels were excluded). This was done to ensure that cases of 
accommodation and predation were specified correctly.  
 The event-history model was significant (p<0.01) which suggested that the time 
to exit for cases of accommodation and predation were different. Figure 7.1 also clearly 
indicates that the two strategies lead to different exit patterns. Therefore, the analysis 

























  Figure 7.1: Graph for Survival Function 
 
    
 Similar analysis can also be conducted without creating a binary variable for the 
incumbent’s response. In the following analysis, incumbent’s response (Retaliation) and 
Strategic Assessment are included as continuous variables. Strategic Assessment and (the 
incumbent’s) Retaliation are both significant in the expected directions with respect to the 
hazard rate for market exit. Distance and market size were not significant and were 
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excluded from the model (Appendix H includes the model with these variables). 
Therefore, Hypotheses 11 and 12 are supported.  
 
Table 7.9: Bivariate Correlations for Hypotheses 11 and 12 
 Time in market Retaliation Str. Assessment 
Time in market 1   
Retaliation -.523 1  
Str. Assessment .659 -.308 1 
 
Table 7.10: Cox regression Results for Hypothesis 11 and 12 
DV: Hazard Beta Std. Error Wald Sign. Exp (Beta) 
Retaliation 2.771 1.25 4.797 .029 15.979 
Str. Asses. -.440 .139 9.942 .002 .644 
 
 
H13: The inter-entrant’s exit will result in loss to consumer welfare as 
measured by the increase in the incumbent’s post-exit market power. 
 
Hypothesis 13 can be tested by comparing the post-exit market power of the 
incumbent to the levels of market power during inter-type competition. However, critics 
could argue that the increase is a given because the market power is measured by the HHI 
index (e.g., any exit from the market will increase post-exit market power). While I 
would counter-argue that the increase in the post exit market power from inter-type 
competition would be higher than intra-type competition, an alternative comparison of 
post-exit market power to the pre-entry levels was sought here. Exit cases in 1996, 1997, 
and 1998 in the previous sample were examined for this analysis. Average post-exit 
market power was calculated for the last year in the database, 1999 for all cases. Pre-
entry market power was calculated and averaged for four quarters preceding entry. Paired 
sample t-test was employed to see if there is any increase between pre-entry and post-exit 
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market power of the incumbent. The results indicated that the pre-entry mean for market 
power (HHI) is 5414.6 while the mean for post-exit is 5751.5 (i.e., 337 HHI point 
increase). The paired t-test was significant (p<0.05). Therefore, Hypotheses 13 is 
supported. This suggests that the incumbents enhance their market power to higher levels 
than even before inter-type entry occurs. This result is disturbing and has public policy 
implications.  
To check that this is not a spurious effect, I tested the alternative hypothesis that 
the market power of incumbents in all markets have increased between 1994 and 1999. 
The same test was run for the randomly created no-entry sample for entry hypothesis 
(H8). The paired t-test was not significant for this no-entry control sample (p<0.05). 
Therefore, the increase in the incumbent’s power could be attributed to the exit of the 
inter-type competitor.  
These findings concluded the main part of the data analysis. A summary of the 
results is presented in Table 7.11. 
 
    Table 7.11: Summary of Results 
Hypotheses Main Methods Results 
H1: Market power of the incumbent and 





H2: The positive relationship between the 
market power of the incumbent and the 
market price premiums will be positively 




H3: Barriers to entry and the market price 





H4: The positive moderating effect of firm 
specific barriers on the incumbent’s 
pricing strategy will be higher than that of 




H5: The positive effect of firm specific MLR, Ordered Supported 
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barriers on the incumbent’s pricing 




H6: The positive relationship between the 
market power of the incumbent and the 
market price premiums will be negatively 
moderated by the incumbent’s strategic 
assessment (i.e., resources, strategic fit, 




H7: Incumbent’s strategic assessment and 





H8: Incumbents’ pre-entry market price 
premiums for markets with inter-category 
entry will be higher than those of markets 
without inter-category entry. 
Binary logit Supported 
H9: Potential inter-category entrants’ 
strategic assessment of the markets will be 
higher for the markets that they enter.  
Binary logit Supported 
H10: The magnitude of the 
incumbent’s response to inter-
entry will be positively associated 
with its pre-entry pricing strategy. 
MLR Supported 
H11: The likelihood of inter-category exit 
from a given market and the magnitude  of 
the incumbent’s competitive response will 





H12: The likelihood of inter-category exit 
from a given market and the entrant’s 






H13: The inter-entrant’s exit will 
result in loss to consumer welfare 
as measured by the increase in the 
incumbent’s post-exit market 
power. 
Paired t-tests Supported 
Overall Assessment: The framework was generally supported except for the hypothesized 
















































The dissertation represents a theoretical and empirical advancement of the debate 
on the effectiveness of pricing strategy in market defense. I have developed a reputation 
for predation framework (Figure 2.3), a reaction to competitive price reduction 
framework (Figure 3.6), and a network price competition framework (Figure 7.2) among 
others, examined several key research questions and found empirical support for most of 
the hypotheses. Several methodologies such as multiple linear regression, binary and 
ordered logit models, multi-level mixed coefficient models, event-history analysis, 
ANOVA, and chi-square and t-tests were simultaneously utilized in the process. In 
accordance with the notion that marketers’ job is to create differentiation (and decrease 
the correlation between cost and price), the notion of cost was de-emphasized during 
framework development. Thus, the dissertation represents contribution with a marketing 
perspective to an area which is pre-dominated by law and economics.  
 In Chapter 3, I discussed how marketing contributes to the analyses of the four 
stages of the current regulatory framework for evaluating predatory pricing. Next, I will 
summarize marketing’s overall contributions through its research designs, data analysis 
methods, data sources, and key concepts.  
 The business and consumer-oriented research output of social sciences in general, 
and marketing in particular, should find its way into the courts’ agendas in antitrust cases 
as they have done so on consumer protection issues. “Soft” research methods such as 
personal interviews, focus groups, questionnaires, and historical analyses are often 
overlooked by economists, yet promise great potential in understanding the strategic 
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paradigms that executives use in decision-making. For example, historical analyses can 
also be useful to assess the recoupment aspect (i.e., track stock/market share performance 
in cases with similar structure/barriers to entry), and to detect trends in managerial and 
jurisdiction practice. The marketing discipline is able in both positive and interpretative 
research via designing and conducting field experiments, quasi-experimental designs, 
focus groups, depth interviews, historical analyses, observation, scanner data analyses, 
and last but not certainly not least, descriptive surveys. Substantial and insightful 
differences between the models developed by economists and marketing researchers in 
estimating demand functions from scanner data have been noted (Scheffman 2002; 
Sullivan 2002). 
 Marketing also uses sophisticated data analysis methods such as structural 
equation modeling, multidimensional scaling, and is the home discipline of conjoint 
analysis. “In addition to the potential of expanded empirical methodologies, antitrust’s 
reliance on price data would benefit from marketing, because the source of these data is 
marketing. An understanding of price data from the perspective of those who generate 
and use them would yield further understanding of their nature and utility in antitrust” 
(Gundlach and Phillips 2002, p.252). The use of marketing research findings is now well 
accepted in both regulatory and legal proceedings. Potential applications of data 
collection and analysis methods and data sources typically utilized in marketing are 
provided in Table 8.1 along with the overall theoretical contributions that may be derived 
from key marketing concepts. The decision-making procedure in the courts today is used 
as a road-map. The dissertation also has managerial and public policy implications, which 
are discussed next.
 
Table 8.1: Overall contributions through Key Marketing Concepts, Methods, and Data Sources 
 Market 
Segmentation 


















• Segment level 







• Prices are signals that 
the incumbent can 
bluff with/manipulate 
due to information 
asymmetry 










• Managers are 



















• Research designs/methods 
typically used by marketers 
would be helpful (e.g., 
consumer surveys/field 
experiments for relevant 














• Relevant markets 







• Predation can be 
profitable even 
without immediate 




• Expected prices would 
change along with the 
stages of the product 








changes lead to 
different recoupment 
calculations 
• Probabilities (of 
recoupment) for 
gains are often 
exaggerated in 
decision-making 
• The relative 






• Survey and historical 
research can delineate entry-
deterrence (e.g., reputation 
effects) due to predatory 
reputation 
• Variety of databases (e.g., 
PIMS) may be used to 











• Forced exit/reduced 
output issue needs 
to be examined at 
the market segment/ 
buyer perceived 
product line level 
• Disciplining through 
predatory pricing can 
also force an entrant to 
raise prices 
• Impact to 
competitors can 
also be perceptual 
• If buyers do not 




to rivals not 
relevant 
• Sophisticated market 







4. Will there 





• Continued service 
to all identified 
segments/niches 
should be a 
consideration in the 
courts 
• Contracts can protect 
businesses from 
predatory pricing 
• Consumers benefit 
from increased inter-
type competition 
• “Co-opetition” among 




















welfare is a 
complex 
phenomenon. 











• A variety of designs may be 
used to identify the levels of 
welfare on each of the sub-
dimensions: (e.g., survey 
research for satisfaction, 
field experiments for 
variety, quasi-experimental 
designs for perceived value 
etc.)  
• A variety of methods may 
be used to analyze the data 
(e.g., conjoint analysis for 
variety and innovation, 
structural equation modeling 
for satisfaction etc.) 
• Scanner data is available to 
examine price predation in 
many retail contexts 
Table 8.1 (continued) 
8.1  Managerial Implications 
 
The dissertation has implications from both the incumbent and the entrant’s point 
of view: 
1. The framework emphasizes the importance and uses of market power as a competitive 
advantage in network industries. The positive relationship between the rate of entry and 
fare premiums indicate that even though most discounters may enter those markets with 
the highest premiums, they might have the lowest chance of survival in the very same 
markets. A significant paradigm shift is implied for the entrants to consider competitively 
and limit priced markets as alternative potential entry targets. It was suggested that 
managers think of past and future competitive interactions, but they do not attempt to 
predict future actions of competitors (Montgomery et al. 2005). If managers of inter-type 
entrants start to undertake these predictions (keeping current antitrust enforcement in 
perspective), it is expected that they might opt to enter markets that are not supra-
competitively priced more frequently in the future. After all, the seriousness of the threat 
to entry depends on the reaction from existing competitors that the entrant can expect; the 
prediction is “sharp retaliation from entrenched competitors” (Porter 1979, p.289). It is 
very important to anticipate how the actions of competitors will differ with differing 
conditions.  
2. An important implication for the incumbents (and caveat for the policy-makers) is that 
predatory pricing can be a viable strategy to pursue under current legislation. Reputation 
effects and a strategy of predation may effectively deter new and potential entrants from 
entering strategic (supra-competitively priced) markets. 
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3. The findings reinforce the importance of firm specific barriers to entry as opposed to 
market specific barriers (i.e., capital requirements, regulation etc).17 Therefore, managers 
should exert effort to understand and build barriers to entry that will be specific for their 
firms. The list of barriers to entry in this category is quite extensive (i.e., alliances, 
product differentiation, brand equity, R&D spending, switching costs etc. (Karakaya 
1989)). Managers will need guidance from academics in these endeavors. 
 
Two Practical Implications for Marketing Managers: 
1. Firms without market power need not worry when cutting price: The courts consider 
market power as a pre-requisite for predation. Demonstration of market power is sought 
through high market share. It was suggested that sixty percent or more represents 
conventional wisdom (1999c). Thus firms without market power may engage in excess 
capacity discounting or otherwise aggressive below cost pricing under current legislation. 
A company without market power does not meet the standards for proof of recoupment in 
a predatory pricing case. However, tying arrangements for sales can still be considered 
predatory regardless of market power (1992). 
2. A Price can mean more than a number: Pricing can gain important implications 
through signaling. For example, a rival’s altered belief about the cost structure may deter 
entry (Gundlach 1995). Therefore, marketers should consider potential implications when 
setting the price. There may be multiple objectives involved such as market penetration. 
Introductory low prices can be set to create excitement for a new product without 
                                                 
17 I do not mean to suggest that firm specific barriers are more important that market specific 
barriers under all circumstances. Market specific barriers would be expected to dominate entry 
conditions in heavily regulated industries (e.g., utilities, airlines in the 70’s).  
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anticompetitive consequences. However, low prices can also be predatory if they are 
entry deterring. The aim in a price change may be simply to match competitors to 
stabilize prices in a market or appeal to retailers. Reduced prices can also increase the 
sales of complementary products. In such cases, suppliers may price below cost but still 
not be predatory if they intend to make money from complementary products (e.g., 
printer prices to compensated from ink cartridge sales) (Gundlach 1995). Thus, marketing 
managers need to consider their reaction to a competitor’s price change carefully.  
 
8.2 Public Policy Implications 
Peteraf (1993) has observed differences between reactions to newly certified 
entrants and formerly regulated ones . Oster and Strong (2001) have also suggested that 
the responses of incumbents to low-cost entrants are different than their responses to 
major players. The responses in case of entry by a discounter were observed to be much 
stronger and vigorous. Many DOT reports also suggest that the lack of price competition 
(i.e., inter-type competition) is the root cause of hub premiums (as opposed to passenger 
mix, operational cost, and quality of service) (2001e). 
 Agglomeration theory and empirical observations in retailing suggests that intra-
type and inter-type competitors should co-exist and prosper in the same markets (Ghosh 
1986; cf. Miller et al. 1999).  Inter-type agglomeration decreases the time and 
transportation costs for the buyers, enabling more expenditure (Ghosh 1986). Inter-type 
competition greatly influences the quality, price, and selection of products available to 
buyers. The theory of cluster development also posits benefits to businesses of all types 
when they are located in geographic proximity due to resulting productivity, innovation 
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and growth (Porter 2000). Thus, suppliers as well as buyers benefit from inter-category 
agglomeration (Ghosh 1986).  
 The following public policy implication stands out among others: policy-makers 
should pay particular attention to the options available to increase the number of inter-
type competitors in network industries, and then to ensure that the competitive process is 
fair in these markets. New legislation should be undertaken if necessary. Increased inter-
type competition also has the very desirable effect of diminishing the chances of strategic 
recoupment, and therefore minimizing predatory practices altogether (i.e., if inter-type 
competition already exists in the market, it is unlikely for the incumbent to predate 
against new inter-type entry). High market concentration has been associated with lower 
costs for firms in the industry (Dickson 1994). On the other hand, the analysis clearly 
indicates that market concentration leads to higher prices. This is an important dilemma 
that policy makers can resolve by ensuring the presence of discounters in key markets.  
 Network industries are more prone to limit and predatory pricing due to the 
interconnected and the winner take-all nature of the markets. It is important that network 
markets are under close monitoring by policy-makers. 
 The lower rate of long-term survival in supra-competitively priced markets fuels 
the suspicion that the current legislation is unable to detect acts of predatory pricing in 
network industries. The current Areeda-Turner (1975) AVC test is not applicable in 
network industries because marginal costs tend to be very low. The application of AVC 
criterion for detecting predation results in entry deterrence through reputation of 
predation and actual predation.  
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 Entry deterrence results in diminished competition and lower consumer welfare in 
the long run. Public policy officials need to seriously look into this issue to protect the 
competitive process. Consumer welfare is a phenomenon that needs to be monitored by 
more than a short-run efficiency perspective. 
 In a global business economy with diminishing tariffs, industries become 
integrated across borders. It is important that the U.S. policy-makers monitor and learn 
from international developments to enhance domestic welfare, because all else being 
equal the more aggressive antitrust shall prevail in international law. Currently, the 
European Union is clearly the more aggressive party in its antitrust enforcement, Canada 
has already taken regulatory action in this direction (2000e), and more recently Australia 
is debating to do the same (e.g., Edwards 2002). Average variable cost tests have already 
been considered inadequate for certain industries such as telecommunications, and 
average avoidable cost tests are being used (1998b). European courts may consider 
above-cost price cuts abusive if coupled with substantial market power (Compagnie 
Maritime Belge Transps. SA v. Commission 1996; Irish Sugar PLC v. Commission 1999). 
Moreover, proof of recoupment is not required, hence a defendant may be found guilty 
even when it did not have a reasonable prospect of recouping losses incurred through 
predatory pricing (1994c). Arguably, these interpretations are bound to surface in the 
U.S. enforcement as well. 
 Marketing discipline can provide additional insights to perspectives offered by 
economists, lawyers and strategic management communities and help resolve the 
stagnant Chicago-Post-Chicago debate in antitrust.18 
                                                 
18 Typical witnesses in a senate subcommittee hearing on aviation include Professor Michael E. 
Levine (law), Professor Emeritus Alfred E. Kahn (political economy) and airline executives 
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8.3 Limitations and Future Research 
 As with all studies, the current research suffers from several drawbacks. The 
available data did not permit analysis at fine detail: the dependent variable was available 
on a quarterly basis and price data was the average yield. If possible, it would be useful to 
examine these issues with monthly data and especially at the business fare versus coach 
fare level. It should be noted that however, as a result of the data structure, the tests 
tended to be very conservative overall. If an incumbent predated against the entrant at the 
coach level and subsidized its losses with increases in business class fares, the data would 
not show this effect. The structural changes in the distribution of market segments (e.g., 
business vs. coach) should be investigated as this has important implications on revenue 
management and pricing policy. Different pricing strategies in different segments of the 
auto market (i.e., aggressive pricing for subcompact, cooperative pricing in the mid-size 
segment) have been identified (Sudhir 2001). Examination of the price elasticity of the 
different segments in the market would be helpful. 
 The data was dated from 1993 through 1999. It has been argued that when the 
environment is turbulent an approximate analysis of today’s conditions is more useful 
                                                                                                                                                 
(2001i). It is our contention that the marketing discipline contains experts that would present 
highly relevant opinions and findings in senate and court hearings. In this respect, the Spring 
2002 Research Workshop and Conference on Marketing, Competitive Conduct, and Antitrust 
Policy held by the University of Notre Dame was certainly a step in the right direction. This event 
was attended by “interested members of marketing’s academic community, top antitrust scholars, 
and respected public policy officials and practitioners. A broad spectrum of research interests 
were represented, including those who study marketing strategy, competitive response/decision 
making, interfirm and marketing channel relationships, retailing, consumer behavior, and other 
topics related to competition. Various research methodologies were also represented, including 
mathematical modeling, survey research, experimentation, and interpretivist methods” (Gundlach 
2002, p.224).  
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than an exact analysis of conditions a decade ago (Evans and Schmalensee 2001). While 
one could argue that the main premises of competition do not change, it is also true that 
the airline industry has experienced very turbulent times especially after September11, 
2001. It would be useful to examine these issues with recent data. 
 The competitive interaction in network industries resembles card games with 
imperfect information. Incumbents with high market power may have incentives to act 
like a table bully with deep pockets. Signaling commitment for future raises is often 
sufficient for winning with inferior hands (so long as the competitors do not really have a 
strong hand i.e., a radical innovation). Therefore, while this research was able to 
demonstrate the existence and effectiveness of the basic defense strategies and provide 
empirical support for the Post-Chicago School of thought, from another perspective it has 
just scratched the surface. Game theory can be used to extract more advanced 
recommendations for the decision-makers in future work. It was recently shown that 
dynamic game-theoretic models may be used to predict specific actions, and that they 
may outperform reaction functions and static models (Ailawadi et al. 2005). 
 Similarly, strategic entry deterrence is an important phenomenon that should be 
examined in future research. “The idea behind “strategic entry deterrence” is that a 
monopolist who pursues predatory pricing with sufficient zeal and frequency will earn a 
reputation formidable enough to scare off all potential entrants indefinitely. The firm can 
then charge monopolistic prices long enough to recoup its investment in predation” 
(1995a, p.1202). 
The current research consciously omitted issues related to cost in the empirical 
side of the investigation but fell short of developing a new non-cost based predation test. 
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Future research should consider alternative cost tests, non-cost based tests or combinatory 
tests not only for predatory pricing but also for the overall predation construct. “A 
determination that an airline’s competitive response is or is not an unfair method of 
competition should not necessarily depend on a cost standard”(2001g, p.60). 
 Predation is not limited to price. The role of other variables in the marketing mix 
in predation should also be inquired in future studies (Robertson and Gatignon 1991). It 
would also be useful to inquire the domain dimension (retaliation in other markets) 
(Kuester et al. 1999) as this aspect of competition remains understudied and it appears 
that this dimension is often employed against entrants with shallow purses. 
 The framework was tested in one network industry --the airlines, therefore the 
generalizability of the results to other networks is questionable. However, as mentioned 
previously, the statistical tests were rather conservative. For example, the ability to of 
airlines to alter their price within minutes and capacity within days could undermine the 
role of price as a credible signal for market potential. Yet, the results indicated that limit 
pricing leads to lower entries than supra-competitive pricing. I would expect these results 
to hold even more in industries where it is not easy to respond to competitive actions so 
readily. Still, it would be useful to test the model in other industries. For example, 
competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) in the telecommunications industry, major 
drug manufacturers with expiring patents in the pharmaceutical industry, and electric 
utility firms can form interesting extension contexts for future inquiry. 
 Due to the labor required in setting up databases, the sample sizes were smaller 
for the entry and subsequently exit analysis. Pending funding, it would be useful to 
undertake these analyses within a research program and achieve larger sample sizes.    
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One reason for the lack of marketing research on the role of pricing strategy in 
market defense may be the interest in being practical. Burns (1986) had emphasized the 
need for empirical research on predatory pricing. After almost two decades, data remains 
hard to find and empirical work on the topic from any discipline is still not numerous. 
Historical data analysis from outside the grocery chain (scanner data) paradigm would 
advance our understanding of the price variable (Malhotra et al. 1999). Emerging 
methods for process model testing (e.g., Burton 2002) may have promising applications 
in competitive interaction contexts. The identified research issues/perspectives are 
presented in Table 8.2. There are a number of methodology issues to consider and a need 





Table 8.2: Issues/Research Perspectives on the Use of Pricing Strategy in Market 
 Defense 








• What is the best pathway of conduct 
for effective aggressive/predatory 
pricing? 
• How can a business without deep 
pockets best defend itself against 
predatory pricing? 
 
Can we develop extensive Reaction 
Frameworks for: 
• Signaling? 
• Non-price predation? 
• Overall marketing mix? 
 
 
Need cases and empirical demonstration 
on how to: 
• Identify managerial objectives 
• Thwart predation with business 
brand equity 
• Employ non-price predation 
• Deter entry by managing reputation 
• Deter entry by price 
• Prevent/minimize lawsuits and legal 
losses 
• Examine the role of contractual 
agreements/CRM as a defense 
against predatory pricing 











•  (How) can we develop (a relatively) 
objective and reliable non-cost 
based test? 
• What is “below-cost”? 
•  (When) will the strategic 
perspective take over? How can the 
process be accelerated? 
• How can we best distinguish 
between protecting the competition 
versus the competitive process? 
• How do we identify and prioritize 
industries that need specific 
legislation? 
• Should predatory pricing be treated 
as a global or domestic issue? 
• What is the interplay between ethics 
and predation? 
• What is the most effective means to 
increase consumer awareness of the 
long-term impact of predation? 
• What is the role of non-profit 
organizations in predatory pricing? 
• (How) can we develop a practical 
and comprehensive measure of 
consumer welfare? 
• How can we best measure 
        reputation effects, varying    
        perceptions of signaling, strategic   
        recoupment, multi-product    
        environment, opportunity costs,  
        relevant markets, barriers to entry,  
        and psychology of predation? 
• What are the consumer attitude/  
        perceptions regarding predatory  
        pricing and related constructs? 
• How does yield management  
        enhance/deter welfare? 
• What is net effect of price  





• How can the current law be made 
enforceable in network industries?  
international cases? 
• (How) should we incorporate 
international cases/legislation? 
• How can the inconsistencies 
between the Federal and State level 
can be resolved? 
• Do historical cycles/swings in 
enforcement help us predict the next 
wave? 
• What are some applications of 
simulations, event-history analysis, 
focus group interviews, neural 
networks/genetic algorithms, game 
theory, and behavioral studies 
relevant for predatory pricing? 
• How can Post-Chicago antitrust be  
        best lobbied among litigators/law     





 Empirical research on pre-entry and post-entry market defense has been lacking. 
The evidence on the use of limit pricing and predatory pricing has been inconclusive 
despite the theoretical basis for these actions. Both actions have direct implications for 
entry and defense conduct. Furthermore, our knowledge on the strength of firm specific 
versus market specific barriers was also a debate item.  
 This research presented empirical evidence that both limit pricing and predatory 
pricing are effective, and do take place in network markets. The role that price plays in 
pre-entry and post-entry market defense was examined in detail from a theoretical basis 
and empirically demonstrated. 
 There is an increasing gap from the insights from modern economic policy (i.e., 
Post-Chicago) and the enforcement of current judicial policy (i.e., Chicago). There is a 
need to go beyond the Chicago School of thought, adopt a strategic framework espoused 
by the Post-Chicago School, and update the current enforcement policy to adapt to the 
realities of the new economy. Marketing syntheses would provide a fresh perspective, 
which may eventually reveal an alternative policy that overcomes the drawbacks of the 
current enforcement.  
 Marketing researchers have not engaged in public policy implications of pricing 
until recently, and a focus on this issue is long overdue (Grewal and Compeau 1999). 
Guiltinan and Gundlach (1996) noted that marketing is uniquely positioned to help form 
public policy guidelines with sophisticated measurement and modeling procedures. 
Marketing can provide insights for realistic and practical derivation of the relevant 
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markets, opportunity costs, non-cost based tests, and analysis of strategic/competitive 
interactions, and impact of predation on consumer welfare. 
 How long it will take for the Post-Chicago foundation (that is generally aligned 
with those from marketing) to reshape the legal superstructure is as yet unknown. 
Undoubtedly, marketing insights can speed up the process. It is my hope that the results, 
insights and the frameworks stemming from this work will attract the thinking of scholars 











Survey of State Law regarding Predatory Pricing 
Table A1: Predatory Pricing Survey 
State   Predatory Pricing Statute  
Alabama Gasoline Specific Below-cost Law. 
Arkansas Sustained Below ATC is prohibited. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. American 
Drugs, Inc. [1995-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 70,853 (Ark. S. Ct.) 
California Below ATC is presumptive evidence of intent. Pan Asia Venture Capital 
Corp. v. Hearst Corp., 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 118, 123-24 (1st Dist. 1999).  
Colorado Below ATC with intent is prohibited. Gasoline Specific Below-cost Law. 
Connecticut General monopolization statute. Below AVC is prohibited. Westport Taxi 
Serv., Inc. v. Westport Transit Dist., 664 A.2d 719, 729-30 (Conn. 1995). 
Florida Gasoline Specific Below-cost Law. 
Georgia Below Cost Act. Messy language --No definition of manufacturer’s cost. 
Emphasis on Federal courts and Robinson-Patman Act 
Hawaii Based on California Unfair Practices Act. Island Tobacco Co. v. R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 627 P.2d 260 (Haw. 1981), overturned on other 
grounds, Robert’s Hawaii Sch. Bus, Inc. v. Laupahoehoe Transp. Co., Inc., 
982 P.2d 853 (Haw. 1999). 
Idaho Yes. 
Kentucky Below ATC is illegal with intent. Remote Services, Inc. V. FDR Corp., 764 
S.W.2d 80 (Ky 1989). 
Louisiana Prohibits below cost sales.  
Maine The Unfair Sales Act. Below cost with intent is prohibited. Cost is not 
defined. 
Maryland Maryland Sales Below Cost Act. Prohibits intent to destroy competition. 
Below cost is not defined. 
Massachusetts Prohibits intent to destroy competition. Below cost is not defined. Gasoline 
Specific Below-cost Law. 
Minnesota Similar to Massachusetts statute, except that there is a Minnesota Attorney 
General’s opinion that the Act does not apply to manufacturers.  
Missouri Gasoline Specific Below-cost Law. 
Montana Prohibits below cost sales at retail and wholesale. 
Nebraska Yes. 
New Jersey Gasoline Specific Below-cost Law. 
North Carolina Yes. Also Gasoline Specific Below-cost Law. 
North Dakota Prohibits below cost sales at retail and wholesale. 
Oklahoma Almost identical to the Massachusetts statute 
Pennsylvania Very similar to the Massachusetts Act. 
Rhode Island Below cost prohibited 
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South Carolina Below cost with intent is prohibited. Cost not defined. 
Tennessee Almost identical to the Massachusetts statute. Also Gasoline Specific Below-
cost Law. 
Texas Prices below AVC, or below short run profit maximizing price and ATC if 
entry barriers are high, are illegal. Caller-Times Publishing Co., Inc. v. Triad 
Communications, Inc., 826 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. 1992). 
Utah Yes. Also Gasoline Specific Below-cost Law. 
Washington Consumer Protection Act was defined as consistent with the Robinson-
Patman Act. Seattle Rendering Works, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., Inc., 
701 P.2d 502, 505-06 (Wash. 1985) Specifically, the court held that prices 
below AVC violate the Act. 
West Virginia Below cost sales are prohibited. 
Wisconsin Yes. 
Wyoming Yes. 
Note:  1. The data are gathered from Calvani (1999), and McCareins (1996) for illustration 
purposes. An independent survey was not undertaken. 







Comparison of HHI and Proposed MP Index 
 
 It has been suggested that simple market share and concentration ratios is not 
sufficient to draw valid conclusions regarding market power (Alpert 1984). It was argued 
that misleading calculations would result in many industries (e.g., soft drink, beer, 
airlines) when solely concentration ratios are used for analysis (Alpert 1984), yet many 
contemporary studies continue to use market share or market concentration for this task. 
Market characteristics (e.g., segmentation, product and price differentiation, growth 
strategy) and barriers to entry would ideally need to be considered for viable results 
which can be an overwhelming task. The unique relationship between incumbent’s 
market share and overall market concentration is such that while both market share and 
market concentration are positively correlated with market power and each other; for any 
given market share, the lower the market concentration the higher would be the market 
power. That is, an incumbent with 50% market share will have relatively more market 
power in a market where all other competitors have 10% share than if the market was 
more concentrated (say with two more firms with 25% share each). This phenomenon is 
inquired further in here. 
  The HHI index is more comprehensive than market share per se but it is still an 
incomplete measure. It does not consider the fact that market power is firm specific and is 
relative to the other competitors in a given market (in accordance with relative power 

















where i represents the airline in question, and n represents the number of airlines in a 
given market. The denominator is simply the HHI for the market in question. This new 
index is better grounded in theory than HHI (see theoretical discussion on market power) 
and serves as a more appropriate measure of market power. For example, when there are 
two firms in a market with 50% market share, the market is heavily concentrated with an 
HHI index of 5000. However, it is a misleading to use the HHI as a proxy for the firm’s 
market power. If the same market had three firms (incumbent 50%, two competitors each 
25%) then the HHI index would go down considerably to 3750 whereas in reality the 
relative market power of the incumbent would go up significantly (67% versus 50% 
according to the proposed index). Several figures that present a comparison between the 
simple HHI and this new augmented index are provided below. Unfortunately, this new 
measure proved inferior to the HHI index when regressed against yield. Therefore, HHI 
index was used the measure of market power in tradition with prior research. 
 When the MP index did not reveal better results than market share or HHI despite 
theoretical expectations (HHI performed better), the following inquiry was performed: 
All markets from Minneapolis for the fourth quarter of 1999 were examined. Northwest 
Airlines was the presumed incumbent for these markets. There were a total 381 markets. 
Six markets that did not have yield measures (due to insignificant volume) were 
excluded. Market power measures were correlated with the average yield in the markets. 
Initial results showed that (ceteris paribus) market share had the highest bivariate 
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correlation (.42), MP index performed second (.34), and HHI correlated worst (.29) 
against average yield (AVyield). 
 
Also please note that market share and Market Power performed much better against the 
Average Yield of the incumbent, Northwest Airlines (NWY). However, HHI was not 
significant due to several markets where NW does not serve (NWY would be zero for all 
these markets) or may not be the incumbent. 
 
Table B1: Bivariate Correlations with Full Sample 
Correlations
1 .836** .340** .293** .415**
. .000 .000 .000 .000
375 375 375 375 375
.836** 1 .669** .001 .727**
.000 . .000 .980 .000
375 375 375 375 375
.340** .669** 1 -.137** .977**
.000 .000 . .007 .000
375 375 381 381 381
.293** .001 -.137** 1 -.040
.000 .980 .007 . .440
375 375 381 381 381
.415** .727** .977** -.040 1
.000 .000 .000 .440 .





















AVYIELD NWY MP HHI MS




 To resolve this problem, the markets where Northwest was not the incumbent 
(e.g., from Minneapolis to other hubs) or did not serve were removed. Therefore, the 
remaining markets were those that Northwest had the highest market share. This would 
be the better way of examining this relationship. 
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Table B2: Bivariate Correlations with Final Sample 
Correlations
1 .994** .326** .518** .486**
. .000 .000 .000 .000
187 187 187 187 187
.994** 1 .328** .497** .477**
.000 . .000 .000 .000
187 187 187 187 187
.326** .328** 1 .681** .890**
.000 .000 . .000 .000
187 187 190 190 190
.518** .497** .681** 1 .920**
.000 .000 .000 . .000
187 187 190 190 190
.486** .477** .890** .920** 1
.000 .000 .000 .000 .
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 This time HHI correlates higher than both market share (second) and market 
power (third) against both AvYield and NWY. Therefore, HHI was used throughout the 
analyses to measure the market power construct. The relationship between the proposed 
(but not used) market power index and the HHI index is illustrated below. 
Comparison of HHI with MP Index for an 












Figure B1: Comparison Graph 1 
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Assumptions: Incumbent’s market share is fixed at 50%. All other competitors have 



















Figure B2: Comparison Graph 2 
Assumptions for comparison basis: Incumbent’s market share is fixed at 20%. All other 
competitors have equal market share (except when only one remaining, 80%). 
 
 














Figure B3: Comparison Graph 3 
Assumptions for comparison basis: Incumbent’s market share is fixed at 80%. All 





 U.S. Regional and Major Airline Hubs 
Hub   Dominant Carrier 
Anchorage  Alaska Airlines 
Atlanta  Delta 
Boston   Delta 
Baltimore  U.S. Air 
Charlotte  U.S. Air 
Chicago  American, United 
Cincinnati  Delta 
Cleveland  Continental 
Columbus   America West 
Dallas/Fort Worth American 
Denver  United 
Detroit   Northwest 
Fort Lauderdale Delta  
Honolulu  Hawaiian 
Houston  Continental 
Indianapolis  U.S. Air 
Las Vegas   America West 
Los Angeles  Delta 
Memphis  Northwest 
Miami    American 
Minneapolis/St. Paul Northwest 
New York  Continental, TWA (merged with American) 
Orlando  Delta 
Philadelphia  U.S. Air 
Phoenix  America West 
Pittsburgh  U.S. Air 
Portland  Alaska Airlines 
Raleigh/Durham American 
St. Louis  Delta 
Salt Lake City  Delta 
San Diego  Southwest 
San Francisco  United 
San Jose  American 
Seattle   Alaska Airlines 
Tampa   Delta 
Washington D.C.  United 
 

















Transformations and Other Analyses 
 
Raw data descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Std. 
Deviation
Skewness Kurtosis 
Inc.Yield 3971 21.5896 18.1793 2.933 11.158 
MarketSize 3971 1173.0098 2613.337 6.485 59.533 
Distance(100s) 3971 11.9084 8.17667 1.473 3.475 
MarketPower 3971 4921.7283 2349.226 .756 -.434 
Resource 3971 10357.71 13947.63 .988 -.659 
Str.Fit 3971 15.2753 25.1554 1.896 2.728 
MarketGrowth 3971 .1138 .62225 15.059 319.622 
MarBarriers 3971 1.64477 1.23204 .988 .819 
FirmBarriers 3971 1.9071 1.22286 -.138 -.935 
 
 
Diagnostic checks suggested that several of the variables should be transformed before 
further analysis are performed. This is expected for indicators of Strategic Assessment 
(i.e., resource, fit, and market growth) variables which were to be converted into a 
composite variable. Figure E1 below shows that the dependent variable violates the 
normality assumption. Following Figures show that the same variable satisfies the 
condition for normality after the transformation * 1y
y


































































Figure E2: Histogram after Ln Transformation on Yield 
 
 

































 However best results are obtained with * 1y
y
= −  (minus sign ensures that the 


































Figure E4: Histogram after final transformation 
 




















Figure E5: Normal Probability Plot for Yield 
 
Similar diagnostic checks are undertaken for the other variables. Natural log 
transformations were performed on Distance and Market size. Other variables (total fit, 
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aggregate resources, market growth were collapsed into categorical variables and 
summed to form the variable Strategic Assessment. The variables were then centered. 
The resulting correlation matrix between the variables is presented below: 
 
Table E2: Correlation Table 
 Yield MP FB MB FB SA SAxMP FBxMP MS D 
Yield 1          
MarketPower(MP) .46 1         
FirmBarriers(FB) .006 -.22 1        
MarBarriers(MB) .121 .02 .19 1       
Str.Asessment(SA) -.33 -.24 -.19 .00 1      
SAxMP .09 -.02 .01 -.05 -.28 1     
FBxMP .04 .09 -.34 -.01 .01 -.21 1    
MBxMP -.04 -.02 -.02 -.38 -.05 -.03 .17 1   
MarketSize(MS) .04 -.01 .00 .41 .25 -.05 -.02 -.30 1  
Distance (D) -.79 -.49 .26 -.02 .07 -.03 -.11 .03 -.15 1 
Note: Significant correlations are bold. 
 
Please note that the highest correlation between the incumbent’s yield is with market 
power (0.46). In order to inquire the generalizability of the findings further, the 
correlations between market power and average market yields for the top 1000 markets 
with incumbents were obtained for twelve quarters (1997-1999). The bivariate 
correlations over time were very consistent (minimum was 0.46, maximum was 0.48 and 
the average correlation was 0.47). Therefore, I conclude that the results are robust and the 
model is applicable for this context. 
 
Hypothesis 5: 
Following the procedure by Neter et al. (1996), The model was run with full sample first.  
 
MLR Results 
R R2 AdjR2 Std. Error F 
.858 .736 .736 .03478 1659.38 
 
Table E3: MLR Model results with full sample  
DV: Incumbent’s Yield Beta t 
Constant  43.368 
Distance -.805 -78.599 
MarketSize -.066 -6.568 
MarketPower .044 4.279 
FirmBarriers .167 17.548 
MarketBarriers .097 10.029 
StrategicAssessment -.209 -21.982 














R R2 AdjR2 Std. Error F 





Table E6: Reduced MLR Model Results 
DV: Incumbent’s Yield Beta t 
Constant  42.974 
Distance -.800 -78.248 
MarketSize -.079 -8.142 
MarketPower .037 3.573 
StrategicAssessment -.215 -22.692 
BarrierstoEntry .205 21.703 
Note: All coefficients significant for p<0.001 
 
 
F* is 1974.610 – 1659.843 =314.767 
314.77 >> / 2(1, 7)nFα −  Thus, we reject equal betas and conclude that the coefficient for firm 
specific barriers are higher.  
 
 
Double cross-sample validation results revealed correlations of 0.82 and 0.84 between the 
dependent variable and the predicted dependent variable for the calibration and hold out 
sample. These compare well with the R-value of 0.83 for the total sample (Mosier 1951). 
Accordingly, the R-square values for y-hat (i.e., total variation explained by the models) 





















HLM Analysis Supplements 
HLM Empty Model 
 
The descriptive statistics for the full raw sample were as follows: 
 
                    LEVEL-1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 VARIABLE NAME       N       MEAN         SD         MINIMUM      MAXIMUM 
     MSIZE          2024     720.34    1537.74         1.00     28284.00 
  INCYIELD          2024      23.53      20.07         4.87       136.97 
  MGROWTHCent.      2024      -0.01       0.54        -0.79        12.40 
    MPOWER          2024    5225.62    2423.55      1499.13     10000.00 
      DIST          2024      11.21       7.68         0.38        51.94 
   FIRMBAR          2024       1.97       1.15         0.00         6.00 
  FIRMBARX          2024    9444.54    6605.39         0.00     35136.21 
    
                      LEVEL-2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 VARIABLE NAME       N       MEAN         SD         MINIMUM      MAXIMUM 
     HPREM            36      14.41       3.90         7.62        24.04 
  HRESOURC            36    34418.36    15063.66      9911.00     53709.00 
     HBARR            36       1.47       0.84         1.00         4.00 
   
 
The empty model results were as follows: 
 
 





 Y = B0 + R 
 
Level-2 Model 
 B0 = G00 + U0 
 
 ---------------------------------------------------- 
  Random level-1 coefficient   Reliability estimate 
 ---------------------------------------------------- 
  INTRCPT1, B0                        0.936 
 ---------------------------------------------------- 
 
The value of the likelihood function at iteration 3 = 3.370939E+003 
 
The outcome variable is  TRYIELD 
 
 Final estimation of fixed effects: 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                       Standard             Approx. 
    Fixed Effect         Coefficient   Error      T-ratio   d.f.     P-value 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 For       INTRCPT1, B0 











 The outcome variable is  TRYIELD 
 
 Final estimation of fixed effects 
 (with robust standard errors) 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                       Standard             Approx. 
    Fixed Effect         Coefficient   Error      T-ratio   d.f.     P-value 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 For       INTRCPT1, B0 





 Final estimation of variance components: 
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Random Effect           Standard      Variance     df    Chi-square  P-value 
                         Deviation     Component 
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 INTRCPT1,       U0        0.03672       0.00135    35     802.33494    0.000 




ICC is calculated as (.00135+.00425)/0.00425 = 24%  
 
 
Variance Components for the two split samples: 
 
Split Sample 1 
 Final estimation of variance components: 
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Random Effect           Standard      Variance     df    Chi-square  P-value 
                         Deviation     Component 
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 INTRCPT1,       U0        0.18034       0.03252    32     214.87036    0.000 




Split Sample 2 
 Final estimation of variance components: 
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Random Effect           Standard      Variance     df    Chi-square  P-value 
                         Deviation     Component 
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 INTRCPT1,       U0        0.15097       0.02279    32     187.38061    0.000 

















 Logit Analysis Statistics 
 
Correlations for the variables for Hypotheses tests for 8-9 
 Entry Distance Market 
Size 
Str.Assessment PricingStrategy
Entry 1     
Distance -.45 1    
Market Size .54 -.18 1   
Str.Assessment .11 .30 .27 1  
PricingStrategy .43 -.73 .15 -.31 1 
Note: Significant correlations (p<0.05) are bold 
 
 
The model was run with dummy variables to denote quarters and PSxSA interaction but 
these were not significant: 
 
Table G1: Results with Dummy Variables 
DP: Entry Beta Std. Error Wald Significance Exp (Beta) 
Distance -1.78 .596 8.952 .01 .168 
Market Size 1.155 .229 25.356 .001 3.173 
DummyQ1 -1.169 .682 2.937 .09 .311 
DummyQ2 -.354 .705 .253 .62 .702 
DummyQ3 .057 .740 .006 .94 1.059 
Str. Asses. .400 .156 6.588 .01 1.492 
PricingStrategy 1.735 .654 8.2 .01 5.669 
PSXSA -.473 .268 3.104 n.s. .623 
Constant 4.755 4.104 1.342 n.s. 116.144 
 
 
Retaliation Hypothesis 10: 
Correlation matrix for H10 
 Retaliation Epricecut EYield PS MS D 
Retaliation 1      
Entrantpricecut .30 1     
EntrantYield .07 .073 1    
PricingStrategy .32 .76 .60 1   
MarketSize -.38 -.15 -.18 -.16 1  
Distance -.23 -.64 -.68 -.84 .26 1 
Note: Significant correlations (p<0.05) are bold 
 
 275
Due to high correlations between independent variables several runs were undertaken 
rotating the variables to ensure that the observed effects are robust. The results verify that 




Alternative Model 1 
DV: Retaliation Beta t-statistic 
Constant  4.392 
MarketSize -.332 -3.193 
PricingStrategy .266 2.557 
Note: All variables significant for p<0.02 
 
 
Alternative Model 2 
DV: Retaliation Beta t 
Constant  4.392 
Distance .507 2.862 
MarketSize -.400 -4.059 
PricingStrategy .758 4.362 
Note: All variables (except the constant) significant at p<0.01 
 
Alternative Model 3 
DV: Retaliation Beta t 
Constant  -1.344 
Distance .502 2.586 
MarketSize -.399 -4.032 
Entrant’s Yield -.010 -.076 (n.s.) 
PricingStrategy .759 4.324 
Note: All variables (except the constant and entrant’s yield) significant at p<0.02 
 
Alternative Model 4 
DV: Retaliation Beta t 
Constant  1.031 
Distance .027 .198 
MarketSize -.367 -3.410 
PriceCut .255 1.894 
Note: Only market size significant at p<0.05 
 
Alternative Model 5 
DV: Retaliation Beta t 
Constant  1.832 
Distance -.113 -.767 
MarketSize -.360 -3.271 
Entrant’s Yield .036 .246 







Event-History Analysis Supplements 
 
Exit Hypothesis 11-12: 
The Correlation matrix for the variables in the binary logit model was as follows: 
 
Correlation Matrix for H11-12 
 Exit Distance MarketSize Str.Asessment Retaliation 
Exit 1     
Distance -.10 1    
Market Size -.52 .02 1   
Str.Asessment -.52 .19 .29 1  
Retaliation .49 -.17 -.40 -.20 1 
Note: Significant correlations (p<0.01) are bold 
 
 
Life table analysis 
 
Comparison of survival experience using the Wilcoxon (Gehan) statistic 
   Survival Variable  TIME      Quarters 
          grouped by  EXIT       
 
  Overall comparison    statistic        8.285  D.F.     1   Prob.   .0040 
 
  Group  label                Total N   Uncen     Cen  Pct Cen  Mean Score 
 
      0  No                         8       1       7    87.50     25.6250 




        Number  Number  Number  Number                  Cumul 
Intrvl  Entrng  Wdrawn  Exposd    of    Propn   Propn   Propn   Proba- 
Start    this   During    to    Termnl  Termi-  Sur-    Surv    bility  Hazard 
Time    Intrvl  Intrvl   Risk   Events  nating  viving  at End  Densty   Rate 
------  ------  ------  ------  ------  ------  ------  ------  ------  ------ 
    .0    40.0      .0    40.0      .0   .0000  1.0000  1.0000   .0000   .0000 
   1.0    40.0      .0    40.0      .0   .0000  1.0000  1.0000   .0000   .0000 
   2.0    40.0      .0    40.0      .0   .0000  1.0000  1.0000   .0000   .0000 
   3.0    40.0      .0    40.0     5.0   .1250   .8750   .8750   .1250   .1333 
   4.0    35.0      .0    35.0     4.0   .1143   .8857   .7750   .1000   .1212 
   5.0    31.0      .0    31.0     4.0   .1290   .8710   .6750   .1000   .1379 
   6.0    27.0      .0    27.0     3.0   .1111   .8889   .6000   .0750   .1176 
   7.0    24.0      .0    24.0     2.0   .0833   .9167   .5500   .0500   .0870 
   8.0    22.0      .0    22.0     1.0   .0455   .9545   .5250   .0250   .0465 
   9.0    21.0      .0    21.0     4.0   .1905   .8095   .4250   .1000   .2105 
  10.0    17.0      .0    17.0     5.0   .2941   .7059   .3000   .1250   .3448 
  11.0    12.0      .0    12.0     3.0   .2500   .7500   .2250   .0750   .2857 
  12.0     9.0      .0     9.0      .0   .0000  1.0000   .2250   .0000   .0000 
  13.0     9.0      .0     9.0     1.0   .1111   .8889   .2000   .0250   .1176 
  14.0     8.0      .0     8.0      .0   .0000  1.0000   .2000   .0000   .0000 
  15.0     8.0      .0     8.0     1.0   .1250   .8750   .1750   .0250   .1333 
  16.0     7.0      .0     7.0      .0   .0000  1.0000   .1750   .0000   .0000 
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  17.0     7.0     1.0     6.5      .0   .0000  1.0000   .1750   .0000   .0000 
  18.0     6.0     2.0     5.0      .0   .0000  1.0000   .1750   .0000   .0000 
  19.0     4.0     1.0     3.5      .0   .0000  1.0000   .1750   .0000   .0000 
  20.0+    3.0     3.0     1.5      .0   .0000  1.0000   .1750     **      ** 
 
 **     These calculations for the last interval are meaningless. 
 




         SE of   SE of 
 Intrvl  Cumul   Proba-  SE of 
 Start   Sur-    bility  Hazard 
 Time    viving  Densty   Rate 
-------  ------  ------  ------ 
     .0   .0000   .0000   .0000 
    1.0   .0000   .0000   .0000 
    2.0   .0000   .0000   .0000 
    3.0   .0523   .0523   .0595 
    4.0   .0660   .0474   .0605 
    5.0   .0741   .0474   .0688 
    6.0   .0775   .0416   .0678 
    7.0   .0787   .0345   .0614 
    8.0   .0790   .0247   .0465 
    9.0   .0782   .0474   .1047 
   10.0   .0725   .0523   .1519 
   11.0   .0660   .0416   .1633 
   12.0   .0660   .0000   .0000 
   13.0   .0632   .0247   .1174 
   14.0   .0632   .0000   .0000 
   15.0   .0601   .0247   .1330 
   16.0   .0601   .0000   .0000 
   17.0   .0601   .0000   .0000 
   18.0   .0601   .0000   .0000 
   19.0   .0601   .0000   .0000 

























Figure H1: Survival Function 
 
 
































Event-History Analysis with continuous variables: 
 




Table H2: Event-History Analysis 
 Beta Std. Error Significance Exp (Beta) 
Distance .245 .443 n.s. 1.278 
MarketSize .000 .176 n.s. 1 
Retaliation 3.024 1.687 .073 20.573 
Str. Asses. -.446 9.916 .002 .640 
 
 With control variables the results are similar; only retaliation is significant at 10% at this 
time but still has the highest beta coefficient. 
 
Note: For the purposes of this analysis, Strategic Assessment consisted of: Resource 
(employee) growth: number of full-time employees during entry vs. those during exit 
(annual); Fit growth (entrant’s share at city 1 + city 2) at entry versus Qexit-1; market 



























Logistics Fares and market concentration are positively related. DOT data 
Regression analysis 
2. (Baker and 
Pratt 1989) 
Experience as 







Former intrastate airlines have larger impact on price 
than do newly established firms –a result consistent 
with these markets being imperfectly competitive 
because of an industry experience barrier to entry. 
Unlike actual competition, a measure of potential 
competition has no effect in constraining price. 
363 inter-state routes between 
California and Texas in 1984. 









Multi-market contact and its interaction with spheres 
of influence are related significantly to lower entry 
and exit. The interaction of multi-market contact and 
concentration was insignificant.  
Data regarding California based 
commuter air carriers between 
January 1979 and December 1984. 
DV: Rate of Market entry and exit 
IV: Market domain overlap, multi-
market contact, concentration, 
spheres of influence 






Multimarket contact has an inverted-U relationship 
with rate of entry and exit. Relative multimarket 
Data regarding California based 




Journal contact and the interaction of multimarket contact 
with firm size have significant effects on entry and 
exit. The rate of entry and exit were considered the 
aggregate measure of interfirm rivalry. Increase in 
multicontact is chance rather than strategy oriented. 
January 1979 and December 1984. 
DV: Rate of Market entry and exit 
IV: Multimarket contact, 
multimarket contact with a rival 
relative to the multimarket contact 
with other competitors, size of 
competitor 
Controls: Focal airline 















Two different approaches are presented for analyzing 
the effects of route and airport dominance on the 
prices that an airline charges. The first is a cross 
section estimation of a carrier’s markup over cost; the 
2nd is a cross section estimation of the ratio of 2 
observed airlines’ prices on a route as a function of 
the ratios of the airlines’ costs, service qualities, and 
shares of traffic on the route and at the endpoints. The 
results indicate that an airline’s share of passengers on 
a route and at the endpoints significantly influences its 














The expected absolute difference in fares between two 
passengers on a route is 36% of the airline’s average 
ticket price. The pattern of observed price dispersion 
cannot easily be explained by cost differences alone. 
Dispersion increases on routes with more competition 
or lower flight density, consistent with discrimination 
based on consumers’ willingness to switch to 
alternative airlines or flights. The data supports 
models of price discrimination in monopolistically 
Data: DOT Q2 1986 




















The impact of price on the overall size of the market is 
measured and the nature, pattern, and extent of 
cannibalization is examined using a set of econometric 
models for overall passenger volume and for each fare 
class share. The analysis shows that: 1. only one class 
of fares expands the market, 2. cannibalization is very 
significant and highly asymmetric, and 3. even small 
deviations from optimal prices substantially reduce 
profit. Based on these estimated models, demand is 
forecasted for air travel and optimal fares are 
calculated.  
Market response and pricing of air 
travel on the Paris-Abidjan, Ivory 
Coast route operated by a French 
airline, Union des Transports 
Aeriens (UTA) is analyzed. 
















Nonresponse and response lag to strategic and tactical 
moves. Competitor dependence leads more often to 
cautious response, and increases response delay, and 
likelihood of reciprocal response. A highly 
irreversible competitive attack has opposite effect. 
 










Nonresponse and response lag to strategic and tactical 
moves. The number of competitors affected by an 
action and the strategic importance of the markets 
under attack increase the number of responses; 
strategic actions reduce the number of responses and 
delay competitive retaliation. 
 









Airport Dominance as measured by share of total 
airport passenger traffic, confers substantial pricing 
power upon the carrier on its routes connecting to the 
DOT 1988 Data 
Fixed effects estimation 




airport. In addition, no significant correlation is found 
between route market share and price. The effect of 
route concentration, while statistically significant, is 
quantitatively unimportant.  
11. (Evans and 
Kessides 
1994) 











Multimarket contact has a strong positive effect on 
prices. Major Airlines set higher fares on routes where 
multimarket contact among competitors is higher 
1000 largest routes in U.S. airline 
industry between 1984 -1988 
DV: Log of average price 
IV: Direct flight, round-trip ticket, 
distance, route market share, 
concentration (route and airport), 
airport market share, multi-market 
contact 
12. (Gatignon 










Variation in marketing mix in response to entry of a 
new competitor was examined. 
Firms retaliate with their most effective marketing 
mix parameters and deemphasize use of less effective 
submixes. Effectiveness was measured in terms of 
elasticities. 
Data from the over-the counter drug 
















Reciprocal multimarket contacts decrease rivalry and 
increase market share sustainability more than 
nonreciprocal multimarket contacts 
DOT data on 48 airlines across 
2897 markets. 
DV: Yield, market share 
IV: Reciprocal and nonreciprocal 
multimarket contact 
Controls: Service attributes, cost 











Multimarket contact strongly decreases rivalry. 
Strategic similarity moderately increases rivalry. 
Higher yields on routes where average multimarket 
DOT data on 48 airlines across 












with competitors is higher.  DV: Yield 
IV: Multimarket contact, Strategic 
similarity 
Controls: Service attributes, 
exogenous market characteristics, 













Multimarket contact is correlated with economies of 
scope. Multimarket contacts have a greater effect on 
prices and performance when they occur in markets 
that share scope economies. 
DOT data on 28 airlines across 
3008 markets from 1984 to 1988 
DV: Cost, price, margin 
IV: multimarket contact, economies 












A framework is presented for market analysis that 
specifically models primary demand, competitive 
reaction, and feedback effects of the market variables. 
This approach is an extension of earlier work on the 
relationship among the elasticities of the marketing 
variables. The model makes several useful marketing 
theoretical contributions, particularly in that it makes 
a sharp distinction between market-expansive and 
competitive effects of the marketing mix variables. 
The principles of the model were applied empirically 
to the case of a city pair of the US domestic air travel 
market, where 3 major airlines compete on the basis 
of flight scheduling and advertising. The analysis 
showed that flight scheduling has a market-expansive 
or a competitive effect, depending on the competitor, 
and that advertising does not have a significant impact 
on performance.  
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The effect of potential entry on performance in airline 
markets is explored empirically. Hypothesis testing 
using regression indicates that structure matters, but it 
is unable to distinguish among 3 alternative 
hypotheses about the particular relationship between 
structure and performance. Perfect contestability is 
rejected by the data. Nonparametric regression trees 
show a similar situation. How structure matters is 
revealed by the regression trees to an extent not 
possible in regression. The most powerful market 
structure explanatory variables are measures of 
concentration that incorporate the number and size 
distribution of incumbents, as well as the number of 
potential entrants that are not significantly deterred by 
economies of scale or scope.  
DOT data. 867 significant nonstop 
city pairs in 1985 
17. (Jayachand
ran et al. 
1999) 










Mutual forbearance, a form of tacit collusion in which 
firms avoid competitive attacks against those rivals 
they meet in multiple markets, is proposed to occur 
because multi-market competition increases the 
familiarity between firms and their ability to deter 
each other. The authors examine how multi-market 
contact increases familiarity and deterrence. They 
provide an extension of the theory of multi-market 
competition by developing a conceptual model that 
identifies competitive and market factors that 
moderate the relationship between the degree of multi-
market contact and the intensity of competition. The 
emphasis is on product line rivalry and entry strategy. 
Non-empirical but central work 






Using a counterfactual research design, changes in 
passenger welfare are determined for 19 US 
 










Policy destination cities for the years 1979, 1983, 1987 on 
the basis of Hicks’ equivalent variation measure. The 
results suggest that travelers to large, long standing 
hub cities were generally insulated from large post-
1979 welfare changes. Travelers to new hubs 
experienced substantial welfare declines between 
1979 and 1987, although their post-1983 welfare 
changes were uniformly positive. Travelers to non-
hub airports had the greatest variances, with both the 
relatively largest welfare gains and the relatively 
largest losses.  











The results show that prices increased on routes 
served by the merging firms relative to a control group 
of routes unaffected by the merger. Mergers may lead 
to more efficient operations, but on the whole, the 
impact of efficiency gains on airfares is more than 
offset by exercise of increased market power. 
Examines price changes associated 
with 14 mergers during 1985-88 
Variables: domestic economy-class 
airfares and number of passengers 
by routes and carriers. 
Ordinary least squares and weighed 
least squares regression was used. 
20. (Mayer et 
al. 1993) 
Consumer 









Integrates economic studies and public opinion 
research by examining consumer opinion (and its 
correlates) in three markets that vary in terms of level 
and kind of concentration in their local markets. 
Majority of respondents across all 3 counties were 
opposed to increased government involvement in both 
airline fares (53.4%) and airline routes (60%).  
Opinions about industry performance and the need for 
government intervention were clearly related to 
perceived and actual conditions. 










Estimates the extent of consumer savings due to 
Southwest for 1998 ($12.8 billion). Southwest’s low 
fares were directly responsible for $3.4 billion of the 
DOT data 
Table I1 (continued) 
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Competition and Policy savings to passengers. The remaining $9.5 billion 
represents the effect that actual, adjacent and potential 
competition from Southwest had on other carriers’ 
fares. The savings amount to 20% of the airline 
industry’s 1998 domestic scheduled passenger 
revenue and slightly more than half the fare reductions 












The operation of market forces in fare determination 
is examined. Yields were calculated for the period, 
and fares and yields were calculated using the same 
methods as during regulation to determine what fares 
would have been if they still were regulated. Industry 
entry and exit rates were studied to determine 
competition levels. Results indicates that fares were 
consistently lower during the past decade of 
deregulation than they would have been under 
continued regulation. Fares fall with increased 
competition, but this effect was limited to slot-
controlled airports. It is suggested that public policy 
should focus on enhancing the effect of competition 















Multimarket contact is related positively to rivalry. 
Market share variation was used as a measure of 
(price and non-price) rivalry. It is shown that 
instability, and hence the degree of rivalry, was 
significantly higher after deregulation. Deregulation 
had a positive effect in all but the very concentrated 
airline markets. 
123 Airline markets during 1974-
1976 and 1978-1980. 
DV: Log of relative market share 
instability 
IV: Concentration, slot constraints 
(dummy), multi-market contacts, 
new entry(dummy), labor 
strike(dummy), deregulation 
(dummy) 












Potential Competition, prices and entry relations in the 
airline industry is studied. Consistent with limit 
pricing models, future entry is directly influenced by 
current prices. Current prices thus appear to provide 
an important signal to potential entrants about the 
probability of profitable entry. The results indicate the 
existence of barriers to entry but these barriers appear 
to have no independent effect on price beyond their 










in the U.S. 
Transportatio
n Journal 
Hub competition contributes directly to increases in 
the number of route competitors and indirectly to 
lower yields on routes. Duopoly hubs are more 
beneficial to consumers than monopoly hubs. 
Regression Analysis 
Note: A review of empirical work in the Airline Industry was provided by Dixit (2000). This Appendix is complementary to his 
review




























Figure J1: Incumbent: Northwest; Route MSP-MCI; Entry: 1995 Q2 





DD: markets dominated by discounters; MD: markets with inter-type competition; 
MM: markets dominated by majors 
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